Urban disaster management: a case study of earthquake risk assessment in Cartago, Costa Rica by Montoya Morales, Ana Lorena
 
 
Urban Disaster Management: 
 
A Case Study of Earthquake Risk Assessment  
 in Cartago, Costa Rica 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
  
 
ITC Publication Series No. 96  
 
Ana Lorena Montoya Morales 
 
 
ITC Publication Series No. 96  
 
Cover Design: Sketch Of Central Cartago In Early Colonial Days  
(From “Archivo De Figueroa”, Courtesy Of National Archives Of Costa Rica) 
 
The research presented in this thesis was performed at the 
International Institute For Geo-Information Science And Earth Observation (ITC) 
P.O. Box 6, 7500 AA Enschede, The Netherlands 
http://www.Itc.nl 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CIP-Data Koninklijke Bibliotheek, Den Haag 
 
© Montoya Morales, Ana Lorena 
 
ISBN 90-6164-2086  
 
All rights reserved. No part of this publication, apart from bibliographic data or brief 
quotations from critical reviews, may be reproduced in any form, by print, photocopy, 
microfilm or any other means, without written permission. 
 
Urban Disaster Management: A Case Study of Earthquake Risk Assessment in Cartago, 
Costa Rica 
Thesis Utrecht University and ITC, With Summaries in Dutch and Spanish  
 
Subject Headings: 
Urban Planning / Disasters / Geographical Information Systems / Remote Sensing / Costa Rica
 
 
Urban Disaster Management: 
 
 
A Case Study of Earthquake Risk Assessment in Cartago, Costa Rica 
 
 
Management van stedelijke rampen: 
 
Een evaluatie van aardbevingsrisico's in Cartago, 
 
Costa Rica. 
 
 
(Met een samenvatting in het Nederlands) 
(Con un Resumen en Español) 
 
 
 
 
 
Proefschrift ter verkrijging van de graad van doctor 
aan de Universiteit Utrecht 
op gezag van de Rector Magnificus, 
Prof. Dr. W.H. Gispen 
ingevolge het besluit van het College voor Promoties 
in het openbaar te verdedigen 
op maandag 2 december 2002 
des ochtends te 10.00 uur 
 
 
 
door 
 
 
Ana Lorena Montoya Morales 
 
geboren op 10 juli 1967 te San José, Costa Rica 
Promotoren:  
 
Prof. Dr. F.I. Masser 
Utrecht University, Faculty of Geographical Sciences 
International Institute for Geo-Information Science and Earth Observation,  
Department of Urban and Regional Planning and Geo-Information Management 
 
 
Dr. Ing. N. Rengers 
International Institute for Geo-Information Science and Earth Observation,  
Department of Earth Observation Systems 
 
 
Prof. Dr. H.F.L. Ottens 
Utrecht University, Faculty of Geographical Sciences, 
Urban Research Centre Utrecht 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  i
Acknowledgements  
 
Over the course of four years of research, discussion, fieldwork, data gathering, processing 
and synthesis, it goes without saying that I have received valuable help from an inestimable 
number of people. To mention each and every one by name would require a second equally 
sized volume of this thesis. However, in a short space, I will try to offer suitable thanks to the 
multitude of contributors, colleagues and friends without whose valuable help and assistance 
I could not have completed this work. 
 
I must firstly thank my three supervisors, Prof. Dr. Ian Masser, Dr. Ing. Niek Rengers and 
Prof. Dr. Henk Ottens for their constant help, guidance and encouragement throughout the 
entire period of my research. I am deeply indebted to them for the stimulation that they have 
provided during countless discussions, and for their ideas on integrating a number of 
independent technologies and methodologies, i.e. Urban Planning, Hazard Mapping, 
Geographic Information Systems and Risk Assessment.   
 
My colleagues (Sherif Amer, Walid Belal, Frans van den Bosch, Mark Brussel, Karen 
Buchanan, Paul Hofstee, Richard Sliuzas, Jan Turkstra, Petra Weber) in what was until 
recently the Division of Urban Planning and Management at ITC, have collectively and 
individually been supportive to me. They have provided me with the much-needed moral 
support to ‘keep going’ and have allowed me to juggle my teaching commitments around my 
research days. My special thanks go to Ayako Kagawa for always being ready to help.  
Similarly, my thanks go to Eric de Man and Luc Boerboom for their kind words of 
encouragement. 
 
Within the walls of ITC a great number of people with very special talents and worldwide 
knowledge work under one roof. To name but a few, Cees van Westen and Nannette 
Kingma have contributed greatly to my understanding of the physical processes, aspects of 
natural hazards and the management of geographic information.  In some cases, they 
provided the sole reference to a useful book or article, and this was highly appreciated. 
 
Much of my data analysis has been performed with the ILWIS software developed at ITC, 
and I am grateful to Jan Hendrikse and Boudewijn van Leeuwen of the ILWIS support group 
for always being ready and willing to help me deal with difficulties, and for their kindness in 
giving up their precious time to answer my questions. 
 
The Mobile GIS Working Group at ITC, especially Ernst Schetselaar, Gabriel Parodi, Wim 
Koolhoven and Rob Lemmens have shared their ideas with me, and have encouraged me 
considerably in the use of this emerging technology.  
 
 
  
  ii
A special thank you must go to Helios Jelema who in the early stages of my work with video 
filming of building facades spent many long hours helping me convert analogue images to 
digital ones.  
 
A large number of support staff at ITC has assisted me in a multitude of ways. In particular,  
Ard Blenke, Harold Borkent, Ard Kosters, Benno Masselink, Gerard Leppink, Job Duim, have 
always been willing to solve technical problems for me, often at the shortest of notice.  
 
Being a foreigner in Holland and not always understanding the long words and intricate 
forms can sometimes be a challenge. Fortunately, the staff of ITC’s Student Affairs 
department has always been there to help solve the impossible. I would particularly like to 
thank Fred Paats, Jan de Ruiter, Bettine Geerdink, Riet Allesie, Andre Klijnstra and Teresa 
van den Boogard for being so understanding and efficient in dealing with the administrative 
pitfalls.  Similarly, Wendy Stiksma, Ginie Osterlaken, May Biervliet, Myriam Ongenae, Frans 
Gollenbeek and Jan Schipper have helped me considerably with travel, logistics, and 
financial arrangements.   
 
I would like to express my thanks to the ITC research coordination team of Prof. Martin Hale 
and Loes Colenbrander for guiding me through the labyrinth of crucial regulations.  
 
The ITC library staff, in particular Carla Gerritsen have been invaluable for obtaining several 
vital books and articles on inter-university library loans, and they deserve special mention. 
 
Ronny Geerdink, Harry Homrighausen and Andries Menning prepared the book cover and 
printed the book. 
 
Tom Scarpas at the Technical University of Delft, Sergio Mora at the Inter-American 
Development Bank, Mohammed Hamza at the Cranfield Disaster Management Centre and 
Hugh Cowan at the Institute of Geological & Nuclear Sciences Ltd. of New Zealand provide 
me with valuable literature material.  Frankie Snyder at FEMA kindly provided me with very 
useful reference material and kindly supplied me with the HAZUS methodology. 
  
As this research was focused on the city of Cartago in Costa Rica, considerable help has 
kindly been provided by a host of institutions and individuals in this country. I would like to 
express my sincere gratitude to the following: 
 
• Gabriela Murillo, Paquita González and Olga Quesada at the CCSS unit of the Ministry 
of Health, for supporting this research throughout in a variety of ways; 
• To CONICIT (National Science and Technology Research Council), in particular to Jorge 
Muñoz, for making a small research grant available for covering some basic research 
costs; 
• Eduardo Brenes, head of the National Urban Development Plan, who provide me with 
statistical figures; 
  iii
• Rolando Mora and Elena Badilla at the School of Geology at the University of Costa Rica 
for making hazard zonation maps and relevant material available; 
• Virginia Chacón, head of the National Archives, provided me with valuable literature 
material including the image for the book cover. 
• The Municipality of Cartago, in particular Eloísa Sáenz, for making digital cadastral base 
mapping available; 
• Eduardo Bedoya, head of IGN as well as the late Carlos Elizondo, for providing me with 
valuable aerial photography and base maps.  
• Alejandro Nieto and Carlos Mena kindly allowed me to ‘take bits off’ their aeroplane and 
then still took me flying to obtain some magnificent oblique aerial photographs of 
Cartago; 
• The staff at the information centre of the National Statistics and Census Bureau (INEC), 
who provided me with census data; 
• Franz Sauter provided most valuable data on damage curves as well as important 
reference material. 
 
I am very grateful to my dear friends, Javier Martínez, Lyande Eelderink, Ruben Vargas, 
Martin Blankestijn, and the Morales ‘tribe’ for moral support and friendship.  Such kind and 
reliable people are such a blessing in this world. 
 
My fellow PhD candidates: Narciso Barrera, Cheng Jianquan, Citlali López, Boniface Oluoch 
Oindo, Ale Raza, Tetra Yanuariadi, Huang Zhengdong, for not only sharing the pain but also 
for the important bits of “intelligence”.  
 
Victor and Margreet Pollé spent a considerable amount of time translating the summary into 
Dutch, thus allowing me to overcome the last major hurdle in this long process.  
 
My sincere thanks to Janice Collins, who’s dedicated editing helped to put this thesis into 
proper English. 
 
Finally, I would like to thank the members of the committee that reviewed the manuscript: 
• Dr. T.W.J. van Asch 
• Prof. Dr. J.L. van Genderen 
• Dr. M.K. McCall 
• Prof. Dr. W.H. van den Toorn 
• Prof. Dr. O. Verkoren 
 
  iv
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
To John and the Montoyas  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  v 
Table of Contents 
 
 Acknowledgments ………………………………………………………… i 
 Table of Contents ………………………………………………………….. v 
 List of Tables ……………………………………………………………….. viii 
 List of Figures ……………………………………………………………… ix 
 List of Acronyms ……………………………………………..……………. xii 
   
 Chapter One:  INTRODUCTION …………………………………………. 1 
1.1 Hazards in Urban Areas ……………………………………………………. 1 
1.2 Problem Statement …………………………………………………………. 9 
1.3 Research Objectives ……………………………………………………….. 9 
1.4 The Choice of a Case Study ………………………………………………. 10 
1.5 Outline of the Dissertation …………………………………………………. 11 
2 Chapter Two:  LITERATURE REVIEW …………………………………. 15 
2.1 Scope for Improvement …………………………………………………….. 15 
2.2 The Thinking Process in Hazard-Prone Urban Areas …………………... 16 
2.2.1 Deriving Risk ………………………………………………………………… 16 
2.2.2 Acceptable Risk ……………………………………………………………... 17 
2.2.3 Risk Prevention and Reduction ……………………………………………. 19 
2.2.4 Risk Perception ……………………………………………………………… 23 
2.2.5 Financial Victims…………………………………………………………….. 25 
2.2.6 Cost-Benefit Analysis ………………………………………………………. 28 
2.3 The Need for Networks in Urban Disaster Management ……………….. 31 
2.4 Complexity of Urban Disaster Management ……………………………... 34 
2.5 Conclusions ………………………………………………………………….. 35 
 Chapter Three:  DESCRIBING THE EARTHQUAKE PHENOMENON  37 
3.1 Physical Parameters of Natural Hazards ………………………………… 37 
3.2 Seismic Hazard ……………………………………………………………… 39 
3.2.1 Faults and Seismic Waves ………………………………………………… 39 
3.2.2 Earthquake-Related Hazards ……………………………………………… 40 
3.2.3 Magnitude and Intensity of Earthquakes …………………………………. 42 
3.2.4 Earthquake Prediction ……………………………………………………… 44 
3.2.5 Ground Motion ………………………………………………………………. 48 
3.2.6 Site Effects …………………………………………………………………... 49 
3.2.7 Building Response ………………………………………………………….. 51 
3.3 Conclusions …………………………………………………………………. 55 
 Chapter Four:  METHODOLOGY REVIEW …………………………….. 57 
4.1 Introduction ………………………………………………………………….. 57 
4.1.1 Small-Scale Approaches …………………………………………………… 57 
4.1.2 Large-Scale Approaches …………………………………………………… 61 
  vi
4.2 Problems Detected …………………………………………………………. 69 
4.2.1 Risk Modelling ………………………………………………………………. 69 
4.2.2 Data Capture ………………………………………………………………… 71 
4.3 Conclusions ………………..………………………………………………… 72 
 Chapter Five:  METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH ……………………. 73 
5.1 Conceptual Model ……….………………………………………………….. 73 
5.2  Input Requirements …………………………………………………………. 77 
5.3 Data Capture ………………………………………………………………… 80 
5.3.1 Classification of Buildings ………………………………………………….. 81 
5.3.2 Remote Sensing …………………………………………………………….. 83 
5.3.3 Ground Data Capture ………………………………………………………. 84 
5.3.4 Data Manipulation …………………………………………………………... 87 
5.4 Stratified Sampling ………………………………………………………….. 92 
5.5 Conclusions ………………………………………………………………….. 94 
 Chapter Six:  NATIONAL PLANNING POLICY AND LEGAL ……….. 
FRAMEWORK 
95 
6.1 Introduction ………………………………………………………………….. 95 
6.2 Organic Law of the National Housing and Urbanism Institute (INVU) 97 
6.3 Urban Planning Law ………………………………………………………… 97 
6.4 Law of the National Commission for the Prevention of and Response .. 
to Emergencies (CNE) 
103 
6.5 Centre for Prevention of Natural Disasters in Central America ……..…. 
(CEPREDENAC) 
105 
6.6 Civil Code ……………………………………………………………………. 107 
6.7  Law of the Federated Board of Engineers and Architects of Costa Rica 
(CFIA) 
107 
6.8 Law for the Establishment of an Anti-Seismic Code for Civil Works ….. 109 
6.9 National Statistics System Law ……………………………………………. 110 
6.10 Constitutional Jurisdiction Law and Parliamentary Ombudsman Law … 111 
6.11 Conclusions ………………………………………………………………….. 112 
 Chapter Seven:  THE CASE OF CARTAGO …………………………… 113 
7.1 Justification of Case Selection ……………………………………………. 113 
7.2 Historical Background ………………………………………………………. 114 
7.3 Human Perception of Disasters …………………………………………… 126 
7.4 Natural Hazards …………………………………………………………….. 127 
7.5 Available Datasets ………………………………………………………….. 133 
7.5.1 National Housing and Population Census  …………….………………… 133 
7.5.2 Hazard Mapping …………………………………………………..………… 135 
7.5.3 Municipal Cadastre and Strategic Plan……………………………………. 135 
7.5.4  The National Geographic Institute (IGN) .………………………………… 136 
7.5.5 The National Insurance Institute (INS) ……………………………………. 137 
7.5.6  Other Institutions ……………………………………………………………. 138 
  vii 
7.5.7 National Spatial Data Infrastructure Initiative…………………………….. 139 
7.6 Conclusions ………………………………………………………………….. 139 
 Chapter Eight:  RISK IN CARTAGO’S URBAN PLANNING ……...…. 
PROCESS 
141 
8.1 Essential Buildings ………………………………………………………….. 141 
8.2 Homogeneous Areas ……………………………………………………….. 144 
8.3 Risk Assessment Results ………………………………………………….. 146 
8.3.1 Hazard Assessment ………………………………………………………… 146 
8.3.2 Vulnerability Assessment and Elements at Risk ………………………… 150 
8.3.3.  Risk Assessment ……………………………………………………………. 155 
8.4  Cost Benefit Analysis of Mitigation Strategies …………………………… 159 
8.4.1 Development Scenario ……………………………………………………... 159 
8.4.2 Redevelopment Scenario ………………………………………………….. 161 
8.5 Conclusions ………………………………………………………………….. 167 
 Chapter Nine:  CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ………. 169 
9.1 Conclusions ………………………………………………………………….. 169 
9.1.1  Data Capture Methodology ………………………………………………… 169 
9.1.2 Data Production and Integration …………………………………………... 170 
9.1.3 Strategy Development and Cost-Benefit Analysis ………………………. 175 
9.1.4 The Multi-Hazard Probability-Based Approach to Disaster …………….. 
Management 
178 
9.1.5 Information Infrastructure and Networks …………………………………. 179 
9.1.6 The Role of Academia ……………………………………………………… 182 
9.2 Recommendations for Further Research ………………………………… 182 
9.3 Final Remarks ……………………………………………………………….. 183 
   
 List of References …………………………………………………………. 185 
 Appendix I – Modified Mercalli Intensity Scale ………………………. 193 
 Appendix II – European Macroseismic Scale 1998 ………………….. 194 
 Appendix III – Building Configuration …………………………………. 198 
 Appendix IV – Day / Night Casualties ………………………………….. 199 
 Appendix V – Damage by Probability Scenario ……………………… 200 
 Appendix VI – Calculation of Human Capital ………………………… 203 
 Summary ……………………………………………………………………. 205 
 Samenvatting ……………………….……………………………………… 208 
 Resumen ………………….………………………………………………… 212 
 Curriculum Vitae …………………………………………………………… 217 
 
  viii
List of Tables 
 
Note:  all tables are the original work of the author unless otherwise stated. 
 
Table 1.1 Potential Effects of Natural Hazards …………………………………….. 2 
Table 1.2 Human Reactions to Natural Disasters………………………………...… 4 
Table 3.1 Frequency of Occurrence of Earthquakes Based on Observations…...  
since 1900 
38 
Table 3.2 Soil Factors Affecting PGA………………………………………………… 50 
Table 3.3 Natural Periods and Frequencies per Building Height ……..………….. 51 
Table 4.1 EDRI Sample Analysis Indicators ………………………………….…….. 60 
Table 4.2 DPM for Wood-Frame Structure Type According to MMI ……………... 61 
Table 4.3 Injury Classification Scale ………………………………………………… 65 
Table 5.1 Summary of Input Data Required ………………………………………… 78 
Table 5.2 Capture Methods …………………………………………………………... 82 
Table 6.1 CEPREDENAC Strategy ….………………………………………………. 106 
Table 6.2 Phases in the Construction Process …………………………………….. 108 
Table 6.3  Minimum Temporary Design Loads ……………………………………… 110 
Table 7.1 Classification of Land-Uses in 1991 Land-Use Mapping ……………… 136 
Table 8.1 Buildings Classified According to Relevance for Emergency Activities  141 
Table 8.2 Distance from House to Temporary Roofed Accommodation ………… 144 
Table 8.3 Homogeneous Areas ……………………………………………………… 144 
Table 8.4 Slope (in Degrees) …………………………………………………………. 146 
Table 8.5. MMI Values in Study Area and in GAM………………………………….. 148 
Table 8.6 Implications of Ground Shaking Intensity on Building Damage ………. 151 
Table 8.7 Urban Growth ………………………………………………………………. 152 
Table 8.8 Percentage of Building Types According to Growth Periods …………. 153 
Table 8.9 Distribution of Population during the Daytime …………….…………….. 155 
Table 8.10 Population Densities for the Night and Day Scenarios ………………… 155 
Table 8.11 Building Damage by Building Type ………………………………………. 156 
Table 8.12 Building Damage per Severity Level …………………………………….. 156 
Table 8.13 Number of Injuries per Injury Level and Type of Scenario ……………. 159 
Table 8.14 Proposed Modifiers to the Construction Permit Rates …..…………….. 160 
Table 8.15 Total Building Losses per Mitigation Scenario …………………………. 162 
Table 8.16 Annual Building Losses and Mitigation Reduction Factor …………….. 163 
Table 8.17 Calculation of Lost Human Capital ………………………………………. 164 
Table 8.18 Annual Population Losses and Mitigation Reduction Factor ………….. 165 
Table 8.19 Benefits of Mitigation Scenarios ………………………………………….. 166 
 
  ix
List of Figures 
 
Note:  all figures are the original work of the author unless otherwise stated. 
 
Figure 1.1 World Urbanisation Trends ………………………………………………... 3 
Figure 1.2  Deaths per 100,000 Inhabitants through Floods in the USA …………... 3 
Figure 1.3  Disaster Management Phases ……………………………………………. 7 
Figure 1.4 Schematic Map of the City of Cartago …………………………………… 10 
Figure 1.5 Flow-chart of the Dissertation …………………………………………….. 13 
Figure 2.1 Conceptual Flow-chart of Risk Assessment …………………………….. 17 
Figure 2.2 Range of Implementation Strategies ……………………………………... 20 
Figure 2.3 Decision-Making Process………………………………………………….. 21 
Figure 2.4 Perception of Damage and Probability…………………………………… 26 
Figure 2.5  Benefit-Cost Ratios ………………...………………………………………. 29 
Figure 2.6  Three Crucial Information Sets for Strategy Formulation in Hazard- .… 
prone Urban Areas 
31 
Figure 2.7  Members of a Disaster Information Network…………………………….. 33 
Figure 3.1  Triggering Effects by Various Natural Phenomena……………………… 39 
Figure 3.2  Classification of Earthquake-Related Natural Hazards ………………… 40 
Figure 3.3  Determination of Richter Magnitude by Means of Nomogram ………… 43 
Figure 3.4  Attenuation Curves …………………………………………………………. 45 
Figure 3.5  PGA – Intensity Relationships …………………………………………….. 46 
Figure 3.6  Gutenberg and Richter Relationship ……………………………………... 47 
Figure 3.7 Ground Motion ……………………………………………………………… 48 
Figure 3.8  Path Effects of Seismic Waves …………………………………………… 49 
Figure 3.9  Site Effects on Ground Motion ……………………………………………. 50 
Figure 3.10 Building Height, Stiffness and Period ……………………………………. 52 
Figure 3.11 Ground Acceleration Record ……………………………………………… 52 
Figure 3.12 Simplified Response Spectra ……………………………………………... 53 
Figure 3.13 Acceleration, Inertial Forces ………………………………………………. 54 
Figure 4.1  Comparison of EDRI Results …………………….……………………….. 58 
Figure 4.2  Conceptual Framework of EDRI …..……………………………………… 59 
Figure 4.3 Comparison of Building Vulnerability for Two Types of Structures …… 62 
Figure 4.4  Example of Building Capacity Curve ……………………………………... 63 
Figure 4.5  Example of Fragility Curves ……………………………………………….. 64 
Figure 4.6  Conceptual Flow Methodology of Casualty Estimation ………………… 66 
Figure 4.7  Types of Earthquake Damage Data ……………………………………… 68 
Figure 5.1 Risk Assessment Conceptual Model …………………………………….. 74 
Figure 5.2  Flow-chart of Population Risk Estimation per Damage Severity Class .  75 
Figure 5.3  Flow-chart of Data Integration Leading to Building Risk Assessment ... 76 
Figure 5.4  Flow-chart of Data Integration Leading to Population Risk ………….… 
Assessment  
77 
  x 
Figure 5.5  Flow-chart of Day Population Modelling ………………….……………… 80 
Figure 5.6  Flow-chart of Building Inventory Data Capture Methodology …….……. 81 
Figure 5.7  City Centre of Cartago:  Mixed Land-uses and Mixed Use of Building 
Materials and Structural Types……………………………………………. 
83 
Figure 5.8  Industrial Estate in Cartago: Single Land-use and Homogeneous …… 
Building Materials and Structural Type (Pre-cast Reinforced Concrete)
83 
Figure 5.9  Low-income Housing in Cartago: Single Land-use and Homogeneous 
Building Materials and Structural Type (Reinforced Masonry)…………. 
83 
Figure 5.10 Example of Portable Equipment ………………………………………….. 85 
Figure 5.11 Coverage Calculation ……………………………………………………… 86 
Figure 5.12 Limitation of Extent of Video Image Interpretation ……………………… 87 
Figure 5.13 Entity-Relationship Model …………………………………………………. 88 
Figure 5.14 Use of GPS and Digital Video for Building Inventory Generation ..…… 89 
Figure 5.15 Series of Captured Images from Digital Video ………………………….. 90 
Figure 5.16 Flow chart of Point Offset Procedure for Thiessen Map Generation …. 91 
Figure 5.17 Steps in the Building Sampling Process …………………………………. 92 
Figure 5.18 Conceptual Diagram of Stratified Random Sampling …………………... 93 
Figure 6.1 Levels of Decision-Making ………………………………………………… 96 
Figure 6.2 Stakeholders in the Regulation of the Construction Process …………. 96 
Figure 6.3 Seismic Zones ……………………………………………………………… 102 
Figure 6.4 Liability and Incentives in Urban Development …………………………. 112 
Figure 7.1 Location of Major Cities in Costa Rica …………………………………… 113 
Figure 7.2 Typical Costa Rican Native Palenque ……..…………………….………. 114 
Figure 7.3 Cartago’s Road Layout Design by de Anguciana in 1572 …….……….. 117 
Figure 7.4 Occupation of Building Blocks During First Century ……………………. 118 
Figure 7.5 Typical Adobe Walls ……………………………………………………….. 119 
Figure 7.6 Cartago’s Road Layout in 1690 …………………………………………… 120 
Figure 7.7 Location of the Various Cities in the Central Valley …………………….. 121 
Figure 7.8 Ruins of the Parish Church at Cartago …………………………………... 123 
Figure 7.9 Typical Bahareque Wall …………………………………………………… 124 
Figure 7.10 Mixed Adobe and Corrugated Metal Walls ………………………………. 124 
Figure 7.11 Typical Reinforced Concrete Residential Construction ………………… 125 
Figure 7.12 Evolution of Building Vulnerability in Cartago throughout its History ... 
(conceptual) 
126 
Figure 7.13 Triggering Effects of Natural Phenomena in Cartago ………………….. 127 
Figure 7.14 Digital Elevation Model ……………………………………………………. 128 
Figure 7.15: Seismic Faults and River Network in Cartago …………………………... 129 
Figure 7.16 Peak Ground Acceleration ………………………………………………… 130 
Figure 7.17 Squatter Occupation of the Floodplain Inside the Perimeter of the …… 
Reventado River Dyke 
131 
Figure 7.18 Urban Growth of Cartago ………………………………………………….. 132 
Figure 7.19 Aggregation of Census Tracts to District Level …………………….…… 134 
  xi
Figure 7.20 Land-use Map Based on 1991 Analogue 1:10,000 Sheet ……………... 137 
Figure 7.21 Vulnerability Curves for Costa Rica ………………………………………. 138 
Figure 7.22 Earthquake Probability in Cartago ………………………………………... 139 
Figure 8.1 Distribution of Buildings According to their Importance for Emergency 
Operations 
142 
Figure 8.2 Proximity to Temporary Accommodation ………………………………… 143 
Figure 8.3 Identification of Homogeneous Non-Essential Built Areas …………….. 145 
Figure 8.4 Regulation to Prevent Damage due to Landslides ……………………… 147 
Figure 8.5.   Map of Hazard Intensity Values of the Study Area ……………………... 148 
Figure 8.6 Regulations and Recommendations to Prevent Damage from Ground  
Rupture 
149 
Figure 8.7 Urban Growth ……………………………………………………………….. 151 
Figure 8.8 Population Density (Night Scenario and Day Scenario) ……………….. 154 
Figure 8.9 Building Damage Ratios …………………………………………………… 157 
Figure 8.10 Minor Injuries ……………………………………………………………….. 158 
Figure 8.11 Zonation for Development …………………………………………………. 160 
Figure 8.12 Total Building Losses ………………………………………………………. 162 
Figure 8.13 Annual Building Losses …………………………………….……………… 163 
Figure 8.14 Total Casualty Losses ……………………………………………………... 164 
Figure 8.15 Annual Casualty Losses …………………………………….…………….. 165 
Figure 8.16 Cost-Benefit Analysis per Mitigation Strategy …………………………... 166 
Figure 9.1 Steel Bracing for Reinforcing Concrete Frames without Proper ..…….. 
Seismic Resistant Design 
177 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  xii 
List of Acronyms 
 
ACI American Concrete Association 
ADB Asian Development Bank 
ASTM American Society for Testing of Materials 
ATC Applied Technology Council 
BCR Benefit-Cost Ratio 
CATIE International Centre for Tropical Agriculture (Costa Rica) 
CBO Community Based Organisation 
CEPREDENAC Centre for the Prevention of National Disasters in Central America 
CFIA Federated Board of Engineers and Architects (Costa Rica) 
CNE National Commission for the Prevention of Risks and Response to 
Emergencies (Costa Rica) 
CRED Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters 
DEM Digital Elevation Model 
DIN Disaster Information Network 
DMC’s Developing Member Countries (of Asian Development Bank) 
DPM Damage Probability Matrix 
DV Digital Video 
EDRI Earthquake Disaster Risk Index 
EMS European Macroseismic Scale 
ERD Earthquake Resistant Damage 
FEMA Federal Emergency Planning Agency 
GAM Greater Metropolitan Area 
GDIN Global Disaster Information Network 
GDP Gross Domestic Product 
GIS Geographic Information System 
GNP Gross National Product 
GPS Global Positioning System 
HAZUS Hazards United States: Software for standardized, national methodology 
for assessing losses from natural hazards. 
IDNDR International Decade for Disaster Reduction 
IFAM Institute for the Assistance and Stimulation of Municipalities (Costa Rica) 
IGAC Instituto Geográfico Agustin Codazzi (Colombia) 
IGN Instituto Geográfico Nacional (of Costa Rica) 
IKONOS First commercial satellite to collect images with one-meter resolution.  
IKONOS is derived from the Greek word for "image." 
INEC National Statistics and Census Institute (Costa Rica) 
INS National Insurance Institute (Costa Rica)  
INVU National Housing and Urbanism Institute (Costa Rica) 
ITC International Institute for Geo-information Science and Earth Observation 
ITCR Technological Institute of Costa Rica 
  xiii
JPG Image file Extension: JPEG Joint Photographic Expert Group 
MDF Mean Damage Factor 
MIDEPLAN Ministry of Planning and Economic Policy (Costa Rica) 
MINAE Ministry of Natural Resources and the Environment 
MINVA Ministry of Housing and Human Settlements  (Costa Rica) 
MMI Modified Mercalli Intensity 
MMWR Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report 
MOPT Ministry of Transport (Costa Rica) 
MS Ministry of Health (Costa Rica) 
MSK Medredev-Sponhhuer-Karnik 
NCIP National Capital Investment Program 
NDIN National Disaster Information Network 
NETC National Emergency Training Center 
NGO Non-Governmental Organisation 
NIBS National Institute of Building Sciences 
OAS Organisation of American States 
PESH Potential Earth Science Hazards 
PGA Peak Ground Acceleration 
PROCIG Central American Project for Geographic Information 
RECOPE Government-owned Costa Rican Petroleum Refinery  
RMS Risk Management Systems Corporation Inc. 
SEN National Statistics System (Costa Rica) 
SICA Central American Integration System 
TIFF Image file Extension: Tagged Image File Format 
UCR University of Costa Rica 
UN United Nations 
USGS United States Geological Survey 
WWW World Wide Web 
 
  xiv
  1
Chapter One:  INTRODUCTION 
 
This chapter describes the thematic context of the study, the main problem to be 
addressed and the research objectives.  In terms of the thematic context, the effects of 
natural hazards in urban areas are documented.  It addresses the need to produce 
forecasts of possible loss (of human life and property) attributable to the different 
hazardous events that could take place, in order to establish the cost-benefit of alternatives 
and ensure successful urban policy policies and adequate economic resource allocation.  
 
1.1  HAZARDS IN URBAN AREAS 
 
Hazards are part of the environment in which we live.  It is impossible to live in a totally 
hazard-free environment since each day one inevitably faces some degree of personal risk 
from road accidents, fire, theft, floods, etc.  A hazard can therefore be defined as a 
threatening event. 
 
Some authors classify hazards according to the triggering reason: voluntary hazards (e.g. 
smoking, paragliding) and involuntary hazards (e.g. fire, earthquake).  Others classify 
hazards into three classes according to their nature: 
 
• Technological hazards are those accidental failures of design or management affecting 
large-scale structures and transport systems, or industrial activities that present life-
threatening risks to the local community (Smith 1996). 
• Natural hazards result from those elements of the physical environment harmful to Man 
and caused by forces extraneous to him (Burton et al. in Smith 1996). 
• Human-induced natural hazards are those that are caused by the human modification of 
the environment. 
 
Threats posed by hazards are classified by the type of loss they cause (see Table 1.1):  
direct (or primary) losses and indirect (or secondary) losses.  They are also categorised 
according to their potential effects (see Table 1.1): hazards with a) social or human effects, 
b) with physical effects and c) with economic effects.  
 
Natural hazards are dynamic and uncertain processes − dynamic because they do not 
always happen in isolation (as one event could trigger another, e.g. an earthquake could 
trigger a landslide) and because they can reshape the environment; uncertain because 
their occurrence is generally difficult to forecast.  Natural disasters can be defined as the 
impact of natural hazards upon a vulnerable community, resulting in disruption, damage 
and casualties that cannot be relieved by the unaided capacity of locally-mobilised 
resources (United Nations Disaster Relief Co-ordinator 1991).  Smith (1996), however, 
points out that there is no universally agreed definition of the scale on which loss has to 
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occur in order to qualify an event as a disaster, although most disasters do have a number 
of common features: 
 
• The origin of the hazardous event is clear and produces characteristic threats to human 
life or well-being (e.g. a flood causes death by drowning). 
• The warning time is normally short; hazards are often rapid-onset events.  This means 
that occurrences can be unexpected even though they occur within a known hazard 
zone, such as the floodplain of a small river basin. 
• Most of the direct losses, whether of life or property, are suffered fairly shortly after the 
event, typically within minutes or hours. 
• The exposure to hazard, or assumed risk, is largely involuntary, normally due to the 
location of people in a hazardous area, such as the unplanned expansion of cities onto 
unstable hill slopes. 
• The disaster occurs with an intensity that justifies an emergency response, such as the 
provision of specialist aid to victims.  The scale of response can vary from local to 
international. 
 
 Social or Human Effects Physical Effects Economic Effects 
Primary  
Effects 
- Fatalities 
- Injuries 
- Loss of income or 
employment opportunities 
- Homelessness 
- Ground deformation and 
loss of ground quality 
- Collapse of and structural 
damage to buildings and 
infrastructure 
- Non-structural damage, 
loss of ground quality for 
buildings and 
infrastructure 
- Interruption of business due 
to damage to buildings and 
infrastructure 
- Loss of productive workforce 
through fatalities, injuries 
and relief efforts 
- Capital costs of response 
and relief 
 
Secondary 
Effects 
- Disease or permanent 
disability 
- Psychological impact of 
injury, bereavement, shock 
- Loss of social cohesion 
due to disruption of 
community 
- Political unrest where 
government response is 
perceived as inadequate 
- Progressive deterioration 
of damaged buildings and 
infrastructure which are 
not repaired 
- Losses borne by insurance 
industry, weakening the 
insurance market and 
increasing premiums 
- Loss of markets and trade 
opportunities through short-
term business interruption 
- Loss of confidence by 
investors, withdrawal of 
investment 
- Capital costs of repair 
 
Table 1.1:  Potential Effects of Natural Hazards (Solway 1999) 
 
According to projections made by the United Nations in 1996, by the beginning of the XXI 
century, half of the world's population will live and work in urban areas and, according to 
projections, the percentage of urban dwellers and urban workers will continue to increase 
during the XXI century (see Figure 1.1).   
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Figure 1.1:  World Urbanisation Trends (United Nations Centre for Human Settlements 1996)  
 
By concentrating population, buildings, infrastructure and economic activities into small 
areas, the greater interplay between the different urban elements that exist creates higher 
vulnerability indices compared with the same elements widely spread in a rural 
environment.  A multiplying effect occurs in urban areas and, therefore, losses due to 
natural hazards are usually much more severe than in rural areas. For this reason, more 
than ever before, the issues of urban planning and disaster management are crucial in 
ensuring adequate social, economic and environmental conditions.  
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Figure 1.2:  Deaths per 100,000 Inhabitants through Floods in the USA 
(data sources: US Census Bureau (1999) and US National Weather Service (1985-1996) 
  
It must be noted at this point that it is not the researcher’s intention to adopt the apocalyptic 
view that others have.  While it is correct to say that there has been an increase in disaster 
losses, it is important to keep in mind that there has also been an increase in the population 
and, consequently, an increase in the number of “urban elements” and therefore of 
“elements at risk”.  For example, a rate of damage depicted as “3.4 casualties per 100,000 
population in Alameda County” (MMWR 1989) is here considered the correct way of 
depicting losses, as only through relative figures can conclusions be drawn.  Moreover, as 
can be observed in Figure 1.2, the mitigation measures already implemented throughout the 
world have proved to have prevented the rate of deaths resulting from natural disasters from 
increasing.  Due to improved weather warning systems, there seems to be a worldwide trend 
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towards a considerable reduction in loss of life − especially loss through floods, landslides 
and hurricanes.  However, this trend does not apply to property damage.  This phenomenon 
highlights the problem of uneven effort and research in some areas. 
 
Reaction Stage Time Relative to Event 
Positive Negative 
1 Before event Understand warnings, 
preparedness 
Panic, fear 
2 During event “What should we do?” Fatalism, “Act of God” 
3 1 min. to 1 day after event Response by survivors, initial 
search and rescue 
Looting, sight-seeing adding to 
traffic chaos 
4 1 day to 1 week after event Community effort, search and 
rescue by emergency services 
Increase in price of basic food and 
commodities 
5 1 week to 1 month after 
event 
Provision of temporary camps, 
burial of dead, analysis of 
problems 
Provision of wrong food and 
medicine, disposal of dead 
6 1 month to 1 year after 
event 
Clear up debris, commitment to 
major rehabilitation projects, 
international funds 
Provision of unsuitable and 
unacceptable temporary 
accommodation, allocation of 
blame, corruption and misuse of 
emergency funds 
7 1 to 5 years Some mitigation work, some 
progress on rehabilitation 
No visible evidence of damage, 
bureaucracy and aid fund 
accountability delays rehabilitation 
and reconstruction 
8 5 to 30 years Increased mitigation work, review 
preparedness and response 
programmes 
Conflicting objectives lead to 
relaxation of building regulations to 
reduce cost of social housing, 
smaller event produces same effect 
on target city 
9 Until next major event in 
100, 200 or 500 years 
Steady programme of mitigation 
work 
“Not happened in my lifetime”, no 
votes for mitigation, funding 
reallocated 
 
Table 1.2:  Human Reactions to Natural Disasters (adapted from Solway 1999) 
 
A paradox exists, however, between the outstanding achievements in science, which make 
life safer and healthier (and have made it possible to land men on the Moon and clone both 
plants and animals), and the slow reduction in the rate of damage attributable to “natural 
hazards” and the horrific rise in the number of deaths from the AIDS virus in Africa.  The 
paradox is complicated by the fact that science itself is not without hazard and has led to the 
relatively recent “man-made” threats caused by the failure of technological systems, the 
catastrophe at Chernobyl (1986) and the oil spill from the Juan Valdez in Alaska (1989) 
being two good examples.  The paradox is further complicated by the social perspective (see 
Table 1.2). As Solway (1999) pointed out, interest in disaster preparedness is proportional to 
the recency and magnitude of the last disaster that took place.  
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Natural disasters can destroy decades of human effort and investment.  Since natural 
disasters can have a strong negative impact on long-term development, they are a threat to 
sustainable development.  In addition to the direct social and economic impact, natural 
disasters affect employment, the balance of trade and foreign indebtedness for years after 
their occurrence, and funds intended for development are often diverted into costly relief 
efforts (Organisation of American States (OAS) 1991). Following Hurricane Caesar (1996), 
the Costa Rican government suspended the National Census in order to divert the funds into 
the reconstruction of bridges and road sections that had been destroyed or damaged.  
According to Tucker, Trumbull et al. (1994), earthquake-caused fiscal losses represent a 
greater percentage of the gross national products (GNP) of developing countries than of 
developed countries.  For example, the 1972 Managua earthquake cost US$ 5 billion and 
represented 40% of Nicaragua’s GNP, while the Northridge (Los Angeles) earthquake 
caused losses of US$ 30 billion, which represents less than 1% of the USA’s GNP and about 
8% of the GNP for the Greater Los Angeles area.   
 
According to ISL (1999), the economic losses attributed to the Turkish earthquakes of 1999 
have reached as high as US$ 30 billion, costing the Turkish government 1% of its GNP in 
1999 and 2% in 2000. Parker, Kreimer et al. (1995) consider that more meaningful than the 
comparison of earthquake expenditure with GNP is its comparison with the National Capital 
Investment Program (NCIP).  Capital for development projects and infrastructure is a 
valuable resource and essential for development planning.  The total cost of the Turkish 
earthquake of 1983 was equivalent to just under 2% of the entire 1983 NCIP for Turkey.  A 
sum equivalent to the cost of the earthquake, 2% of the NCIP, was spent on public housing 
throughout Turkey in 1982.  Slightly more than 2% was invested in public health services, 
while educational facilities accounted for just over 4%.  In this context it can be seen that the 
loss of similar sums of money to replace the damaged building stock is a severe penalty that 
drains funds needed elsewhere and can slow down the country’s economic development.  
 
Benson (1998) believes that as one moves from developing to highly developed economies, 
the nature of a disaster’s impact alters.  The absolute cost of physical damage increases but 
its relative cost (as a proportion of national or local wealth) decreases; and the number of 
lives lost also declines.  For example, in the USA Hurricane Andrew (1992) caused damage 
estimated at US$ 22 billion (equivalent to 0.3% of GNP) but only 14 people lost their lives.  In 
contrast, in the Philippines Typhoon Angela (1995) caused losses of US$ 63 million 
(equivalent to 0.1% of GNP) but the death toll reached 916.  It is estimated that per capita 
losses of the GNP in developing countries are 20 times greater than in the developed 
countries (Clarke and Munasinghe 1994). The somewhat extreme examples of Bangladesh 
and Turkey help one to understand the meaning of disaster losses for the economy of a less 
developed country.  According to Rahman (in Caballeros Otero and Zapata Martí 1994), 
more than 5% of Bangladesh’s GNP is lost annually to recurrent natural disasters.  Erdik 
(1994) pointed out that Turkey annually allocates, on average, about 1.5% of its national 
budget just for rural housing construction after earthquake disasters. 
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The greater losses through natural disasters in the developing world highlight differences in 
terms of the weakness of the economies, the perception of people towards natural disasters 
and the scant attention that has been paid to disaster management.  For example, Tucker, 
Trumbull et al. (1994) illustrate the disparity between earthquake threat and earthquake 
mitigation effort in developing and developed nations by analysing the number of attendees 
at the World Conference of Earthquake Engineering over a period of 35 years.  While the 
ratio of attendees from developing countries has remained approximately constant, for 
developed nations the value has increased 400-fold. Unfortunately, as pointed out by 
Mitchell (1998), until very recently, disaster management and long-term development tended 
to be seen as distinct entities instead of being inextricably linked and part of the same 
ongoing process.  Moreover, in many countries disaster response has been the only form of 
disaster management carried out.  The Yokohama Message stated “disaster response alone 
is not sufficient, as it yields only temporary results at a very high cost. We have followed this 
limited approach for too long” (United Nations 1994). 
  
Waugh (2000) points out that disaster management involves actions and demands resources 
beyond the means of individuals and family groups.  Indeed, threats to life and property from 
nature and from humankind encourage the development of communities to pool resources in 
order to find common solutions.   
 
Disaster management should consist of an organised effort to mitigate against, prepare for, 
respond to, and recover from a disaster (Federal Emergency Management Agency, National 
Emergency Training Center et al. 1998). The following definitions describe each of the 
phases of this disaster management cycle (see Figure 1.3): 
  
• Mitigation relates to pre-activities that actually eliminate or reduce the chance or the 
effects of a disaster.  Mitigation activities involve assessing the risk and reducing the 
potential effects of disasters, as well as post-disaster activities to reduce the potential 
damage of future disasters.  Examples of mitigation mechanisms include land-use 
regulations, engineering works, building codes and insurance programmes.  
• Response refers to activities that occur during and immediately following a disaster.  
They are designed to provide emergency assistance to victims of the event and reduce 
the likelihood of secondary damage.  Response activities include search and rescue, 
evacuation, emergency medical services and fire-fighting, as well as reducing the 
likelihood of secondary effects, for example to the contents of damaged buildings.  Local 
government officials, as well as the community itself, constitute the ”first responders” and 
therefore have to handle disasters for hours or even days before state and foreign 
resources arrive on the scene. 
• Preparedness consists of planning how to respond in case an emergency or disaster 
occurs and working to increase the resources available to respond effectively.  
Preparedness covers contingency planning, resource management, mutual aid and 
  7
cooperative agreements with other jurisdictions and response agencies, public 
information, and the training of response personnel.  
• Recovery constitutes the final phase of the disaster management cycle.  Recovery 
continues until all systems return to normal or near normal.  Long-term recovery from a 
disaster may go on for years until the entire disaster area is either completely restored or 
redeveloped for entirely new purposes that are less disaster-prone.  Recovery activities 
encompass temporary housing, restoration of basic services (e.g. water, electricity), food 
and clothing, debris clearance, psychological counselling, job assistance, and loans to 
restart small businesses   
 
In the past, this process was thought to be composed of four distinctive phases, but now 
there is increasing recognition that the phases can and should overlap considerably.  
Disaster responders, for example, should be taking measures to facilitate recovery, as well 
as encourage preparedness for the next disaster and mitigation to reduce its impact.  
  
 
Figure 1.3:  Disaster Management Phases 
 
 
 The theoretical conditions of disaster 
management.  In practice, however, the cycle 
operates differently since mitigation is often 
overlooked.  Mitigation measures should be 
two-fold:  prevention of development in 
hazardous land and reduction of damage in 
built-up areas. 
 
MITIGATION RECOVERY 
RESPONSE 
pre-disaster   post-disaster 
In theory 
  In practice 
LEGEND 
PREPAREDNESS 
 
 
Waugh (2000) considers that disaster management should attempt to develop disaster 
resistant, resilient and sustainable communities.    
 
• Disaster resistance is achieved through land-use regulations, building codes, 
engineering works and other mitigation programmes. 
• Disaster resilience is achieved by developing the necessary medical facilities, social 
services, public education and other capabilities useful in disasters and crises. 
• Sustainable communities are achieved by incorporating disaster management into their 
economic, environmental and social programmes. 
 
One of the most serious problems threatening disaster management relates to planning 
authorities relying on raw information such as hazard zonations rather than on integrated 
information such as property damage and human casualty forecasts. Analysis of hazard 
mapping alone is not enough for the mitigation of disasters, as hazard mapping only depicts 
the natural phenomena. Tucker, Trumbull et al. (1994) clearly illustrate the problem by 
indicating that the 1988 Spitak earthquake in Armenia (former USSR) and the 1989 Loma 
Prieta earthquake in California were of similar size and affected populations of comparable 
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size.  However, the Armenian event killed 25,000 people whereas the Californian earthquake 
killed 63.  The difference in the casualty figures lies in vulnerability levels.  It is therefore 
necessary to move forward by analysing the impact that the natural phenomena could have 
on the urban “elements” (e.g. population, buildings, lifelines) as well as the multiplying effect 
that might be caused by the interaction between these “elements”. 
 
The document entitled “Methodological Guide for the Formulation of Regional Urban Plans; 
Applicable to Cities” issued by the Colombian government is a clear example of how urban 
planning is carried out in many countries. The guidelines are very thorough in describing the 
procedure for deriving hazard maps for earthquakes, floods and landslides. They are also 
very thorough in showing how to map population densities, land-uses, infrastructural 
services (both social and physical), the socio-economic status of the population, and 
environmental issues such as ecological conservation, mining effects and pollution. 
However, a major gap can be observed in these guidelines since there is no mention of 
“what to do next”. The following is the only description given: “This hazard information is 
useful when contrasted to maps on population density, infrastructure location and socio-
economic profile of the population” (IGAC 1996). But how can one compare or “contrast” 
them?  As the document makes no reference to this issue, it is evident that, despite the 
acknowledgement of the importance of integrating multi-disciplinary information, there is a 
gap in terms of how to perform this. 
 
Menoni, Petrini et al. (1997) consider that a comprehensive approach to assessing 
systemic vulnerability, especially when this term refers to urban and regional systems, has 
still to be fully developed.  Similarly, Papadopoulos and Arvanitides (1996) report that in 
Greece several investigators have developed methods for assessing earthquake hazards, 
although “only a very limited number of papers related to the earthquake risk description 
have appeared”. These authors have indeed identified where a serious gap in knowledge 
lies. 
 
In a seminar the Developing Member Countries (DMCs) of the Asian Development Bank 
(1991) concluded that the importance of risk and vulnerability analyses was recognised, 
even though they were not always widely practised.  Delegates felt that such analyses 
should be mandatory in the appraisal of all future projects.  Such appraisals would not be 
achieved without additional costs, but it was felt that the resulting benefits would by far 
exceed the cost involved. 
 
Russel, Rahman et al. (1991), when describing the case of Nepal, gave a description that 
applies globally.  They consider that cost-benefit analysis of disaster mitigation measures is 
not currently practiced.  Comprehensive risk mapping and vulnerability analyses for the 
various sectors do not exist and no common reference norms are available.  Decisions on 
where major government infrastructure or construction projects should be located tend to be 
taken subjectively. 
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1.2  PROBLEM STATEMENT 
 
Two very important problems hampering the reduction of disaster losses in urban areas are 
hereby identified and constitute the main problems that the research will tackle: 
 
• The lack of economically and rapidly produced inputs for risk (damage) 
assessment, preventing the cost-benefit implications of disaster mitigation 
and prevention measures to be assessed.   
• The lack of clarity related to the integration of risk assessments into the 
urban planning and management process.    
 
Using a geographical information system (GIS) to integrate and process data, the research 
will concentrate on the particular problem of forecasting direct urban disaster losses (of 
human life and buildings) attributable to earthquake hazards, for the purpose of improved 
urban planning and management. The research will focus on earthquake loss, and its 
ultimate objective is to help bridge a serious gap that exists between the mapping of 
hazardous events and urban decision-making and policy-making.   
 
1.3  RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
 
The main objectives that the research aims to achieve are the following: 
 
1. To develop a methodology for providing timely and economically feasible inputs for 
assessing the earthquake risk of people and buildings.  This requires identifying what 
data should be collected and how.  Different data collection methods will be analysed in 
terms of speed, effectiveness and cost.  Since the aim is to develop a method that is 
applicable to urban areas where few data and economic resources are available, focus 
will be given to: 
• Developing a method for data collection that could be carried out mostly by non-
specialists (e.g. undergraduates, construction workers, building inspectors) rather 
than the complex data acquisition techniques that only highly trained and costly 
specialists can perform. 
• Utilising video and photograph capture and interpretation for developing an 
inventory of relevant building and population characteristics. 
 
2. To test such methods in a case study and evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of 
the methodology.   
 
3. To establish how to effectively incorporate risk assessment into the process of urban 
strategy formulation, with particular emphasis on its contribution to establishing the 
cost-benefit of mitigation measures. 
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4. To evaluate the use of GIS as a tool for: 
• Data storage and integration interoperability  
• Zonation of urban risk  
• Urban decision-making 
 
1.4  THE CHOICE OF A CASE STUDY 
 
The city of Cartago in Costa Rica, a highly hazard-prone city, constitutes an interesting site 
for testing the developed methodology.  It lies 1,200 m above sea level in what is known as 
Costa Rica’s “Central Valley”.  Cartago is located downstream of rivers originating near the 
crater of the Irazú volcano and has been washed away by lahars (mudflows of volcanic 
origin) several times in the course of its history (see Figure 1.4).  On the path of one of these 
rivers lies the San Blas landslide, considered the biggest landslide in Central America in 
terms of volume.   
 
Two active seismic faults, located a few hundred metres from built-up areas, are 
responsible for earthquakes which devastated the city last in 1841 and 1910. This city 
therefore requires a disaster management plan that is not only appropriate but also of a 
multi-hazard nature, as a volcanic eruption can trigger a lahar or an earthquake can trigger 
a landslide.   
 
 
 
Figure 1.4:  Schematic Map of the City of Cartago  
(red line illustrates the boundary of the protective dyke) 
 
Hazard mapping, digital cartography and socio-economic data are available.  From the 
point of view of time for data handling and processing, the city is manageable, since its 
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population is approximately 150,000 inhabitants.  Other reasons in favour of this site are 
that the city is very diverse in terms of the building materials. 
 
1.5  OUTLINE OF THE DISSERTATION 
 
The dissertation is divided into nine chapters as presented in Figure 1.5. 
 
The first chapter describes the thematic context of the study, the main problem to be 
addressed, the research objectives and the reasoning behind the selection of the case 
study.  In terms of the thematic context, the effects of natural hazards in urban areas are 
documented.  It addresses the need to produce forecasts of possible loss (of human life 
and property) attributable to the different hazardous events that could take place, and their 
use for establishing the cost-benefit of alternatives to ensure successful urban policies and 
adequate economic resource allocation. 
 
In Chapter Two, a general literature review is presented.  The chapter begins with a 
review of the calls made by the various international organisations dealing with disaster 
and urban growth issues on the subject of disaster mitigation planning.  The second part of 
this chapter presents a sequence of questions that best describe what the decision-making 
process in hazard-prone urban areas should include.  The opinions of different authors 
regarding the various issues are recorded and discussed.  The need to establish disaster 
information networks (DINs) and the role that could be played by the World Wide Web 
(www) will be discussed. 
 
Chapter Three explains physical parameters that can be associated with hazards in 
general. In terms of the types of hazards to be analysed and considering the time available, 
a decision was made to restrict the research to the assessment of damage due to 
earthquakes.  The main characteristics of earthquakes are reviewed in order to explain the 
reasoning behind the components of risk assessment methodologies. 
 
Chapter Four is devoted to reviewing current views and methodologies for population and 
building vulnerability and risk determination for earthquakes.  The problems detected are 
highlighted.  Concluding remarks include the reasoning behind the two areas of interest 
that will be explored in the research.  
 
Chapter Five presents a description of the methodology that will be utilised, as well as a 
description of the required data inputs.  The damage data to be used for testing the 
methodology in the case study will be described.  This chapter discusses technological 
aspects such as aerial photo interpretation and video capture and processing, spatial data 
modelling and stratified sampling techniques. 
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In Chapter Six, Costa Rican urban planning and disaster management policy is analysed 
and various relevant regulations are discussed.  The stakeholders are identified and both 
their roles and responsibilities are analysed. 
 
In Chapter Seven, the case study is described.  First, a geographical and historical 
description of the city of Cartago is given.  Next, the particularities of the datasets in terms 
of their availability, resolution, currency and format are presented.   
 
In Chapter Eight, the results of the risk assessment are analysed and the implications of 
these results for the formulation of urban strategies are elaborated.   
 
In Chapter Nine, the conclusions of the research are presented as well as a number of 
recommendations for further research. 
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Figure 1.5:  Flowchart of the Dissertation  
 
1.  THEMATIC CONTEXT
-problem statement
-research objectives
-choice of case study
-outline of dissertation
5.  METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH
7.  THE CASE STUDY
- physical and historical characteristics
- datasets
8.  RISK IN THE URBAN PLANNING PROCESS
3.  UNDERSTANDING THE 
HAZARDOUS EVENTS
-physical parameters
-seismic hazards
- data input requirements
- conceptual model
- data capture
- spatial data modelling
- data integration
- data processing tools
4.  METHODOLOGY REVIEW
- small scale approaches
- large scale approaches
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- policy
- legal framework
2.  LITERATURE REVIEW
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-decision making process
-disaster networks
Large scale approaches
9. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
- conclusions
- recommendations for further research
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- implications
8. RISK IN THE URBAN PLANNING PROCESS
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Chapter Two:  LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
In this chapter the stance of institutions such as the United Nations on the topic of natural 
hazards will be discussed, as well as the programmes launched.  A literature review will be 
presented related to the interdependency of issues surrounding disaster management, as 
well as the move towards disaster information networking via the World Wide Web.  The 
last section in this chapter presents a summary of reasons why disaster management is a 
challenging and complex task. Chapter Three explains the physical parameters of hazards 
in general and discusses the characteristics of earthquakes and their implications for 
buildings. 
 
2.1 SCOPE FOR IMPROVEMENT 
 
The United Nations launched the International Decade for Disaster Reduction (IDNDR 1990-
2000) with the objective of raising people's awareness of what they can do to make 
themselves safer from natural disasters.   
 
In order to achieve this objective, the following goals were declared for the decade:  
 
• To improve the capacity of each country to mitigate the effects of natural disasters, with 
special attention being given to assisting developing countries in assessing disaster 
damage potential, and in establishing early warning systems and disaster-resistant 
structures. 
• To devise appropriate guidelines and strategies for applying existing scientific and 
technical knowledge, taking into account cultural and economic diversity. 
• To foster scientific and engineering endeavour aimed at addressing critical gaps in 
knowledge in order to reduce loss of life and property. 
• To disseminate new and existing technical information related to measures for 
assessing, predicting and mitigating natural disasters. 
• To develop measures for assessing, predicting and mitigating natural disasters through 
programmes of technical assistance and technology transfer, demonstration projects, 
education and training, and to evaluate the effectiveness of those programmes. 
 
In 1994 the member countries of the United Nations launched the Yokohama Strategy and 
Plan of Action for a Safer World, which provided the guidelines for disaster prevention, 
preparedness and mitigation. The Yokohama strategy emphasises the following issues: 
 
• Human and institutional capacity-building and strengthening 
• Compilation and sharing of information via networking  
• Risk assessment as well as the monitoring and communication of forecasts 
• Sub-regional, regional and international cooperation 
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• Mobilisation of resources 
 
Parallel to the United Nation’s initiatives and in the context of the American continent, the 
Organisation of American States (OAS, 1991) has made a call for its member states to: 
 
• Incorporate natural hazard considerations early in the process of integrated development 
planning and investment project formulation 
• Put a higher value on risk reduction in evaluating investment projects 
• Increase the proportion of expenditure for prevention activities relating to rehabilitation, 
relocation and reconstruction 
 
Unfortunately, not all organisations show a consistency between their manifestos and the 
activities that they carry out and the topics for which they make funding available. For 
example, during an interview a senior officer with the OAS Natural Hazards Project pointed 
out that this office, in the belief that such information would not be used, did not fund projects 
related to the development of methods for deriving forecasts of human loss and building 
damage at urban level. The decision was based on the belief that most politicians are only 
concerned with macro-economic figures, such as forecasts of possible loss of agricultural or 
industrial production through natural events.  
 
This somewhat contradictory behaviour is in part to be blamed for “the critical gaps in 
knowledge” that the United Nations mentioned as one of the key issues that need to be 
tackled. It also helps one to understand the reason for the paradox between the advances 
in science and the slow reduction in the rate of losses caused by natural hazards. 
  
2.2 THE THINKING PROCESS IN HAZARD-PRONE URBAN AREAS 
 
To some extent, the task of urban planners relates to gathering, processing and presenting 
data to allow a series of questions to be answered so that decision-makers can formulate 
successful strategies. 
 
The first question in this sequence is: what is the risk? − in other words, what would be 
the expected losses in human life, property and production if the scenario or scenarios 
presented by earth and atmospheric scientists took place?   
 
2.2.1  Deriving Risk 
 
To explain how risk is assessed, the following United Nations definitions (1991) are provided 
and a summary is made regarding the disciplines concerned: 
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Figure 2.1:  Conceptual Flowchart of Risk Assessment  
 
Natural hazard (H) determination involves the estimation of the probability of occurrence 
(within a specific period of time in a given area) of a potentially damaging natural 
phenomenon.  The disciplines concerned are earth and atmospheric science. 
 
Vulnerability (V) determination involves the estimation of the degree of loss suffered by a 
given element at risk or a set of such elements, resulting from the occurrence of a natural 
phenomenon of a given magnitude and expressed on a scale from 0 (no damage) to 1 
(total damage).  The disciplines concerned are human geography, construction 
engineering, etc.    
 
The elements at risk (E) include the population, buildings, civil engineering works, 
economic activities, public services, utilities and infrastructure, etc., at risk in a given area. 
 
Specific risk (Rs) determination involves the estimation of the expected degree of loss 
due to a particular natural phenomenon and as a function of both natural hazard and 
vulnerability (Rs=H·V).  The disciplines concerned are human geography, construction 
engineering, etc. 
 
Risk (Rt) determination involves the estimation of the expected damage or loss of 
property and human lives and the disruption of economic activity due to a particular natural 
phenomenon (Rt=E·Rs).  The disciplines concerned are urban planning, urban and human 
geography, and economy.   
 
The flowchart in Figure 2.1 illustrates the methodology for vulnerability and risk 
determination leading to economic loss estimation. 
 
When such risk has been determined, planners need to decide whether it is within 
tolerable limits.   
 
2.2.2 Acceptable Risk 
 
Risk may be at “acceptable levels”, not requiring or necessarily justifying government 
intervention, or it may be “unacceptable”, requiring small to massive investments to mitigate 
the threat to life and property.  Petak and Atkinsson (1982) view it in terms of the size of the 
gap between the desired state of affairs and perceived reality (see Figure 2.3).  In their view 
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the size of this gap determines whether some action must take place.  Whenever this gap is 
small, little or no intervention is necessary.  Their view highlights the importance of empirical 
work in creating an adequate model of the “real world”.  In the case of disaster management, 
this translates into models to estimate the losses of a human, physical and economic nature.  
Failure to model this ”real world” will therefore hamper the decision-making process. 
 
Cardona (1997) considers “acceptable risk” to be the possible losses that could be accepted 
by a community in return for a degree of profit or benefit. The United Nations Disaster Relief 
Co-ordinator (1984) considers it unacceptable when “a community undergoes severe 
damage and incurs such losses to its members and physical appurtenances that the social 
structure is disrupted and the fulfilment of all or some of the essential functions of the society 
is prevented”.   
 
Waugh (2000) considers that the notion of “acceptable risk” is an acknowledgement that it is 
not possible to eliminate completely all risk from hazards.  Establishing where to draw the 
line, however, is a very difficult task since acceptability is related to social values, the state of 
knowledge about the hazard, the credibility of the warning, and perceptions about the 
exposure.  Those who choose to live in Mexico City, with its well-known seismic hazards, 
assume some risk.  Some people may not fully understand the risk and once they have 
experienced a major earthquake may pack and move to a more stable area, while others 
may simply adjust to living with the hazard.  The determination of “acceptable” levels also 
may be controversial because different individuals and different communities may well have 
different notions of how much risk they are willing to accept.  Younger people may take more 
risks than older people.  Property owners may be less willing to ignore hazards than renters 
and other more transient populations.  Business owners and managers, too, may be less 
inclined to take actions to reduce risk when the actions may result in significant financial 
losses.    
 
How to define what is acceptable and adjust public policy accordingly is both a 
methodological and a political problem.  Risk-taking behaviours by individuals and 
communities can increase the level of risk for others.  While there is little debate concerning 
the need to rescue individuals, there is increasing debate concerning their responsibility for 
the cost of the rescue operations and their liability for deaths and injuries to search and 
rescue personnel (Waugh 2000).  As a consequence, some governments require disaster 
victims to pay for rescue operations when they have knowingly put themselves at risk.   
 
According to the same author, in public policy terms, the level of threat posed by a particular 
hazard should determine its priority vis-à-vis other threats and problems.  With finite 
resources, communities, like individuals, have to choose when and where to invest their 
money and their energy (see Figure 2.3). 
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Some people have tried to establish what is “acceptable risk” or “risk tolerance” in a 
quantitative form. Sheehan and Hewitt (1969) consider acceptable an event that has 
consequences below the following values: 
 
• 100 people dead or 
• 100 people injured or 
• US$ 1 million in damage  
 
The obvious weakness of this approach is that it is based on a threshold rather than on a 
ratio, and it is therefore totally subjective.  
 
The Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED) (in Smith 1996) at the 
University of Louvain, Belgium, uses the following criteria for establishing which events are 
“disastrous”: 
 
• 100 people dead  
• 1% of the total national population in affected people  
• 1% of the total annual GNP in damage 
 
The ratio criteria for damage and affected people indicate more accurately the impacts of a 
disaster on countries with small populations and weak economies and constitute a better 
way of measuring risk. 
 
Starr (in Cardona 1997), for example, after having surveyed different communities, has 
suggested that acceptable population risk is that which is below 1 death per 1 million people 
exposed. However, all these numbers are subject to debate since what is “acceptable” 
varies from culture to culture. Others such as Wiggins et al. (also in Cardona 1997) consider 
that the ratio should be 0.1 rather than 1.  
 
When the risk is not acceptable, urban planners are faced with the need to know how risk 
can be reduced.   
 
2.2.3 Risk Prevention and Reduction 
 
Alexander (1993) highlights a very important issue as he points out that, broadly speaking, 
there are two ways of dealing with risk mitigation: 
 
• Risk aversion involves a decision to achieve the maximum possible risk mitigation, 
regardless of the costs involved. This method does not allow one risk to be compared 
with another in order to apportion scarce resources; neither does it allow the balancing of 
costs and benefits. This method has been widely used in disaster management with very 
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negative results and it is now considered only applicable to certain advanced 
technologies such as air travel, nuclear hazards and to virulent diseases. 
 
• Risk balancing helps determine what risks are acceptable and thus helps set goals for 
community mortality, morbidity and economic loss. This approach assumes that some 
positive level of risk is socially acceptable.  
 
Broadly speaking, risk can be reduced by adequate disaster management.  Choosing the 
right implementation strategy, however, can be difficult since there are many available 
options.  Figure 1.3 in Chapter One gives an insight into the points in time when strategies 
could be implemented.  This can be further expanded by means of a tri-dimensional matrix 
(see Figure 2.2) describing the range of possible implementation measures, including levels 
of government (who will implement the strategy?), management phase (when will the 
strategy be implemented?) and implementation measure (how will it be implemented?).  
 
 
 
Figure 2.2:  Range of Implementation Strategies (Masser and Montoya 2000)  
 
The combination of these elements defines the range of possible implementation strategies.  
In practice, some blocks are more common than others, although all are possible.  Examples 
of these strategies include, to name just three: 
 
• A national emergency commission (national level) implementing an educational 
campaign related to the evacuation of buildings (non-structural measure) to lower the 
vulnerability of people to future earthquakes (pre-disaster measure). 
• A municipality (local level) building a dyke (structural measure) in order to lower the 
vulnerability of the population and buildings to future floods (pre-disaster measure). 
• A ministry of public works (national level) repairing a bridge (structural measure) 
destroyed by a flash flood (post-disaster measure). 
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Figure 2.3:  Decision-Making Process (Petak and Atkinsson 1982) 
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There are many implementation measures for risk mitigation that must be carefully analysed.  
They can be broadly classified into structural and non-structural measures.  Non-structural 
measures involve urban development restrictions as well as educational campaigns, while 
structural measures involve the modification of the environment. According to the United 
Nations Disaster Relief Co-ordinator (1991), the following are several of the possible 
measures: 
 
• To modify the hazard by means of: 
a. Protective measures that aim to reduce the impact of the hazard. Such measures 
include constructing dykes or dredging river basins. The protection of sites is often a 
costly option, and should therefore be related to capital investments in the area as a 
whole and compared carefully with other options. 
b. Site improvement that mitigates the disaster by changing the physical characteristics 
of the site itself. The objective of this option is to prevent the triggering of the hazard 
(i.e. landslides) or to regulate its impact by ground improvements or drainage and 
slope modification. 
 
• To reduce structural vulnerability by improved engineering design, by construction 
methods and by strengthening.  Strengthening construction, however, does not 
contribute to risk reduction when the vulnerability is 100%. This is the case for most 
landslides and for the direct effects of volcanic eruptions. 
a. Strengthening of buildings: resistance can be increased by means of waterproofing 
or strengthening against ground shaking. 
b. Strengthening of infrastructure: the physical strength of infrastructure systems is 
improved in order to ensure adequate functioning of day-to-day facilities and 
services during and after a natural disaster.  Infrastructure systems require high 
public investments; it is therefore important that the vulnerability of such elements be 
low.  
 
• Changing the functional characteristics of settlements, such as changing the population 
density, the layout of a neighbourhood or the relative importance of infrastructure 
systems. 
a. Regulation of land-use: in this option, risks are reduced not by reducing the hazard-
proneness of the site, but by changing the functional characteristics of the hazard 
area.  An important problem in the regulation of land-use is enforcing the plans.  
Regulation may be problematic, especially within existing settlements. Relocation of 
settlements is an option, although it can have far-reaching negative consequences. 
b. Expansion or duplication of infrastructure: the impact of natural hazards on the 
functioning of infrastructure systems is reduced by increasing the number of 
connections, or loops, within the system. Although expansion of infrastructure may 
require high public investment, such infrastructure investments may stimulate 
economic development. 
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Apart from the issues raised by the United Nations, the following elements are also 
important: 
 
• Education campaigns to raise the awareness of hazards and risks as well as of warning 
and evacuation systems. 
• Modification of the loss burden by stimulating the insurance sector to offer disaster 
insurance (and reinsurance) and by creating disaster funds within the communities 
themselves. 
 
Smith (1996) considers that one of the major problems is that systematic research into 
natural hazards began recently with people such as Gilbert White (White 1936; White 1945), 
who was the first in the USA to recognise that structural measures were not the only way to 
tackle floods.  Structural measures include – to take floods as an example – the construction 
of dykes to provide protection against river or sea floods.  In Vietnam, people have been 
building and maintaining such structures for some 2000 years (Benson 1998).  According to 
Wu (in Smith 1996), some five million Chinese lost their lives in floods between 1860 and 
1960, despite the fact that the flood “engineering” defence of cities dates back over 4,000 
years.   
 
One very important aspect to be reviewed relates to law enforcement, as sometimes the 
single issue of enforcing existing building and other development regulations would 
considerably decrease the probability of damage.  Monzón-Despang and Gandara-Barorit 
(1994) clearly highlight this issue by pointing out that in Guatemala City, the municipality is 
only capable of monitoring 40% of the formal construction due to lack of personnel and a 
high level of clandestine construction.  According to the Independent Insurance Agents of 
America (2000), losses from Hurricane Andrew could have been reduced by as much as 30 
to 40% had existing building codes been properly enforced.  Kunreuther (in Waugh 2000), 
for example, supports a system that includes monetary incentives to reduce risk, fines for 
non-compliance, tax credits to encourage mitigation programmes, well-enforced building 
codes and effective land-use regulations. 
 
In establishing possible non-structural measures such as educational campaigns, another 
question must be answered: what or who do people blame for disasters? 
 
2.2.4 Risk Perception 
 
As Smith (1996) pointed out, one of the biggest challenges is to resolve the resulting conflict 
between technical risk analysis and the more subjective risk perception. The degree of 
perceived risk varies greatly between individuals of the same age and sex, depending upon 
education, location, occupation and lifestyle. It also varies from country to country as a 
consequence of educational campaigns.  For example, according to Kaneko (1994), in the 
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Japanese prefecture of Saitama, 65% of the population is aware of the threat of a major 
earthquake, while Ventura and Schuster (1994) consider that in the Greater Vancouver 
Regional District only 50% of the population is aware of the seismic risk.  Unfortunately, it is 
not only a question of modifying the perception of risk as, due to income, many people 
accept voluntary risk and engage in a constant game of “Russian roulette” in return for some 
benefits. Twigg (1998) considers that in the Indian city of Indore the reasons why many 
slums are found on the banks or floodplains of several rivers are mainly: 
 
• Proximity of the dwellings to the market 
• Proximity to job opportunities 
• Affordability of land 
• Better chance of getting funds for improvement because of the slum’s visibility 
 
On the other hand, when disasters are perceived as “Acts of God" and a specific religion is 
strongly observed, the task of vulnerability reduction is very difficult.  According to Haque 
(1997), in 1985 about 34% of the floodplain occupants in Bangladesh (27% in 1995) 
perceived the occurrences of erosion events as the “will of Allah”.  His research shows that 
the perception of the causes of erosion relates to educational attainment.  The educated part 
of the population (with relatively better accessibility to the media and other sources of 
technical knowledge) demonstrated better perception of the causes of hazards.  About 38% 
of respondents with “no education” stated that erosion was the “will of Allah” while only 17% 
with secondary and post-secondary education expressed the same view.  Similarly, his study 
proved that the relatively higher-income groups are more aware of these hazards than the 
marginal ones.  Haque goes further by analysing the displaced people’s perception.  He 
found that 32% of them with less than three relocations perceive the cause to be the “will of 
Allah”, while 45% of displaced people with more than 12 relocations share this fatalistic view.  
 
Festinger’s theory of cognitive dissonance − or as Tobin and Montz (1997) refer to it: “denial” 
behaviour − helps to explain why this reaction exists.  His theory suggests that individuals 
reject information and suppress facts that might be damaging to their prevailing value 
system.  Fortunately, this way of thinking is on the change in most countries.  For example, 
in the USA, Smith (1996) believes that the classic defence of “Act of God” in cases of civil 
liability for human and property losses through landslides carries decreasing credibility, and 
recent court judgements have tended to identify the developer, or his consultants, as mainly 
responsible for damage due to failure. 
 
The media also play an important role in the public perception of disasters.  According to 
Hawkins (1993), aircraft accidents deter some potential passengers from flying, while the 
daily carnage on the roads seems to have no equivalent effect.  The reason, he believes, lies 
mainly in media coverage of air accidents. 
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Urban planning is a very complex discipline in which a series of objectives must be achieved.  
To name but a few, these include the provision of education, medical, infrastructural and 
recreational services to the community; employment opportunities for all; and the 
encouragement of economic development.  In the light of the scarce economic resources 
that developing countries possess, the cost of structural measures to prevent or mitigate 
disasters must be carefully investigated through cost-benefit analyses.  
 
This implies the need to address a third question: from amongst the people themselves, the 
government, the insurance industry and local or foreign donors, who will pay for the 
losses?  
 
2.2.5  Financial Victims 
 
Disaster insurance plays a vital role in urban economy.  Where this is not available, it is 
entirely up to the people themselves and government agencies (themselves or through 
foreign aid) to pay the costs of reconstruction and relief.  Adequate insurance coverage 
therefore allows the losses to be shared amongst a broader group, thereby reducing the 
financial burden on the government and/or the people involved.  Kunreuther (in Waugh 2000) 
considers that an insurance system with rates based on risk can serve as the cornerstone of 
a disaster management programme.  Kunreuther (1998) considers that insurance has the 
advantage over all other policies in that through lower premiums it rewards individuals prior 
to a disaster for investing in loss reduction measures, as well as paying these same people 
for damage suffered through a disaster.  They consider that, for insurance to be effective in 
both these roles, those who are at risk must bear a substantial portion of the costs of residing 
in hazard-prone areas, otherwise they will have limited economic incentive to take protective 
actions and will rely on others to bail them out later after the next disaster. 
 
According to Waugh (2000), reliance upon private insurance raises some serious questions.  
First, can the private insurance industry provide enough coverage to ensure that substantial 
proportions of property losses are covered after a major disaster?  With some qualification, 
the answer to this question is yes; but there may be serious problems in areas in which a 
single disaster or series of disasters can overwhelm the capacities of insurance providers.  
Insurance companies depend upon the existence of a large pool of customers (the “law of 
large numbers”) who share the risk but do not all experience losses at the same time. 
 
In 1994, the insurance industry of California collected US$ 500 million in earthquake 
premiums but paid out US$ 11.4 billion in damage caused by the Northridge disaster (Valery 
1995).  According to Smith (1996), as a consequence of the large insurance claims following 
hurricanes Hugo (1989), Iniki (1992) and Andrew (1992), plus the Northridge (1994) 
earthquake, several companies in the USA were forced out of business.  More precisely, and 
according to Kunreuther (1998), losses through Hurricane Andrew alone triggered the failure 
of nine small and medium insurers, which were caught off guard by the very large increases 
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in exposure in hazard-prone areas and inaccurate loss estimates.  Similarly, the National 
Insurance Institute (INS) in Costa Rica (a government-owned monopoly company) would 
have probably been unable to cover the losses due to the 1990 earthquake if the 
government had not bailed it out.  
 
Faced with the prospect of losses that cannot be forecast, the insurance industry either over-
charges, limits its liability in various ways or fails to offer disaster coverage.  It becomes 
evident that the less certainty in terms of possible losses, the more reluctant insurance 
companies are to offer disaster insurance.  In the UK, the policy-holder base has been 
deliberately widened by including storms and floods as part of the “standard comprehensive 
household structure and contents policy”.  In Japan, on the other hand, special earthquake 
clauses have been introduced to limit indemnity to a maximum of US$ 110,000, of which the 
government might have to pay a portion.  Waugh (2000) considers that, in anticipation of 
catastrophic events, insurers may raise rates high enough to cover the “probably maximum 
loss”, require a deductible so that property owners share the risk, and/or buy reinsurance to 
cover losses in excess of expectations.  While private insurers theoretically can raise rates 
high enough to cover almost any losses, the cost may be prohibitive for all but the most 
affluent property owners, and even they may choose to accept the risk rather than pay for 
the insurance.  
 
 
Figure 2.4:  Perception of Damage and Probability (comparison between earthquake perception in 
California and hurricane perception in the Caribbean)  
 
Unfortunately, the vast majority of the property at high risk from earthquakes is currently 
uninsured, even in countries where governments support insurance schemes or where they 
hold a monopoly over insurance.  Most policies are on commercial and industrial property 
rather than on residential property.  It is very common that the only residential property to be 
insured is that which is tied to a mortgage, as insurance is most often a requirement for the 
granting of loans.  According to Smith (1996), in 1995 only 3% of homeowners in Kobe had 
earthquake insurance.  Broadly speaking and according to the Insurance Information 
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Network of California (1999), traditionally about 25 to 30% of Californian homeowners carry 
earthquake insurance.  In the San Fernando (California) earthquake of 1971, property 
damage amounted to some US$ 500 million, of which only US$ 32 million were covered by 
insurance (Hudson and Petak 1981).  Since the subsequent disaster loan programme 
provided over US$ 257 million in aid, it is evident that the general tax-payer assumed much 
of the financial burden (Smith 1996).  This relates directly to the problem of awareness and 
perception, as an individual living in a hazard-prone area may view an earthquake as a low 
probability / high consequence event.  This is in contrast to the situation in Jamaica, where a 
major factor in the recovery after Hurricane Gilbert (1988) was the relatively high level of 
insured risk – approaching 40% (Kunreuther 1998) – due to the perception of hurricanes as 
medium probability / high consequence events (see Figure 2.4). 
 
It is important to realise that high insurance coverage does not necessarily ensure the re-
establishment of activities following a disaster.  In most cases, insurance premiums are set 
on the basis of property valuation, and unfortunately many property owners undervalue their 
property to reduce property tax and insurance premiums.  The post-disaster payout by the 
insurance company will be a fraction of the market value and therefore many property 
owners will be unable to rebuild to pre-disaster levels unless they possess savings or some 
funding is made available.  Moreover, elderly or middle-aged business owners may simply 
choose to take their insurance payments and retire rather than invest the time, effort and 
money necessary to rebuild to pre-disaster levels.  Therefore, despite high insurance 
coverage, disasters can have devastating effects on the economic base of a community. 
 
A careful balance must be sought, as the availability of both foreign and national disaster aid 
may discourage municipal governments as well as individual home and business owners 
from adequately insuring their property and adopting other mitigating measures. Roth et al. 
(in Bolt 1994) consider that the greatest overall benefit from earthquake insurance accrues 
when there is a link between the availability of low-cost insurance and a requirement to 
upgrade the seismic resistance of the structure.  In the case of homes, inspections at the 
time of purchase should establish premium levels according to the degree of risk inherent in 
the dwelling and its location.  An important side benefit could be the widespread reduction of 
risk, not by government regulation but by market incentives contained in graduated 
insurance premiums. 
 
Disaster aid results from humanitarian concern following the loss of life, and as such it is 
applauded on moral grounds.  Foreign disaster aid, however, can never fully rectify the 
economic and social disparities around the world that are responsible for so much 
vulnerability.  Foreign aid is not ideal as a long-term measure for disaster reduction, as it is 
dependent upon the state of the national and foreign economies as well as upon diplomatic 
relations.   
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Despite the efforts to organise disaster relief, the results are often disappointing.  After 
Hurricane Mitch hit Central America (1998), the national emergency commissions in the 
affected countries called on foreign countries to stop the collection of clothing as they 
considered the true need to be food and drinking water.  This highlights the problems of 
useless disaster aid.  Similarly, following the Guatemala City earthquake (1976), the peak in 
the delivery of medical supplies happened after most casualties had already been treated 
and hospitals were back to normal levels (Smith 1996).  According to the same author, the 
field hospitals supplied to Guatemala by neighbouring countries were the only fully effective 
ones and, by the time the main supply of “packaged” disaster hospitals arrived from the 
USA, a surplus of hospital beds was available in the capital city.  Brown et al. (in Tucker, 
Trumbull et al. 1994) go even further in their criticism of the effectiveness of national foreign 
disaster agencies in meeting the needs of developing countries.  For example, they consider 
that the technical assistance provided by the USA has not served to foster an independent 
science and technology capability of the most needy developing nations.  They argue that 
US development philosophy focuses on supplying technology and expertise to developing 
nations rather than on contributing to indigenous capability.  Further, they point out that this 
aid has been targeted at just a few countries and the research agenda usually reflects the 
priorities of the “donor” rather than those of the host nation.     
 
Following the earthquake in Managua, Nicaragua (1972), allegations were made regarding 
the corruption of high local officials in the distribution of foreign aid.  This created a situation 
in which a donor agency from Mexico refused to allow its goods to be unloaded from its 
plane (by then already at Managua airport) until permission was granted for distributing the 
aid directly to the affected people.  The cargo returned to Mexico as such permission was 
never granted.  This illustrates some of the many difficulties and weaknesses surrounding 
foreign disaster aid.  These examples highlight two criteria that are of immense importance 
in dealing with disaster aid and resources in general:  
 
• Efficiency refers to the adequate allocation of economic resources to maximise social 
welfare 
• Equity relates to fairness in the distribution of resources 
 
2.2.6  Cost-Benefit Analysis 
 
If the risk is not within “tolerable limits”, what are the costs of the various prevention and 
mitigation measures?  Cost-benefit analyses are a necessity in establishing the feasibility 
of prevention and reduction measures.  Cost-benefit analysis was developed by the 
Navigation Boards in the USA in the 1920s. In 1936, in light of the ever-increasing costs of 
flood alleviation, cost-benefit analysis was incorporated in the Flood Control Act, which 
specified that “the benefits, to whomsoever they accrue, must justify the costs” (Sewell et al. 
in Tobin and Montz 1997).  Similarly, Dixon (in Tobin and Montz 1997) demonstrated the 
value of cost-benefit analysis graphically, showing that the size of a project and availability of 
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funding might influence project selection (as shown in Figure 2.5).  Different project goals 
have different benefit-cost ratios.  For example, maximising the benefit-cost ratio (B) yields a 
different result than maximising net benefits (C).  Erdik (1994) considers that certain simple 
measures that have essentially zero cost compared with the benefits deserve to be 
implemented immediately.  A few examples of this include evacuation drills and the tying-
down and securing of furniture, appliances and electronics in homes and offices. 
 
Because risk-modified cost-benefit analysis has not been integrated into the project activities 
of most development agencies, it is not possible to fully judge its potential effectiveness.  
Kramer (1994), for example, considers that national and international development agencies 
often act as if their programmes and natural disasters are unrelated.  Risk analysis 
constitutes a prerequisite since without the knowledge of the possible losses the benefits of 
mitigation measures cannot be established.  Efforts, therefore, to produce risk zonations 
must be high on the urban agenda.  The Organisation of American States (OAS) (1991) 
considers that the forecasting of losses should be a concern not only for the countries in 
which they occur but also for international lending agencies and the private sector, as they 
should be interested in protecting their loans and investments.  A few examples from Benson 
(1998) that help describe the impact of risk-modified cost-benefit analysis are given below: 
 
 
Figure 2.5:  Benefit-Cost Ratios (source: Tobin and Montz 1997)  
 
• The World Bank and USA Geological Survey calculated that economic losses worldwide 
from natural disasters in the 1990s could be reduced by US$ 280 billion if US$ 40 billion 
were invested in preparedness, reduction and prevention strategies. 
• In China, US$ 3.15 billion have been invested over the past 40 years in measures to 
control floods; this is believed to have averted potential losses of US$ 12 billion. 
• The Thames Barrier project to protect London from floods cost £ 730 million sterling, but 
this was considered a wise investment because the potential loss of property through a 
Thames flood was £ 3.5 billion (the flood was considered inevitable even though it might 
not have taken place for many years). 
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• The Anheuser-Busch company spent US$ 30 million on preparations to protect its 
brewery in the San Fernando Valley in California against earthquakes.  These included 
plans for alternative water supplies.  When an earthquake hit the area, the company 
saved more than US$ 300 million because these measures enabled it to carry on 
production with only minimal interruption. 
• The owner of a sweetshop in India, interviewed in 1994, said he had paid 25 rupees to 
put stepping stones around his shop so that customers would not have to stand in flood 
water. Not to have done so would, he reckoned, have cost him 100 to 200 rupees in lost 
business. 
 
However, cost-benefit analysis in disaster management is not as simple as the previous 
examples have depicted.  Since it also involves preventing the loss of lives, establishing the 
benefit of each saved lived is a fraught issue.  To many, equating human life with a financial 
value appears both illogical and morally questionable. Failing to do so, however, implies that 
decisions regarding mitigation strategies are based solely on property and production.  
Where life-saving is to be evaluated in financial terms, the most widely used method is the 
“human capital approach”, in which a life is valued in accordance with its potential for future 
productivity.  The monetary value of an individual’s life is the sum of all of his or her expected 
future earnings.  Unfortunately, distinguishing between the value of different individual’s lives 
on the basis of their earning power is liable to lead to unacceptable decisions; for example, it 
could be computed that there was a zero or even negative loss in the collapse of an old 
people’s home, (as the inhabitants may not be receiving either a salary or pension, and the 
state may be keeping them).  Similarly, the lives of people living on low incomes would be 
assigned a lower value (United Nations Department of Humanitarian Affairs 1994).  In the 
case of reinforcing of weak structures, one of the difficulties in the analysis relates to the 
trade-off between life safety and construction costs.  According to Bolt (1994), this trade-off 
is well illustrated by recent studies of the seismic resistance of state-owned buildings in 
California.  It is estimated that over US$ 20 billion-worth of state property is involved, and 
much of it is vulnerable to damage.  The California Seismic Safety Commission, after testing 
the proposed hazard evaluation methodology on 40 state-owned buildings, recommended 
that priorities for upgrading these structures should be based on a benefit-cost ratio (BCR), 
defined as the number of lives saved per reconstruction dollar.  As a consequence, structural 
engineers were retained to provide a prioritised list of state-owned structures based on the 
BCR method.  Such a list was essential to obtain cost estimates so that the state 
government could fund a realistic schedule of upgrading. 
 
In summary, to ensure successful urban disaster management, three different types of 
information must be made available to decision-makers (see Figure 2.6): 
 
• “Financial resilience” (self-coping) capacity, which refers to the degree to which the 
different owner groups can cover the economic losses either themselves or through 
disaster insurance. 
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• Disaster assessment of likely hazardous events for economic losses (i.e. property 
damage) and human casualties, and the triggering effects of natural phenomena. 
• Cost of mitigation measures. 
 
 
 
Figure 2.6:  Three Crucial Information Sets for Strategy Formulation in Hazard-Prone Urban Areas  
 
Risk assessment involves a fragile chain. Siccardi and Adom (1993) point out the three 
reasons why the chain can fail: 
 
• Failure of scientists to correctly forecast: meaning their inability to locate the harmful 
event in space and time and to measure the uncertainties involved. 
• Failure of scientists to predict, formulate a message and correctly transfer the full 
information with their uncertainties. 
• Failure of the human community to perceive the complexity of the message, which 
results in the inability to take suitable action. 
 
2.3 THE NEED FOR NETWORKS IN URBAN DISASTER MANAGEMENT 
 
Accurate information presented in a timely and appropriate manner to facilitate informed 
decisions is of high importance in ensuring that these decisions lead to success.  Failing to 
acknowledge that disasters do not respect boundaries is a first step in preventing different 
government organisations from wasting valuable time and resources by producing virtually 
duplicated information.  
 
It is observed that a common error in developing countries is related to the belief that 
government organisations (with the help of universities or consulting firms) should collect 
information and process it with the intention of using it for decision-making at only the 
government level.  It is therefore important to identify all the potential users of risk zonation 
information within the public and private sector and to establish the positive role they could 
play in the economic sustainability of the data produced by government agencies.  The 
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insurance industry, for example, should be seen not only as a user of governmentally 
produced data but also as a provider of valuable information, since insurance coverage is an 
important parameter for urban disaster planning.  Bertz (1994) emphasises the importance of 
establishing close cooperation between the insurance industry and disaster management 
agencies, while Kunreuther (1998) believes that only through joint efforts with other 
stakeholders can insurers overcome their problems. 
 
On the other hand, substantial information already exists that could be used to this end, but 
there are numerous obstacles to accessing it and the necessary methods for integrating it 
from a variety of sources for use in decision-making are presently inadequate.   
 
Implementation of an improved national or international network for making better 
information available in a more timely manner could substantially improve the situation 
(Commission on Geo-Science Environment & Resources of the US National Research 
Council 1999). 
 
It is therefore important to expand from the concept of a single user / single data provider to 
the concept of multiple users and multiple data providers.  The selling of data is crucial to 
achieving the necessary economic sustainability of data production for all the information 
providers.  However, computer linking via the internet provides the perfect tool for enabling 
access and transfer of the required data amongst the stakeholders.  
 
As the above report points out, another problem present even in a highly developed nation 
such as the USA relates to the lack of uniformity in the availability of information across the 
country.  Information is often produced from disparate sources and transmitted in whatever 
format the provider prefers, requiring significant effort to compile it in a form that provides a 
coherent picture or even thwarting integration altogether.  Data standards are often 
inconsistent and, even more dangerous, users are sometimes unaware of the limitations and 
uncertainties in data or are presented with conflicting interpretations of data without the 
means to assess the reliability of the sources.  Along with the technical difficulties in 
accessing information and assessing data reliability, impediments arise from the lack of 
interaction between users and providers of information.  No entity exists to coordinate or 
foster communication amongst these groups. 
 
The first and key step in achieving this objective is to involve all the stakeholders by: 
 
• Identifying potential users and their data needs (see Figure 2.7), since disaster 
information users’ needs vary considerably. 
• Identifying potential data providers as well as the characteristics of the data they could 
provide (type, resolution, reliability and currency of the data). 
• Identifying an entity that will coordinate or foster communication amongst these groups. 
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Figure2.7: Members of a Disaster Information Network 
 
There are already initiatives related to the design of networks such as the National Disaster 
Information Network (NDIN) in the USA (Federal Emergency Management Agency 1997).  
The objective of the NDIN is first to set up a disaster information network within the USA and 
later to link it to similar networks in other countries. 
 
Work already carried out as part of the NDIN initiative included conducting a survey to 
identify user needs.  The survey is a key step in identifying commonalties in terms of data 
needs amongst the different institutions. One important aspect, however, would be to survey 
not only the ideal data needed but also the “minimum acceptable data”.  The reason is that a 
compromise is likely to be required between the quality of the data and the speed and cost 
of data acquisition since, even with the private sector’s willingness to purchase loss 
prediction information, the necessary predictions might still be economically unfeasible.  
 
According to the Commission on Geo-Science Environment & Resources of the US 
National Research Council (1999), the overall goal of a disaster information network should 
be to reduce the rate of disaster losses.  Some of the features it should include are: 
 
• Improved methods for finding information with specific attributes, for example for a 
particular area or type of hazard. 
• Ways to determine the source, quality and reliability of information, including standards 
for data compatibility. 
• Systems or software for integrating information rapidly to produce and deliver 
information tailored to the needs of a decision-maker for the specific problem at hand 
• Courses to train users and build awareness. 
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The focus of a DIN should be on developing integrative products for decision-makers.  Top 
priority should be accorded to this area because the wealth of information that resides in 
numerous databases cannot be readily utilised by those who must take action to reduce 
risks or respond to disaster losses.  A few examples (from the many that could be cited) of 
integrative products are: 
 
• Local maps showing how hazards and risks vary in space and time. 
• Estimates of probability of occurrence of hazardous events. 
• Estimates and examples of potential effects, especially on structures. 
• Real-time display of what is happening during the course of a disaster. 
• Systems for contingency planning. 
• Codes, standards and construction methods for structures. 
 
2.4 COMPLEXITY OF URBAN DISASTER MANAGEMENT 
 
Waugh (2000) considers that disaster management programmes are difficult to design, 
implement and coordinate for the following reasons: 
 
• Disaster management is a low-priority political issue, only getting on the public agenda 
during or immediately after a disaster.  Officials and the public are also quick to forget the 
lessons learned from disasters and thus are fated to repeat mistakes. 
• Disaster management programmes generally do not have strong political constituencies 
to support effective action and to encourage larger budget allocations.  Residents seldom 
lobby for stronger building codes and more restrictive land-use regulations or vote for 
funding mitigation measures. 
• Regulatory efforts to reduce the impact of disasters and to manage known hazards better 
often meet strong opposition.  Without data to substantiate the need for regulatory 
programmes, with the benefits expressed in dollar terms, there is little to offset the 
economic costs of regulation. 
• Disaster management programmes generally do not have politically influential 
administrative constituencies.  Key personnel are often political appointees and may not 
remain in office long enough to implement effective counter-disaster programmes.  
Relatively few elected officials and career public administrators understand and 
appreciate the importance of disaster management programmes.  Disaster managers are 
often out of the administrative mainstream, in small and ill-funded offices.  They may be 
viewed as lacking recognised technical expertise and administrative skill, and/or the level 
of education of other officials. 
• The effectiveness of emergency management policies and programmes is difficult to 
measure unless there has been a disaster. 
• The technical complexity of disaster management programmes frequently makes them 
difficult to explain to the public and to officials who control budgets, as well as making it 
difficult to design effective programmes. 
  35
• The horizontal and vertical fragmentation of the government creates jurisdictional 
confusion and leads to coordination problems. 
• It is often difficult to create good working relationships amongst national, provincial and 
local agencies because fiscal, administrative and policy-making capacities differ greatly. 
• The current political climate is more hospitable to programmes that are decentralised and 
is also more supportive of state and local self-reliance, particularly in fiscal matters. 
• Financial resources for new programmes and initiatives are scarce at any level, unless it 
can be documented that they will save money or a “policy window” created by a major 
disaster stimulates public support for action. 
• The diversity of hazards complicates the assessment of risk and the design of disaster 
management programmes. 
 
2.5 CONCLUSIONS 
 
It was concluded that urban disaster management is a complex issue as it involves multiple 
stakeholders and strategy possibilities which can be implemented at different points in time.  
Moreover, disasters are often regarded as “Acts of God” and therefore the issue of human 
perception must be always taken into account.  It was also concluded that as disasters do 
not respect political or administrative boundaries, the establishment of information networks 
should be high on planning agendas.  Finally, since disaster management is only one of 
many issues that decision-makers face, efforts must be made to raise awareness of the 
benefits of disaster mitigation.  
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Chapter Three:  DESCRIBING THE EARTHQUAKE 
PHENOMENON 
 
Rather than focusing on the production of hazard zonations and vulnerability determination, 
this research focuses on developing a methodology for the production of an inventory of 
buildings, the data integration necessary to estimate risk, and the use of these estimations 
for the purpose of urban strategy formulation.  It is necessary, however, to review the most 
important characteristics of natural phenomena as this allows a better explanation of the 
reasoning behind the various risk assessment methodologies that have been developed.  
Particular attention is paid to those earthquake characteristics that have a strong bearing on 
structural damage.  Chapter Four reviews the approaches to earthquake damage 
assessment by different groups and presents a summary of the strengths and problems 
detected. 
 
3.1  PHYSICAL PARAMETERS OF NATURAL HAZARDS 
 
In describing hazard zonation maps, it is necessary to explain concepts related to the 
physical parameters of natural phenomena.  Tobin and Montz (1997) consider the following 
to be the relevant parameters of natural events: 
 
• Physical mechanisms relate to magnitude, duration and spatial distribution of natural 
hazards.  By measuring magnitude, one can define the knowledge of nature and improve 
the response.  The magnitude of natural hazards represents a force of nature rather than 
determining the vulnerability of a particular population.  It is important to distinguish 
between magnitude and intensity.  Magnitude should be considered as an appraisal of 
the physical parameter of a geophysical event (i.e. the Richter Scale for earthquakes), 
while intensity relates to the impact of an event on human systems.  Sometimes 
assessments of some hazards are given as intensity estimates since direct 
measurements are difficult to make.  Two examples of intensity scales are the Fujica 
Scale for tornadoes and the Modified Mercalli Intensity Scale (MMI) for earthquakes 
(refer to Appendix 1).  The duration scale for natural events ranges from a few seconds 
(as in the case of earthquakes and tornadoes) to years (as in the case of droughts).  The 
spatial distribution relates to the area in which the hazardous events take place.  In most 
cases, natural phenomena can be spatially defined and therefore mapped. 
 
• Temporal distribution refers to frequency, seasonality and diurnal patterns.  By 
examining the frequency (also known as return, recurrence and occurrence period or 
interval) of specific hazardous events, it is possible to establish whether particular 
physical processes can be delineated within a temporal framework, such as on seasonal 
or diurnal scales.  The traditional approach for measuring an event’s return period has 
been to analyse historical records by calculating the average number of occurrences 
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over a specific time period.  It is important to note that return periods can be misleading 
since there are periods of high activity followed by periods of low activity that are 
overlooked. 
 
Over a million earthquakes are detected by sensitive seismographs on Earth every year.  
From the analysis of such records, one can conclude that small earthquakes occur more 
frequently than larger ones. However, over 50,000 of these earthquakes are large enough 
to be felt by people each year (Table 3.1).  
 
Descriptor Magnitude Average Annually 
Great 8 and higher 1 
Major 7 - 7.9 18 
Strong 6 - 6.9 120 
Moderate 5 - 5.9 800 
Light 4 - 4.9 6,200 (estimated) 
Minor 3 - 3.9 49,000 (estimated) 
Very Minor < 3.0 Magnitude 2 - 3: about 1,000 per day  
Magnitude 1 - 2: about 8,000 per day 
 
Table 3.1:  Frequency of Occurrence of Earthquakes Based on Observations since 1900 
(USGS 2002). 
 
Another temporal feature is seasonality, since some natural events occur more 
frequently at certain times of the year than others (i.e. hurricanes along the Caribbean 
take place between April and November each year).  Diurnal patterns are observed only 
in the case of thunderstorms, which typically occur during the late afternoon. 
 
• Warning period is also referred to as rapidity of commencement or speed of onset.  
This characteristic has a bearing on the success or failure of preventative action.  
Earthquakes, tornadoes and flash floods allow minimal to no warning.  A longer warning 
period is possible for volcanic activity, tsunamis, hurricanes, floods, etc. 
 
• Triggering effects relate to the secondary events that can take place following one main 
event (see Figure 3.1).  For example, the eruption of the Colombian volcano Nevado del 
Ruiz in 1985 triggered a lahar (volcanic debris flow) that killed 23,000 people in the town 
of Armero.  Epidemics claimed the lives of further inhabitants of Armero and were 
triggered by standing water and decomposing human and animal bodies.  Awareness of 
triggering effects is a very important issue and unfortunately one that is frequently 
overlooked by disaster managers. 
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Figure 3.1:  Triggering Effects by Various Natural Phenomena  
 
3.2 SEISMIC HAZARD  
 
An earthquake is the vibration of the Earth's surface caused by the release of energy in the 
Earth's crust. The sudden dislocation of segments of the crust usually generates this energy, 
although it can also be caused by man-made explosions or volcanic eruptions.  The most 
destructive earthquakes are of a tectonic nature, caused by the sudden dislocation of large 
rock masses along geological faults within the Earth's crust.  
 
The remaining sections in this chapter are largely based on US Geological Survey literature 
(USGS, 1997), and are presented to explain terminology that is used in Chapter 4. 
 
3.2.1 Faults and Seismic Waves 
 
A fault is a fracture within some particular rocky mass within the Earth's crust. Some faults 
can be many hundreds of miles long. Fault length is one important parameter, depth 
another.  The sudden movement of the two sides of an active fault, where both sides of the 
fracture move with respect to each other, causes an earthquake. This topic constitutes the 
field of global tectonics, which studies the deformation of the Earth’s crust. 
 
Over the course of time, the two sides of an active fault move slowly but continuously in 
relation to each other.  This movement is known as fault slip and it may be as little as a few 
inches or so per year.  The movement of these two sides of the fault with respect to each 
other cannot be entirely smooth.  The motion along the fault is accompanied by the gradual 
build-up of elastic strain energy within the rock.  The rock stores this strain like a giant spring 
being slowly tightened.  Eventually, the strain along the fault exceeds the capacity of the 
rocks (at that point) to store any additional strain.  The fault then ruptures, which means that 
it suddenly moves a comparatively large distance in a comparatively short amount of time.  
 
The time it takes for a particular area to reach the limit of elastic strain varies greatly. 
Compared with the typical human life span, however, it is usually long, varying anywhere 
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from a few decades to a few thousand years.  The average time it takes for earthquakes of a 
given magnitude to re-occur along a fault is known as the recurrence interval for that fault.  
 
Most importantly, the rupture of the fault also results in the sudden release of the strain 
energy that has been built up over the years, resulting in seismic waves.  These waves 
travel outward from the source of the earthquake along the surface and through the Earth at 
varying speeds, depending on the material through which they move.  It is actually the 
seismic waves caused by the sudden release of energy as a fault suddenly slips that creates 
most of the destructive effects. 
 
3.2.2 Earthquake-Related Hazards 
 
As Shedlock and Tanner (1999) point out, earthquake hazard assessment attempts to 
answer three basic questions: 
• Where do earthquakes occur? 
• How often do earthquakes occur? 
• How big can we expect these earthquakes to be? 
 
Earthquake-related hazards can be roughly divided into ground motion and collateral 
damage (refer to Figure 3.2).  This dissertation will focus on the effects of ground motion 
only.   
 
 
 
Figure 3.2:  Classification of Earthquake-Related Natural Hazards  
 
Ground Motion 
 
When seismic waves reach the surface of the Earth at such places, they give rise to what is 
known as “ground motion”. The most destructive of all earthquake hazards is caused by 
seismic waves reaching the ground surface at places where human-built structures, such as 
buildings and bridges, are located.  
 
Strong ground motion causes buildings and other structures to move and shake in a variety 
of complex ways.  Many buildings cannot withstand this movement and suffer damage of 
various kinds and degrees.  Most casualties, damage and economic losses caused by 
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earthquakes result from strong ground motion acting upon buildings incapable of 
withstanding such motion.  It is for this reason that it is often said, "Earthquakes don't kill 
people, buildings do."  Earthquake shaking can cause buildings and bridges to collapse; 
disrupt gas, electricity and telephone services; and sometimes trigger landslides, 
avalanches, mudflows, flash floods, fires and tsunamis (huge destructive ocean waves).   
 
Collateral Damage 
 
Ground rupture consists of liquefaction and landslides.  Liquefaction takes place when 
loosely packed, water-clogged sediments at or near the ground surface lose their strength in 
response to strong ground shaking.  When soil loses its bearing strength, buildings and other 
structures that rest on it will settle.  As observed following the 1985 Mexico City earthquake, 
structures may remain intact but become tilted.  In this case, the structure will probably need 
to be rebuilt, but little loss of life results. 
 
Landslides, another type of ground failure, are often highly destructive. Davidson (1997) 
considers that, besides damaging buildings and other structures, landslides can increase the 
impact of an earthquake by blocking and destabilising roads, and by inducing flash floods 
through blocking rivers.  Like liquefaction, landslide hazard is discussed in terms of 
susceptibility, opportunity and potential.  Susceptibility depends on soil cohesion, water level 
and slope steepness.  Opportunity depends on ground shaking demand, precipitation, and 
distance to the earthquake source.  During the 1964 Anchorage (Alaska) earthquake, 
landslides triggered by very strong local ground motion devastated the Turnagain Heights 
residential development and many downtown areas in Anchorage.  According to the United 
Nations Disaster Relief Co-ordinator (1991), in the 1970 earthquake in Peru, which claimed 
70,000 lives, about 20,000 people perished in the avalanche of debris from the north peak of 
Nevado Huascarán.   
 
Another important class of earthquake hazards are tsunamis.  According to Smith (1996), 
these result from the tectonic displacement of the seabed associated with large, shallow-
focus earthquakes under the oceans, but they can also be caused by exploding volcanic 
islands and large rock-falls into confined bays.  Tsunami is a Japanese word meaning “huge 
wave”, although in reality it consists of not one but a series of waves.  The crests of the 
waves may not extend far above the level of the water, but they may extend far below.  The 
wavelength (distance between wave crests) may stretch for a hundred or more kilometres, 
making the tsunami difficult to detect until it is in shallow water.  As the wave approaches the 
seashore, it increases in height due to the pulling of water from the shore.  The first warning 
that a tsunami is about to hit is usually the receding water.  The run-up is the maximum 
height the wave reaches and the inundation is the maximum distance it travels once it 
reaches shore.  Because there may be considerable time between waves − even though 
they can travel 800 km an hour − people have been killed returning to their homes after the 
initial waves.  In 1952 an earthquake off the coast of Kamchatka Peninsula, Russia, caused 
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a Pacific-wide tsunami that caused extensive damage in Hawaii.  Similarly, in 1960 Hawaii 
was hit by a major tsunami that originated off the coast of Chile in South America.  While 
there was considerable property damage in Hawaii and California, the devastation was 
greatest in Chile, where 330 to 2000 were killed (Waugh 2000). The Risk Management 
Systems Corporation Inc. (RMS) (in Davidson 1997) considers that three factors determine 
the severity of a tsunami: 
 
• The seismic source mechanism (i.e. magnitude and type of earthquake faulting 
mechanism) 
• The distance and seafloor topography over which the tsunami travels as it propagates 
from the source to the destination 
• The topography of the coast at the run-up site 
 
Damage to buildings also causes a variety of secondary effects that can be greatly 
destructive.  Fires, for example, are often created as a result of building damage resulting 
from an earthquake.  These post-earthquake fires have on some occasions in the past 
reached catastrophic dimensions.  The great San Francisco earthquake of 1906 and the 
Kanto (Japan) earthquake of 1923 were followed by fires that were amongst the largest 
peacetime fires in human history.  Fires that break out following earthquakes can be very 
destructive since there might be simultaneous ignitions and, moreover, the fire suppression 
capability may be impaired by damaged water supply systems, the unavailability of 
personnel, and restricted mobility due to debris-filled and damaged roads. Davidson (1997) 
considers that three main components govern the fire hazard:   
 
• The number and location of potential ignition sources (i.e. gas-line breaks, overturned 
water heaters, electrical shorts, flammable liquid spills) 
• The ease with which fire will spread in the city due to the distribution of fuel (i.e. wooden 
structures, building contents) 
• The ease with which fire can be controlled due to the characteristics of the region’s fire 
suppression agencies (i.e. management, fire-fighting personnel, emergency water 
supply, equipment) 
 
3.2.3  Magnitude and Intensity of Earthquakes 
 
The severity of an earthquake can be expressed in terms of both magnitude and intensity. 
Despite the two terms bearing different meanings, they are often incorrectly used as 
synonyms. 
 
The area of the fault where the sudden rupture takes place is called the focus or hypocentre 
of the earthquake.  The point on the Earth's surface directly above the focus is called the 
epicentre.  The magnitude is related to the amount of seismic energy released at the 
hypocentre.  It is based on the amplitude of the earthquake waves recorded on instruments 
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that have a common calibration but are located at various positions.  Seismographs record a 
trace that shows the varying amplitude over time of ground oscillations beneath the 
instrument.  Sensitive seismographs, which greatly magnify these ground motions, can 
detect strong earthquakes from sources anywhere in the world.  The time, location and 
magnitude of an earthquake can be determined from the data recorded by a number of 
seismograph stations.  The magnitude is thus represented by a single, instrumentally 
determined value (the Richter Scale).  
 
The Richter Scale is not used to express damage.  An earthquake in a densely populated 
area which results in many deaths and considerable damage may have the same magnitude 
as a shock in a remote area that does nothing more than frighten the wildlife.  Humans may 
not even feel large-magnitude earthquakes that occur beneath the oceans.  According to 
Sauter (1989), each whole number step in the magnitude scale corresponds to the release 
of about 32 times more energy than the amount associated with the preceding whole 
number value.  The local magnitude is determined using the M = log a/T + B relationship1.  It 
can also be determined by using the nomogram presented in Figure 3.3.  Given the 
epicentral distance (left axis) and the maximum wave amplitude A (right axis), a straight line 
drawn between the two axes determines magnitude M. 
  
 
Figure 3.3:  Determination of Richter Magnitude by Means of Nomogram (Bolt 1978)  
                                                 
1 Where a is the terrain displacement measured in microns (10 to -6 m), which is obtained by dividing the 
maximum amplitude of the record (A) by the amplification of the instrument; T is the wave’s period in seconds 
and B is a factor that considers the epicentral distance and the attenuation of the waves.    
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The effect of an earthquake on the Earth's surface is called the intensity.  Intensity is based 
on the observed effects of ground shaking on people, buildings and natural features.  It 
varies from place to place within the disturbed region, depending on the location of the 
observer with respect to the earthquake epicentre and the local site conditions.  The intensity 
scale consists of a series of certain key responses, such as people awakening, movement of 
furniture, damage to chimneys and finally total destruction. Although numerous intensity 
scales have been developed over the last several hundred years to evaluate the effects of 
earthquakes, the one currently used in many countries is the MMI Scale (refer to Appendix 
1).  The scale comprises 12 increasing levels of intensity, ranging from imperceptible 
shaking to catastrophic destruction, which are designated by Roman numerals.  It does not 
have a mathematical basis; instead it is an arbitrary ranking based on observed effects.  The 
lower numbers of the intensity scale generally deal with the manner in which the earthquake 
is felt by people.  The higher numbers of the scale are based on observed structural 
damage.  Structural engineers usually contribute information for assigning intensity values of 
Vlll or above.  It is important to note that many authors, amongst them Sauter (1989), 
consider that intensities between I and IV are irrelevant for seismic risk analysis as 90% of 
damage occurs from scale VIII upwards.  Other intensity scales include Rossi-Forel, 
Medredev-Sponheuer-Karnik (MSK) and the European Macroseismic Scale 1998 (EMS). 
 
The EMS Scale (refer to Appendix 2) also has a 12-degree range and is roughly equivalent 
to the MMI Scale.  The major difference is in the detail.  The different terms used are defined 
at the outset, in particular building types, damage grades and quantities, and these are now 
considered individually.  Also, it is the only scale to be illustrated.  Drawings show graphically 
precisely what is meant by the different damage grades and photographs can be used in the 
field for comparison with actual cases of damaged structures.  Since the description of 
damage is more detailed, this scale is more useful for formulating damage reduction 
strategies and for prioritising work. 
 
The intensity value assigned to a specific site after an earthquake is more meaningful to the 
non-scientist than the magnitude because intensity refers to the effects actually experienced 
at a particular place.  To assign intensity values, for example, following a widely-felt 
earthquake, the US Geological Survey mails questionnaires to postmasters in the disturbed 
area, requesting information.  The results of this postal survey and information furnished by 
other sources are used to assign an intensity value, and to compile isoseismal maps that 
show the extent of various levels of intensity within the felt area.  The maximum observed 
intensity generally occurs near the epicentre. 
 
3.2.4  Earthquake Prediction 
 
Scientific understanding of earthquakes is of vital importance.  The goal of earthquake 
research is to increase the reliability of earthquake probability estimates.  Ultimately, 
scientists would like to be able to specify a high probability for a specific earthquake on a 
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particular fault within a particular year.  Earthquake prediction provides warning of potentially 
damaging earthquakes early enough to allow an appropriate response to the disaster, thus 
enabling people to minimise loss of life and property. 
 
Scientists estimate earthquake probabilities in two ways: by studying the history of large 
earthquakes in a specific area and by measuring the rate at which strain accumulates in the 
rock.  They study the past frequency of large earthquakes in order to determine the future 
likelihood of similar large shocks.  For example, if experts estimate a 90% chance of a peak 
(maximum) ground acceleration (PGA) value of 0.10 g being exceeded at least once every 
50 years, a return period of 22 years is implied (refer to the equations below).  Stated in a 
different way, there is a 4.5% probability that such a scenario will occur in a year.   
 
(1 – p)n = 1 - Pn 
Rp = 1/p 
Where  :    
 Pn = Probability that the value is exceeded in n years 
 Rp = Return period 
 p = Probability that the value is exceeded in one year 
  
According to Shedlock and Tanner (1999), earthquake hazard can be estimated by means of 
a characterisation of the seismic sources, the attenuation of ground motion and the actual 
calculation of probabilities.  Seismic catalogues are the main tool used to determine the 
seismic sources (where, how often and how big earthquakes are likely to be).  These 
catalogues contain the following data: 
 
• Date of occurrence  
• Coordinates of the epicentre in degrees of latitude and longitude 
• Focal depth 
• Magnitude 
 
Figure 3.4:  Attenuation Curves (Sauter 1989) 
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The most frequently used parameter to define ground motion is the PGA, expressed either 
as gals (cm/s2) or as a percentage of gravity (% g).  Attenuation relationships express the 
maximum acceleration produced by an event at a given site at a certain distance from the 
epicentre.  In other words, they express ground motion as a function of magnitude and 
distance (refer to Figure 3.4).    
 
A considerable amount of data regarding earthquakes is given in intensity (usually in MMI).  
Several researchers (the most widely known being Gutenberg and Richter (1942), as well as 
Trifunac and Brady (1975)) have therefore related PGA values, which are instrumental 
measurements, to the observed intensity values, which are subjective measurements.  
Figure 3.5 illustrates the relationships according to several authors; a considerable variance 
is observed and it highlights one of the many sources of uncertainty in risk assessment. 
 
 
Figure 3.5:  PGA – Intensity Relationships (Sauter and Shah 1978)  
 
Gutenberg and Richter developed an empirical relationship between magnitude and 
occurrence (log N = a – b·M) to determine return periods2 (refer to Figure 3.6). 
 
The validity of the probability (and return period) results obviously depends on the amount 
and quality of data.  Scientific information about earthquakes is very scarce and instrumental 
                                                 
2 Where N is the number of events of higher than magnitude M per unit of time; a and b are seismic fixed values 
characteristic of each zone; M is the magnitude expressed on the Richter Scale. 
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records have only been available for the past 100 years.  The extrapolation into the future 
and the prediction based on data collected in such a relatively short period of time therefore 
make the predictions somewhat unreliable.  
  
 
Figure 3.6:  Gutenberg and Richter Relationship (Sauter 1989) 
 
Another way to estimate the likelihood of future earthquakes is to study how fast strain 
accumulates.  When plate movements build up the strain in rocks to a critical level, rocks will 
suddenly break and slip to a new position.  Scientists measure how much strain accumulates 
along a fault segment each year, the time since the last earthquake along the segment, and 
how much strain was released in the last earthquake.  This information is then used to 
calculate the time required for the accumulation of strain to build up to the level that results 
in an earthquake.  This simple model is complicated by the fact that such detailed 
information about faults is rare.  According to USGS (1997), in the USA only the San 
Andreas Fault system in California has adequate records for using this prediction method.  
 
Both these methods, and a wide array of monitoring techniques, are being tested along part 
of the San Andreas Fault.  Over the past 150 years, earthquakes of approximately 
magnitude 6 have occurred on average once every 22 years on this fault near Parkfield, 
California (the last one took place in 1966).  Due to the consistency and similarity of these 
earthquakes, scientists have started an experiment to "capture" the next Parkfield 
earthquake.  A dense web of monitoring instruments, including global positioning systems 
(GPS), was deployed in the region during the late 1980s.  The main goals of the ongoing 
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Parkfield Earthquake Prediction Experiment are to record the geophysical signals before and 
after the expected earthquake, to issue a short-term prediction, and to develop effective 
methods of communication between earthquake scientists and community officials 
responsible for disaster response and mitigation.  This project has already made important 
contributions to both earth science and public policy.   
 
3.2.5  Ground Motion 
 
The dynamic response of a building to earthquake ground motion is the most important 
cause of earthquake-induced damage.  Failure of the ground and soil beneath buildings is 
also a major cause of damage.  However, contrary to popular belief, buildings are rarely, if 
ever, damaged because of fault displacement beneath a building.  
 
 
 
Figure 3.7: Ground Motion (USGS 1997) 
 
The seismic waves travel for great distances before finally losing most of their energy (see 
Figure 3.7).  At some time after their generation, these seismic waves will reach the Earth's 
surface and set it in motion, which not surprisingly is referred to as earthquake ground 
motion.  When this phenomenon occurs beneath a building and when it is strong enough, it 
sets the building in motion, starting with the building's foundation.  It then transfers the 
motion throughout the rest of the building in a very complex way, in turn inducing forces that 
can produce damage.  
 
The complexity of earthquake-induced ground motion is due to three factors:  
• Source effects: the seismic waves generated at the time of the earthquake fault 
movement are not all of a uniform character. 
• Path effects: as these waves pass through the Earth on their way from the fault to the 
building site, the soil and rock media through which they pass modify them.  When the 
waves pass through a material of different density, their speed and heading change (see 
Figure 3.8). 
• Local site effects: once the seismic waves reach the building site they undergo further 
modifications, which are dependent upon the characteristics of the ground and soil 
beneath the building and the topography of the terrain.  
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Figure 3.8:  Path Effects of Seismic Waves (adapted from Bolt 1978) 
 
The parameters of earthquake ground motions that have the greatest importance for 
buildings are: the duration, amplitude (of displacement, velocity and most importantly 
acceleration) and frequency of the ground motion.  Frequency is defined as the number of 
complete cycles of vibration made by the wave per second.  A complete vibration is the 
distance between one crest of the wave and the next, in other words one full wavelength 
(abbreviated as 1 Hz).  Surface ground motion at the building site is a complex superposition 
of vibrations of different frequencies. At any given site, some frequencies usually 
predominate.  
 
3.2.6 Site Effects 
 
Earthquake intensity at a given site is attenuated or increased by local site conditions.  Two 
significant factors that determine amplification are soil and topography.  Urban (2002) 
considers that site conditions are perhaps the most complex subject to model within the field 
of earthquake hazard.  
 
Soil Effects 
 
According to the same author, the physical-mechanical properties of soil (i.e. cohesion, 
structure and depth of the superficial layers) influence the vertical transmission of the wave.  
In general, the intensity of ground motion is higher in unconsolidated soft soils than in firm 
soil or rock. 
  
According to Finn (1994), damage patterns in Mexico City after the 1985 Michoacán 
earthquake demonstrated conclusively the significant effects of local site conditions on the 
seismic response of the ground.  Peak accelerations of incoming motions in rock, generally 
less than 0.04 g, were amplified about five times on the clay soils of the old lakebed, with 
devastating effects for structures with periods close to site periods.  Similarly, Housner (in 
Finn 1994) points out that in the 1989 Loma Prieta earthquake major damage occurred on 
soft sites in the San Francisco-Oakland region, where the spectral accelerations were 
Epicenter
Hypocenter
City
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amplified two to four times above adjacent rock sites.  Similarly, the research of Rebez, 
Peruzza et al. (1999) demonstrated that soil condition was a first-order factor influencing the 
level of the expected shaking, with an average increase of about 0.2 g for the prediction 
related to a 475-year return period for Italy, when passing from rock to soft soil.  Table 3.2 
illustrates the amplification factors applied on the basis of local soil maps.  
 
Soil Class Factor Description 
A 0.7 Hard rock 
B 0.8 Rock 
C 1.0 Very dense soil and soft rock (firm ground reference condition) 
D 1.5 Stiff soil 
E 2.0 Soft soil 
F 2.0 Special soils likely to liquefy or otherwise fail 
 
Table 3.2:  Soil Factors Affecting PGA (Emergency Preparedness Canada 1999) 
 
Topographic Effects 
 
Castro (1999) considers that the variation in intensity occurs due to the roughness or 
irregularity of the topography.  Additional authors (Sauter 1989; Urban 2002) found that 
topography has a significant influence on the intensity of the ground motion, and that the 
effect can be either amplification or attenuation.  Mulas de la Peña (1995) points out that the 
geological conditions have an equally meaningful influence; thus, if the edges of the valleys 
are constituted of unconsolidated soils, the amplifying effect can yet be even greater.   
 
 
 
Figure 3.9:  Site Effects on Ground Motion (Sauter 1989) 
 
Figure 3.9 illustrates the results of a research by Vogt (1987), who concluded that PGA near 
the valley (site B) is amplified by 50% with respect to a flat terrain (site A), while at the edge 
of the valley (site C) amplification was twice that of the reference value; at the bottom of the 
valley (site D) an attenuation exists and therefore PGA is reduced by 65%. 
 
According to Urban (2002), some relationships have been established based on differences 
in the length, width or height of the topography.  Others such as Mulas de la Peña (1995) 
approached this from the point of view of geometry from the base of a riverbed or ravine.  He 
concluded that the maximum amplification factors were obtained at the crests of the slopes 
with higher inclination.  Castro (1999) correlated geometry with the damage observed from 
A B C
D
E
F Gplain
valley
edge of 
valley crest
alluvial deposit
rock
  51
the 1999 Armenia-Colombia earthquake collected as the part of the Rapid Inventory of 
Earthquake Damage (RIED) project (ITC, TU Delft et al. 2000).     
 
There are differences of opinion related to the maximum distances from the borders of 
hillsides or scarps where building damage is above average.  For example, Geli et al. (in 
Urban 2002) consider that the effects exist up to a distance of 200 m, whereas Castro (1999) 
considers that the distance is 70 m.  Despite the differences of opinion related to the figures, 
there is consensus about the correlation between damage of buildings and borders of 
hillsides or scarps. 
 
As Sauter (1989) pointed out, despite recognition of the effect of topography on the intensity 
of ground motion, no appropriate methods to quantify this have been developed and 
therefore building codes currently lack this consideration. 
 
3.2.7 Building Response 
 
The response of a building to ground motion is as complex as the ground motion itself, yet 
typically quite different.  Buildings also begin to vibrate in a complex manner and, because 
this is a vibratory system, it also possesses a frequency content.  The building's vibrations, 
however, tend to centre around one particular frequency, which is known as its natural or 
fundamental frequency.  In general, the lower a building is, the higher its natural frequency; 
the taller the building is, the lower its natural frequency.  
 
An important quality of a building’s response is the building's natural period.  The building 
period is simply the inverse of the frequency: whereas the frequency is the number of times 
per second that the building will vibrate back and forth, the period is the time it takes for the 
building to make one complete vibration.  
 
This means that a very tall building with a low natural frequency has a high natural period.  
For example, it takes a skyscraper a comparatively long time to sway back and forth during 
strong wind (see Figure 3.10).  Table 3.3 below provides a representative range of building 
heights and natural periods: 
 
Height 
(in storeys) 
Typical Natural Period 
(s) 
Typical Frequency 
in cycles/second (Hz) 
2 0.2 5.0 
5 0.5 2.0 
10 1.0 1.0 
20 2.0 0.5 
30 3.0 0.3 
 
Table 3.3: Natural Periods and Frequencies per Building Height 
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When the frequency content of the ground motion is centred on the building's natural 
frequency, resonance occurs which tends to increase or amplify the building's response.  
Due to this, buildings suffer the greatest damage from ground motion at a frequency close or 
equal to their own natural frequency.  
  
 
 
Figure 3.10:  Building Height, Stiffness and Period (USGS 1997) 
 
The Mexico City earthquake of 19 September 1985 provides a striking illustration of this.  
The majority of the many buildings that collapsed during this earthquake were around 20 
storeys high and therefore had a natural frequency of around 2.0 Hz.  These 20-storey 
buildings were in resonance with the frequency contents of the 1985 earthquake.  Other 
buildings of different heights and with different vibrational characteristics were often found 
undamaged, even though they were located right next to the damaged 20-storey buildings.  
 
 
 
Figure 3.11:  Ground Acceleration Record (Sauter 1989) 
(record typical of a nearby earthquake: high frequencies and high horizontal acceleration)  
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Different buildings can respond in widely differing manners to the same earthquake ground 
motion.  Conversely, a given building will act differently during different earthquakes.  This 
phenomenon highlights the need to concisely represent the building's range of responses to 
ground motion of different frequency contents.  Such a representation is known as a 
response spectrum.  A response spectrum is a graph that plots the maximum response 
values of acceleration, velocity and displacement against period and frequency.  Such 
response spectra are very important in earthquake engineering.  
 
 
Figure 3.12:  Simplified Response Spectra (Sauter 1989) 
 
Figure 3.12 illustrates a response spectrum.  It shows how building response characteristics 
vary with building frequency and period. As building period lengthens, accelerations 
decrease and displacement increases.  On the other hand, buildings with shorter periods 
(but higher natural frequencies) undergo higher accelerations but smaller displacements.  
The amount of acceleration that a building undergoes during an earthquake is a critical 
factor in determining how much damage it will suffer.  The spectra in Figure 3.10 provide 
some indication of how accelerations are related to frequency characteristics.  Figure 3.9 
shows one way in which response spectra can be useful, since identifying the resonant 
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frequencies at which a building will undergo peak accelerations is one very important step in 
earthquake resistance.  
 
The damage that a building suffers primarily depends not upon its displacement but upon 
acceleration.  Whereas displacement is the actual distance the ground and the building may 
move during an earthquake, acceleration is a measure of how quickly they change speed as 
they move.  During an earthquake, the speed at which both the ground and building are 
moving will reach some maximum.  The more quickly this maximum is reached, the greater 
their acceleration.  
 
Acceleration has an important influence on damage because, as an object in movement, the 
building obeys Newton's Second Law of Dynamics.  The simplest form of the equation 
expressing the Second Law of Motion is:     F = M.A 
 
This states the Force acting on the building is equal to the Mass of the building times the 
Acceleration.  As the acceleration of the ground, and in turn of the building, increases, so 
does the force that affects the building, since the mass of the building is constant.  
 
 
 
Figure 3.13:  Acceleration, Inertial Forces (USGS 1997) 
 
The greater the force affecting a building (refer to Figure 3.13), the more damage it will 
suffer; decreasing F is an important goal of earthquake-resistant design.  When designing a 
new building, for example, it is desirable to make it as light as possible, which means of 
course that M, and in turn F, will be lessened.   
  
F is an inertial force, that is, the force is created by the building's tendency to remain at rest 
and in its original position, even though the ground beneath it is moving.  This inertial force F 
imposes strains upon the building's structural elements.  These structural elements primarily 
include the building's beams, columns, load-bearing walls and floors, as well as the 
connecting elements that tie these various structural elements together.  If these strains are 
large enough, the building's structural elements will suffer various types of damage. 
 
The magnitude of the building’s response (the accelerations that it undergoes) depends 
primarily upon the frequencies of the input ground motion and the building's natural 
frequency.  When these are near or equal to each other, the building's response reaches a 
Building
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peak level.  In some circumstances, this dynamic amplification effect can increase the 
building’s acceleration to a value two times or more that of the ground acceleration at the 
base of the building.  Generally, buildings with higher natural frequencies and a short natural 
period tend to suffer higher accelerations but smaller displacement.  In the case of buildings 
with lower natural frequencies and a long natural period, this is reversed: the buildings will 
experience lower accelerations but larger displacements.  
 
As stated before, the taller a building, the longer its natural period tends to be.  But the 
height of a building is also related to another important structural characteristic: the building 
flexibility.  Taller buildings tend to be more flexible than short buildings.  Therefore, a low 
building tends to be stiff, while a taller building tends to be flexible.   
 
Stiffness greatly affects the building's uptake of earthquake-generated force.  Ductility is the 
ability to undergo distortion or deformation such as bending without resulting in complete 
breakage or failure.  The ductility of a structure is one of the most important factors affecting 
its earthquake performance.  One of the primary tasks of an engineer designing a building to 
be earthquake-resistant is to ensure that it will possess sufficient ductility to withstand the 
size and types of earthquakes it is likely to experience during its lifetime.  
 
Ground and building motion during an earthquake has a complex, vibratory nature. The 
building actually moves back and forth in many different horizontal directions.  All vibrating 
objects, including buildings, tend to eventually stop vibrating as time goes on. More 
precisely, the amplitude of vibration decays with time.  Without damping, a vibrating object 
would never stop vibrating once it had been set in motion.  All buildings possess some 
intrinsic damping.  The more damping a building possesses, the sooner it will stop vibrating, 
which of course is highly desirable from the standpoint of earthquake performance.  
 
3.3 CONCLUSIONS 
 
It was concluded that the triggering effects of natural phenomena are an important 
consideration in scenario development.  It was also concluded that unless hazard maps 
have been developed on the basis of a complete earthquake catalogue and have been 
calibrated for local soil and topography, the results of an urban risk assessment are likely to 
be inaccurate.  Finally, since one important cause of building damage is resonance, risk 
assessment should be developed for typical resonant frequencies. 
 
  56
  57
Chapter Four:  METHODOLOGY REVIEW 
 
This chapter reviews the opinions and approaches to earthquake damage assessment of 
different groups and presents a summary of the strengths and problems detected.  In 
Chapter Five, the case study is introduced.  A review is made of the current legal framework 
regulating urban planning and disaster management. 
 
4.1  INTRODUCTION 
 
Contact was established with many government agencies, research centres and software 
developers around the world in the search for detailed technical information on their views 
and findings, or any particular method they had developed for assessing building risk.  Many 
of those contacted, particularly the software manufacturers, have unfortunately responded 
with comments such as “for obvious reasons we can not give you the details …”.  This 
seems to imply there is considerable profit resulting from loss predictions and that this 
information is valuable to users beyond the public planning environment.  It would appear 
that many of these methodologies were developed for the insurance industry and, therefore, 
they are considered “secret assets” due to their high commercial value and are not readily 
available to the general public.   
 
Several previous research methods will be described to better explain the approaches to risk 
assessment that have been used and to be able to identify their methodological constraints.  
 
4.1.1  Small-Scale Approaches 
 
In China, Chen, Chen et al. (1997) use GDP (gross domestic product) instead of building 
stock considerations, since they believe that the number of man-made facilities is directly 
proportional to GDP.  Their approach, however, does allow the production of a city risk 
zonation map.  Their method is based on a macroscopic index of exposure and population 
distribution.  Since GDP figures are rarely available at regional or local level, the method can 
be used for establishing only risk at national level and only for macro-economic planning.   
 
 Papadopoulos and Arvanitides (1996) have developed a quantitative approach for 
assessing the earthquake risk for each of the 23 regions of Greece.  Their method is 
therefore applicable to large scales.  Age of construction, average population density and 
regional GDP per capita are the parameters used.  The construction age is used as the 
authors consider that the year of implementation of the building code constitutes a turning 
point in the increased earthquake resistance or decreased vulnerability of the structures.  
The benchmark, however, is not the year of implementation itself (1959) but 1965, as they 
consider some time is needed for adjusting to new regulations.  Population vulnerability is 
assessed by means of flat population densities.  Since this method is intended for estimating 
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regional risk, an assumption has been made that the relative value of the elements at risk is 
proportional to the regional GDP per capita.  The results are reclassified and presented on a 
five-class qualitative scale (very low, low, intermediate, high and very high). 
 
At the John A. Blume Earthquake Engineering Centre at Standford University, Davidson 
(1997) developed a composite specific risk index, referred to as the Urban Earthquake 
Disaster Risk Index (EDRI), to allow a comparison of the relative overall earthquake disaster 
risk of cities worldwide.  The objective therefore is to produce not zonation maps but rather a 
simple indicator (see Figure 4.1).  EDRI assesses the specific risk for a city as a whole, not 
for a specific site. 
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Figure 4.1: Comparison of EDRI Results  (Davidson 1997)  
 
EDRI considers factors that contribute to the specific risk whereas loss estimation models 
aim at estimating the expected consequences of future earthquakes (i.e. deaths, injuries, 
damaged buildings, economic loss).  The main headings (refer to Figure 4.2) that are 
identified as contributing factors in EDRI are: 
 
• Hazards: magnitude, spatial distribution and frequency of the geological triggering 
phenomena 
• Exposure: size of the city measured in terms of quantity of people and physical objects 
as well as amount and types of supported activities 
• Vulnerability: the ease with which exposed people, physical objects and activities may be 
affected 
• External context: the way in which impact within a city affects people and activities 
outside the city 
• Emergency response and recovery capability: the way in which a city can effectively and 
efficiently reduce the consequences of an earthquake through formal and organised 
efforts 
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 Figure 4.2:  Conceptual Framework of EDRI (source:  Davidson 1997) 
 
One or more simple and measurable indicators (see Table 4.1) are used to represent each 
of the broad abstract criteria presented (refer to Figure 4.1).  The indicators have been 
chosen on the basis of: 
 
• Validity: the indicator accurately represent the factors for which they are proxies 
• Data availability and quality: indicators are measured using data that is reliable, available 
in a consistent form from around the world, and relatively easy to collect 
• Quantitativeness and objectivity: indicators are easily evaluated and understood 
• Comprehensible: indicators should be understandable; familiar concepts and measuring 
systems should be used 
• Directness: indicators measure the concept of interest itself 
 
The index illustrates (see Figure 4.1), for example, that the specific risk (EDRI) in Jakarta is 
about equal to that of San Francisco but significantly less than that of Tokyo.  It also 
indicates that the specific risk in Jakarta is caused mostly by high vulnerability and 
insufficient emergency response and recovery capability.  The specific risk in San Francisco 
results from the high frequency of earthquakes, while in Tokyo it results from the vast 
number of people and structures exposed.   
 
Several approaches leading to the production of seismic risk information of higher spatial 
resolution will be discussed next.  In Costa Rica, Montero and Rodríguez (1990) have 
classified the building stock according to the census tract data.  The parameters they used 
were:  
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Ground Shaking • Exp (MMI w/50-year return period 
• Exp (MMI w/500-year return period 
• Percentage of urbanised area w/soft soil 
Collateral Hazards • Percentage of urbanised area with high liquefaction 
susceptibility 
• Percentage of buildings that are wood 
• Population density 
• Tsunami potential indicator 
Physical Infrastructure 
Exposure 
• Population 
• Per capita GNP, constant 1999 US$ figure 
• Number of housing units 
• Urbanised area 
Population Exposure • Population 
Economy Exposure • Per capita GNP, constant 1990 US$ figure 
Physical Infrastructure 
Vulnerability 
• Seismic code indicator 
• City wealth indicator 
• City age indicator 
• Population density 
• City development speed indicator 
Population Vulnerability • Percentage of population aged 0-4 or above 65 
Economic External Context • Economic context indicator 
Political External Context • Political country context indicator 
• Political world context indicator 
Planning • Planning indicator 
Resources • Per capita GNP, constant 1990 US$ figure 
• Ten-year average of annual real growth in per capita GNP 
• Housing vacancy rate 
• Number of hospitals per 100,000 people 
• Number of physicians per 100,000 people 
Mobility and Access • Extreme weather indicator 
• Population density 
• City layout indicator 
 
Table 4.1:  EDRI Sample Analysis Indicators (Davidson 1997) 
  
• building material (i.e. adobe, wood and concrete) 
• maintenance level (i.e. good, regular, poor) 
• land-use, since they consider that building code enforcement is lower in residential areas 
compared with other land-uses   
 
To establish the population vulnerability they used a flat population density figure only.  The 
result is a risk zonation with no further analysis of the economic losses that this could imply.   
 
  61
   Probability of Damage (%) by Intensity (MMI) and 
Damage State  
Damage 
State 
Damage 
Factor 
Range (%) 
Central 
Damage 
Factor (%) 
 
VI 
 
VII 
 
VIII 
 
IX 
 
X 
 
XI 
 
XII 
1. None 0 0 3.7       
2. Slight 0-1 0.5 68.5 26.8 1.6     
3. Light 1-10 5 27.8 73.2 94.9 62.4 11.5 1.8  
4. Moderate 10-30 20   3.5 37.6 76.0 75.1 24.8 
5. Heavy 30-60 45     12.5 23.1 73.5 
6. Major 60-100 80       1.7 
7. Destroyed 100 100        
Mean Damage Factor (MDF) (%) 1.73 3.79 5.45 10.6 21.4 25.5 39.4 
 
Table 4.2:  DPM for Wood-Frame Structure Type According to MMI (ATC (Applied Technology 
Council) 1985) 
 
In California, King and Kiremidjian (1999) have used the ATC-13 (California Earthquake 
Damage Data) classification of building structures, which subdivides buildings into 15 
classes.  However, because of the degree of uncertainty in the ground visual inspections, 
they insist on the need to aggregate the results to a lower spatial resolution − in this case the 
census track level.  Damage ratios derived from the ATC-13 damage data were produced to 
depict building vulnerability (see Table 4.2 and Figure 4.3).  Population vulnerability is 
addressed by using flat population densities overlaid onto building vulnerability, meaning that 
it is a “mirror” function of building vulnerability.  Their approach describes the quantification 
of the economic losses by multiplying the area of the building by the present construction 
cost for that type of building.   
 
4.1.2 Large-Scale Approaches 
 
ATC-13 presents historical damage data in the form of damage probability matrixes (DPM) 
such as that of Table 4.2.  A DPM relates the probabilities of reaching or exceeding the 
damage state as a function of the ground motion intensity according to the Modified Mercalli 
Intensity (MMI) (for a description of the MMI, refer to Chapter 3 and Appendix I).  The mean 
damage factor (MDF) for a construction class exposed to the same level of intensity is the 
product of the central damage factor and the associated probabilities.  The MDFs can be 
used to depict the overall building vulnerability (see Table 4.2).  The Applied Technology 
Council (ATC) defines the percentage financial loss in terms of “damage factor” as follows: 
 
 
              DF  = DL  / Rv 
Where: 
 DF:  damage factor 
 DL:   dollar loss 
 Rv:  replacement value 
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Cardona (1997) modified the ATC-13 classification to better reflect the Colombian building 
stock.  He added the construction year of the building since he considered that it was evident 
from damage data that pre-seismic-code buildings were bad performers.  He used ATC-13 
damage curves, although slightly modifying them.  Similarly to King and Kiremidjian (1999), 
he collected information at individual building level but aggregated it later to a lower spatial 
resolution that he called “cells”. Population vulnerability was addressed by using a flat 
population density, although two scenarios (a night and a day scenario) were used to depict 
commuting trends.    
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Figure 4.3:  Comparison of Building Vulnerability for Two Types of Structures 
(based on ATC-13 mean damage ratios) 
 
In Italy, Menoni, Petrini et al. (1997) used a quite different approach.  Buildings were divided 
into four classes according to their maintenance condition, but then they rated them 
according to the degree of compliance with the construction code, relying on ground visual 
observations.  The method for establishing social and economic losses was not discussed.   
 
In Turkey, Erdik and Swift-Avci (1997) performed an interesting test for assessing present 
risk in old Istanbul, using Turkish earthquake data as well as ATC-13 and other damage data 
sources in order to compare the differences and similarities between the results.   
 
The National Institute of Building Sciences (NIBS) developed a methodology referred to as 
HAZUS (National Institute of Building Sciences (NIBS) 1999) for assessing earthquake risk 
in the USA.  This methodology was developed for the Federal Emergency Management 
Agency (FEMA).  The goal of FEMA was to provide federal, state and local agencies, as well 
as other public and private organisations, with a methodology that was not only reliable but 
would also allow comparisons between different areas.  
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Generally speaking, this constitutes a more sophisticated approach than those previously 
discussed.  Damage predictions for model building types for a given level of ground shaking 
are developed as the basis for estimating:  
 
• Casualties due to structural damage  
• Monetary losses due to building damage (i.e. cost of repairing or replacing damaged 
buildings and their contents) 
• Monetary losses resulting from building damage and closure (e.g. losses due to business 
interruption) 
• Social impacts (i.e. loss of shelter) 
• Other economic and social impacts 
 
NIBS (1999) developed functions for estimating building damage due to ground shaking.  
The extent and severity of damage to structural (and non-structural) components of a 
building are described by one of five damage states: None, Slight, Moderate, Extensive and 
Complete.  The functions that were developed for estimating building damage due to ground 
shaking include: 
 
• Fragility curves that describe the probability of reaching or exceeding different states of 
damage given peak building response 
• Building capacity (push-over) curves that are used (with damping-modified demand 
spectra) to determine peak building response 
 
HAZUS uses a technique to estimate peak building response as the intersection of the 
building capacity curve and the response spectrum shaking demand at the building’s 
location demand spectrum.   
 
The building capacity curves 
developed for HAZUS are based 
on engineering design parameters 
and judgment.  According to NIBS 
(1999), three control points that 
define model building capacity 
describe each curve: 
 
• Design capacity 
•     Yield capacity 
•     Ultimate capacity 
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Figure 4.4:  Example Building Capacity Curve (NIBS, 1999) 
Sa=spectral acceleration, Sd=spectral displacement  
 
 
• Design capacity represents the nominal building strength required by current model 
seismic code provisions (e.g. National Institute of Building Sciences (NIBS) 2001), or an 
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estimate of the nominal strength for buildings not designed for earthquake loads.  Wind 
design is not considered in the estimation of design capacity, and certain buildings (e.g. 
tall buildings located in zones of low or moderate seismicity) may have a lateral design 
strength considerably greater than that based on seismic code provisions. 
• Yield capacity represents the true lateral strength of the building, considering 
redundancies in design, conservatism in code requirements and true (rather than 
nominal) strength of materials.   
• Ultimate capacity represents the maximum strength of the building when the global 
structural system has reached a fully plastic state.  Ultimate capacity implicitly accounts 
for loss of strength due to shear failure of brittle elements.  Typically, buildings are 
assumed capable of deforming beyond their ultimate point without loss of stability, but 
their structural system provides no additional resistance to lateral earthquake force.  
 
These fragility curves (see Figure 4.5) describe the probability of being in a specific damage 
state and they express damage as a function of building displacement.  Peak ground 
acceleration (PGA) is used rather than the Modified Mercalli Scale (for equivalent MMI 
values for PGA, refer to Appendix I).  The PGA allows for more precision as probabilities are 
not given at an ordinal scale but at a continuous scale; however, depending on the contents 
of the hazard mapping, it may provide no advantage over the MMI. 
 
The above method used the ATC-13 classification, although the building type “mobile 
homes” was added to the classification.  This classification is enhanced by further 
subdividing the building types according to the number of storeys, giving a total of 36 
classes.  A parameter is incorporated related to compliance with building code regulations: 
pre-code, low / medium / high code compliance.   
 
 
Figure 4.5:  Example of Fragility Curves (National Institute of Building Sciences (NIBS) 1999) 
 
The historical building damage and casualty data used is “global” in nature, as the California 
damage data contained in the ATC-13 database (known as ATC-13d) was combined with 
data from other countries.  FEMA considered this necessary since ATC-13d contained 
limited data on the total collapse of buildings and it was believed that by incorporating data 
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from the earthquakes in El Salvador, Mexico and Armenia (former USSR), the forecasts 
would be more reliable.  The damage data is presented in the form of fragility curves (see 
Figure 4.5).   
 
The breakdown into five damage states is used not only to calculate the cost of damage to 
the building stock but also to calculate casualties, injuries and shelter needs.  For example, 
NIBS (1999) assumes that there is a strong correlation between building damage (both 
structural and non-structural) and the number and severity of casualties.  It considers that in 
smaller earthquakes, non-structural damage will most likely control the casualty estimate, 
while in severe earthquakes (where there will be a large number of collapses and partial 
collapses) there will be a proportionately larger number of fatalities.  The total floor area of 
buildings within the “complete” damage state is therefore used to estimate the number of 
casualties (refer to Figure 4.6).  
 
The casualty output consists of four injury severity levels (first proposed by Durkin and Thiel 
(1993)) presented at the census tract level.  Table 4.3 defines the injury classification scale 
used in HAZUS. NIBS (1999) considers that the selected four-level injury scale represents 
an achievable compromise between the demands of the medical community (in order to plan 
their response) and the ability of the engineering community to provide the required data.  
For example, medical professionals would like to have the classification in terms of "injuries 
and illnesses" to account for worsened medical conditions caused by an earthquake (e.g. 
heart condition).  However, currently available casualty assessment methodologies do not 
allow a finer resolution in the casualty scale definition. 
 
Severity Level Injury Description 
1 Injuries requiring basic medical aid without requiring hospitalisation 
2 Injuries requiring a greater degree of medical care and hospitalisation, but 
not expected to progress to a life-threatening status 
3 Injuries that pose an immediate life-threatening condition if not treated 
adequately and expeditiously.  The majority of these injuries are the result 
of structural collapse and subsequent entrapment or impairment of the 
occupants. 
4 Instantaneously killed or mortally injured 
 
Table 4.3:  Injury Classification Scale  
(National Institute of Building Sciences (NIBS) 1999) 
 
To assess the population vulnerability, a three-scenario approach was adopted (2 a.m., 2 
p.m. and 5 p.m.).  The reasoning behind these scenarios is not explained by NIBS but it is 
probably the following: 
• 2 a.m. depicts the population densities when people are at home 
• 2 p.m. depicts the population densities when people are at work or school 
• 5 p.m. depicts the population densities when people are commuting 
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One interesting aspect relates to fatalities in the commuting population being established as 
a percentage of people located under or on bridges or overpasses. 
 
Damage probabilities per structural damage states (slight, moderate, extensive and 
complete) are used to calculate the number of people in each of the injury severity levels.  
The casualty rates used in HAZUS are relatively uniform across building types for a given 
damage level, with differentiation to account for types of construction that pose higher than 
average hazard at moderate damage levels (e.g. falling of pieces of un-reinforced masonry) 
or at severe levels (e.g. complete collapse of heavy concrete construction as compared with 
wood-frame construction).  Rates used in the ATC-13 method were evaluated and revised 
based on comparison with a limited amount of historical data.  According to NIBS (1999), in 
the Northridge earthquake of 1994, the casualties estimated by HAZUS are a reasonable 
representation of the actual numbers observed. 
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Figure 4.6:  Conceptual Flow Methodology of Casualty Estimation  
(National Institute of Building Sciences (NIBS) 1999)  
 
The final casualty output produced by HAZUS is (refer to Figure 4.6): 
 
• Casualty rates by model building type for slight structural damage (damage state 1) 
• Casualty rates by model building type for moderate structural damage (damage state 2) 
• Casualty rates by model building type for extensive structural damage (damage state 3) 
• Casualty rates by model building type for complete structural damage (damage state 4) 
without structural collapse 
• Casualty rates by model building type for complete structural damage (damage state 4) 
with structural collapse 
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One of the strengths of the method is that it distinguishes between “regular” and “essential” 
facilities.  Bolt (1994) considers that one of the lessons after the 1989 Loma Prieta 
earthquake in California was the seismic fragility of many crucial facilities.  He argues that, in 
decision-making on risk reduction, the failure to allow for the functioning of key institutions 
such as hospitals, banks and utilities as well as life safety can have the gravest 
consequences.  “Essential” facilities are those vital to emergency response and recovery 
following a disaster and therefore include medical care facilities, emergency response 
facilities and schools.  School buildings are included because they often play a key role in 
housing people displaced from damaged homes.  This highlights the fact that emergency 
and relief planning considerations are being carefully addressed by NIBS.  Generally there 
are very few of each type of essential facility (if any) in a census tract, making it easier to 
obtain site-specific information for each facility.  For “essential” facilities, a thorough building-
by-building inspection is suggested, along with computer structural response modelling. 
 
In HAZUS, the general building stock is inventoried by calculating, for each census tract, the 
total area of groups of buildings with specific characteristics (i.e. calculating the total area of 
low-rise un-reinforced masonry structures).  The methodology is therefore based on the 
census tracts as the smallest geographical unit.  Census tracts are divisions of land that are 
designed to contain 2,500 to 8,000 inhabitants with relatively homogeneous population 
characteristics, economic status and living conditions.  For this reason the physical area 
within census tracts will vary depending on the density of the population.  In densely 
populated regions census tracts can be a few city blocks, whereas in rural areas a census 
tract may be many square miles.  Census tract divisions and boundaries change only once 
every 10 years.  Census tract boundaries never cross county boundaries; hence they can 
completely and uniquely define all the area within a county.  This characteristic allows a 
unique division of land from country to state to county to census tract (National Institute of 
Building Sciences (NIBS) 1999).  
    
NIBS considers that collecting even this “simplified” inventory can be problematic, as there 
are rarely reliable and complete databases that provide the necessary information (i.e. 
building size, building occupancy, building height, structural system).   
 
It therefore proposes two possible methods for capturing data for creating an inventory of 
regular buildings: 
 
• Application of a set of guidelines called “Rapid Visual Screening of Buildings for Potential 
Seismic Hazards (Applied Technology Council (ATC) 1988).  Broadly speaking, the 
screening of regular buildings requires a sidewalk inspection lasting between 15 and 20 
minutes per building. 
• Inferences about large groups of buildings based on land-use patterns; for example,  if 
this is a residential area, 50% of the buildings are single-family wooden structures and 
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50% are multi-family wooden structures.  NIBS (1999) considers that there are 
inaccuracies in the inventory of general building stock due to inferences made. The error 
tends to be random and can be accounted for in the probabilistic aspects of the 
methodology.    
 
The approach used in Canada, (Emergency Preparedness Canada 1999) involves 
calculating damage to buildings and casualties on the basis of MMI values.  For different 
building types, damage severity rates are generated for each intensity level.  Three types of 
casualties (i.e. minor, major, death) are calculated on the basis of the 7 damage severity 
levels.  The damage rates are also used to calculate the number of people in need of 
temporary shelter.   
 
In contrast to all the above, Kappos, Stylianidis et al. (1998) use an analytical method for 
reviewing buildings rather than empirical-statistical methods (see Figure 4.7). Analytical 
damage data (left) is produced either from a computer simulation or from a scale model 
tested on a shaking table.  Empirical damage data (right) is produced from visual 
observations from a past event.  These authors’ approach uses analytically calculated 
damage indices by means of computer modelling Greek buildings according to their 
structural design.  It is important to mention this method since it constitutes the most time-
consuming approach to building vulnerability determination and one that requires highly 
specialised professionals and computer equipment for a building-by-building analysis.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.7:  Types of Earthquake Damage Data (United Nations Disaster Relief Co-ordinator 1991) 
 
Alexander (1993) considers that even though configuration is not likely to be the sole cause 
of building failure, it may be a major contributor.  He points out that historically, before the 
use of steel and reinforced concrete construction, good configuration was one of the major 
determinants of good seismic performance.  Building plans tended to be symmetrical; spans 
were short so that there was a high density of supporting walls and the need for massive 
load-bearing construction.  However, this increased earthquake forces in the building and 
tended to keep unit stresses in the materials to very low values. 
 
Similarly, Davidson (1997) points out that the vulnerability of single structures can be 
assessed according to the following criteria: 
ANALYTICAL
shaking table
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model
EMPIRICAL
damage  records
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• Structural system and construction material, since a structure should be able to undergo 
long-duration horizontal and vertical shaking without excessive loss of stiffness or 
strength. 
• Configuration should be regular and symmetrical to minimise torsional response, and the 
elevation should have no great discontinuities in stiffness, strength or mass. 
• Structural continuity, as structural elements should be tied together so that they shake as 
a single unit. 
• Changes in structural condition because of the effects of aging, maintenance, damage in 
previous earthquakes and retrofitting. 
 
Rojahn (1994) considers that, although there are exceptions, good earthquake performers 
normally have the following characteristics: 
 
• They are constructed of materials that can undergo long-duration horizontal and 
vertical shaking without excessive loss of stiffness or strength. 
• They are based on firm foundation materials (the structure does not tip or settle due to 
foundation failure). 
• They have regular, symmetrical plan shapes (so that torsional response is not induced 
in the structure). 
• They are composed of structural elements that are tied together (the structural 
elements do not separate during earthquake shaking). 
• They are not too close to other structures (so as to avoid two structures pounding 
against each other). 
• They have not previously been damaged by an earthquake. 
 
4.2 PROBLEMS DETECTED 
 
4.2.1 Risk Modelling 
 
After reviewing the different approaches, the problems identified are summarised as 
follows: 
 
• The most obvious difficulty is when no mention is made of the characteristics of the 
building stock.  It can be argued that this approach could be acceptable for deriving 
population vulnerability for some types of natural hazards, since one could drown 
during a flood without the built environment playing a role.  The ground shaking from an 
earthquake, however, is not enough to kill human beings; it is by interacting with the 
built environment that people become vulnerable.  The type of structure constitutes a 
strong parameter, although there are other issues that also play an important role (i.e. 
configurational aspects, age of construction).  On the other hand, when GDP is 
substituted for building stock considerations, the built environment is seen as 
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homogeneous and the results obtained would be unreliable for urban policy making.  
Bendimerad (1997) considers that the lack of building inventories significantly impairs 
progress in assessing risk to large areas and that effective non-time-consuming data 
collection methods are urgently needed.  Steinberg (1998), for example, warns against 
the danger of putting too much emphasis on urban economics, finance and public 
administration and only a very marginal focus on the built environment of cities.   
 
• One important drawback of specific risk assessments such as EDRI is that they do not 
allow validation.  
 
• It is very surprising to see that there is no mention in any of these studies about the 
dilemma presented by buildings of high cultural/historical value that have a high 
vulnerability.   
 
• Another problem refers to the selection of land-use mapping as a criterion for 
establishing the economic value of the built environment. Land-use mapping alone is 
not accurate since it only gives an insight into the concentration of economic activities.  
For example, land-use maps typically do not include information about the number of 
storeys of buildings and therefore they must be used in combination with other data to 
derive information about the economic value of the built environment.  Information 
about the area of construction could be derived by using data acquisition techniques 
such as aerial photography.  
 
• Another weakness relates to using flat population density maps to represent the 
vulnerability of the population.  Firstly, people are not “fixed to the ground” throughout 
the day, for example they commute to work and to school.  For this reason, population 
densities throughout the day change considerably.  One could then argue that the 
population densities typically produced by census bureaux reflect the situation only 
during the night since the source of this information is the number of people that inhabit 
a home.  This is therefore not reliable information to be used for emergency planning 
for a “week-day 11 a.m. scenario”, for example.  Kakhandiki and Shah (1998) consider 
that information about the temporal variations of risk, attributable to changes in the 
human component of natural disasters, is rarely included in disaster assessment 
carried out by hazard management professionals.  Uitto (1998) mentions the 
differences between densities during night-time, daytime and commuting periods. 
 
Secondly, people are not equal in terms of mobility and dependency.  In reality, people 
are more or less mobile depending on age, gender or mental health.  Shoaf, Sareen et 
al. (1998) consider that children, women and the elderly are at increased risk of injury 
and death.  Moreover, they indicated that during the Kobe earthquake more than half of 
all fatalities were people over 60 years of age.  Takahashi (1998) has also addressed 
the high vulnerability of the elderly.  Smith (1996) indicated that amongst the dead in a 
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flood in Bangladesh 50% were children under 10.  Since this age group comprised 30% 
of the population, it was clear that the young were at higher risk.  Hearn-Morrow (1999) 
considers all the following groups to be at higher than average risk: the elderly, the 
physically or mentally disabled, renters, poor households, women-headed households, 
ethnic minorities (by language), recent immigrants/residents, large households, 
children, the homeless and tourists/transients.   
 
• A last problem relates to viewing the building stock’s response to particular hazards in 
isolation.  A type of building with low vulnerability to one type of hazard could have a 
high vulnerability to another type of hazard, hence the necessity to use an integrated 
approach that keeps the broader picture in mind at all times.  The majority of natural 
hazard research has focused on single hazards but of course any city may be prone to 
more than one hazard type.  This idea led to the concept of “all-hazards-to-a-place” 
(Hewitt et al. in Gatrell and Vincent 1991). 
 
4.2.2 Data Capture 
 
There are rarely reliable and complete databases that provide the necessary information 
on buildings (such as size, land-use, height and structural system) that could be used for 
loss estimation.  To provide the required inputs for assessing risk, conceptual models are 
important; however, the financial and temporal implications of data capture and integration 
should be carefully analysed.  This is of special importance in developing countries, where 
resources are scarce. 
 
Two major problems are detected in terms of data capture: 
 
• In the developing world, it is unreasonable (both from a temporal and a financial point of 
view) to collect building type information on an individual basis by either the rapid visual 
sidewalk screening or by analytical methods.  Besides being slow and expensive, the 
production of building stock inventories by analytical methods demands highly trained 
personnel (i.e. civil engineers specialised in structural engineering), who are unlikely to 
be available in the numbers required for completing the task within acceptable time 
frames.  Building inspectors and other less qualified personnel can carry out rapid visual 
screening of buildings.  However, in countries where financial resources are not 
available for carrying out appropriate building inspection of ongoing construction, it is 
obvious that rapid visual screening of existing buildings is low priority.     
• Making inferences about large groups of buildings rather than building-by-building 
inspection could provide the answer to building type inventories in the developing world.  
However, basing inferences about the building stock solely on land-uses, as suggested 
by NIBS, reflects a lack of knowledge about the urban development process.  Although 
this method is financially and temporally feasible, it is highly unreliable as it does not 
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account for the historical changes in the use of construction materials and structural 
types, which occur due to increased knowledge and the enforcement of regulations. 
 
4.3  CONCLUSIONS 
 
It is considered that the methodology developed by NIBS is very comprehensive in terms of 
the modelling of urban earthquake risk and the outputs produced.  Given the diversity of the 
building stock in the USA, its classification covers most building types and is therefore easily 
transferable to other countries.  Considering the data input requirements and the complexity 
of the calculations this involves, however, their method is expensive and time-consuming.  
Conversely, the method developed by the Applied Technology Council (ATC-13), despite 
being more simplistic and less accurate, is more applicable in developing countries due to its 
data requirements.  Moreover, it is easily transferable into a GIS environment and the 
outputs obtained are sufficient to carry out planning at, for example, the building block level 
which is adequate for strategic planning.  
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Chapter Five:  METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH 
 
Two methodologies are discussed; one deals with a rapid cost-effective method of collecting 
data for identifying relevant characteristics of buildings, while the second relates to the 
geographically referenced data integration necessary to assess population and building risk. 
 
5.1 CONCEPTUAL MODEL 
 
The conceptual model in Figure 5.1 was developed on the basis of the definitions by the 
United Nations presented in Chapter Two.  The objective of the methodology is to assess 
earthquake risk by using either digital datasets that are typically available in developing 
countries or datasets that can be rapidly and cheaply generated.  This methodology has 
therefore been developed for data-constrained and financially constrained local 
governments.  The methodology applies to population and building earthquake risk.  Due to 
time constraints, infrastructural risk, which is a key issue in disaster mitigation, is excluded 
from the research.  The methodology consists basically of three components (refer to Figure 
5.1): a) data input collection or compilation, b) data integration and c) information outputs.   
 
The input data collection or compilation stage involves the hazard intensity maps (one map 
for each return period), the population and building vulnerability damage data, and the 
inventory of population and buildings (elements at risk), as well as the cost of buildings and 
salaries.  In terms of the characteristics of these datasets, the cost data can be either 
spatially referenced or non-spatially referenced, depending on the source.  If the source is a 
cadastral database or any other similar source containing individual building valuations, the 
dataset is spatially referenced.  On the other hand, if the dataset contains generic values 
issued by the local chamber of construction or similar body for the purpose of estimating 
construction taxes and/or consulting or construction fees, the dataset is non-spatial.  One of 
the “propositions” of this dissertation relates to the necessary distinction between the 
sources of the vulnerability damage ratios.  The vulnerability damage data is non-spatial in 
the case of regular buildings, as the source of the data is historical records from previous 
earthquakes and possibly even from a different urban area.  In the case of essential 
buildings, however, their vulnerability ratios are spatially referenced since these are 
surveyed individually.  Essential buildings are studied in detail as they are key in the rescue 
and relief phases of the disaster management cycle and therefore these should be dealt with 
individually. 
 
The data integration stage consists of the combination of datasets by means of table 
calculations and overlays (for an insight into the data integration steps, refer to Figures 5.3 
and 5.4).  Five final outputs are generated: the population risk, the building risk as well as 
both of these expressed in financial terms plus a risk figure which combines the previous two 
into a single figure.   All these figures are presented as absolute figures as well as relative to 
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Figure 5.1:  Risk Assessment Conceptual Model  
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Figure 5.2:  Flowchart of Population Risk Estimation per Damage Severity Class  
 
the probability (return period).  These five datasets constitute inputs for a cost-benefit 
analysis of mitigation strategies.   
 
The building risk is expressed as the number of buildings (and total building area) in each 
damage severity class (none, very low, low, medium, high, very high), where the severity 
class is a reclassification of the percentage of expected damage.  A threshold is set to 
identify the severity at which demolition is necessary, as beyond a certain degree of 
damage, repairs are no longer either economically or technically feasible.  The damage 
severity class gives an insight into the magnitude of not only the rescue and relief necessary 
but also of temporary accommodation requirements (for further discussion on the application 
of the various components of the risk assessment, refer to Chapter Eight).  For example, the 
classification allows the identification of the areas where deaths are likely, and these are 
associated with the severity class “very high”.  Similarly, it is considered that people in need 
of temporary accommodation are those not associated with either of the severity classes 
“none” and “very low”.  This classification makes it possible to calculate the duration of the 
victim’s displacement.  The victims whose buildings are under classes “high” and “very high” 
will be displaced for longer periods of time as these buildings will probably be demolished 
and rebuilt. Conversely, the residents of buildings that suffered “low” damage, and that can 
therefore be repaired rapidly, will require only brief periods of temporary accommodation. 
Finally, the percentage of building damage is converted into financial losses expressed as 
replacement value. 
 
The population risk is calculated on the basis of the building severity class (the higher the 
building damage, the higher the casualties). It is expressed as the number of people in each 
injury level (minor injuries, major injuries and deaths).  The three-level classification allows 
emergency planners to prepare for and mitigate against a disaster.  This breakdown is 
particularly useful to assess whether the local health facilities can cope, or whether pooling 
of resources across a wider area is necessary.  On the other hand, the flat casualty figure 
(the sum of these three classes), is only useful in the context of regional planning as it 
Building Damage
Severity x
Minor injuries
Major injuries
Deaths
Lost salary 
Lost salary 
Lost salary 
Lost pension
Lost pension
Permanently
disabled
Others Lost salary 
Pop. Risk US$ 
Damage Severity x
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enables the comparison between the levels of risk of urban areas within a region.  To assess 
population risk in financial terms, lost earnings are computed for each injury class (refer to 
Figure 5.2).  For deaths, the lost salary as well as lost pension are calculated based on: the 
average age, the retirement age, the life expectancy, monthly income, inflation rates and the 
last salary to pension ratio.  For major injuries, a distinction is made between “permanently 
disabled” and “temporarily disabled” persons.  For those permanently disabled, the same 
approach as employed to estimate losses to deaths is used.  For those who suffer major 
injuries but are not permanently disabled, as well as for those with minor injuries, the salary 
equivalent to the number of days of leave is calculated.   
 
 
 
Figure 5.3:  Flowchart of Data Integration Leading to Building Risk Assessment 
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Figure 5.4:  Flowchart of Data Integration Leading to Population Risk Assessment 
 
5.2 INPUT REQUIREMENTS 
 
The data requirements for assessing risk can be grouped into five categories (see Table 
5.1).   
 
To produce a specific risk zonation, a map of Modified Mercalli Intensity (MMI) values is 
required, since most of the vulnerability (damage) data is produced on the basis of this 
classification.  As discussed in Chapter Three, whenever an MMI map is not readily 
available, it can be produced on the basis of a peak ground acceleration (PGA) map − 
although to ensure more accurate results, it should be calibrated according to soil types and 
topographic characteristics.  In other words, in cases where the MMI values map is 
unavailable, three maps can be used to derive the MMI map: a PGA map, a soil types map 
Population 
Census
Injury
Vulnerability
Ratios
Building 
Risk
Map
Multiple Maps
Operation
Attribute table
Map plus corresponding
attribute table
LEGEND
join + table
calculation 
Population
Specific Risk 
(per injury level)
Population Risk
US$ Scenario **
(per injury level)
cross + table
calculation 
Population
Risk
attribute
mapping 
Building 
Risk
Population Risk
Population
Census
Income*
* This table is necessary if the 
population census does not 
contain income data or if access 
to it is restricted.
Population
Risk US$
join + table
calculation 
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and a topographic map.  In the case of Cartago, an MMI map has been produced at a scale 
of 1:200,000 by Morales and Aguilar (1993), a pair of leading scientists from the School of 
Geology of the University of Costa Rica.  Alternatively, a PGA map developed by Flores and 
Schmidt (2000) and a soil types map developed by the School of Geology (Flores and 
Chacón 1996) are both available at the larger scale of 1:50,000, while topographic sheets 
are available at 1:10,000.  To achieve reliable results in the urban specific risk assessment, 
a map produced on the basis of a micro-zonation study (i.e. 1:25,000) is needed.  
Consequently, it can be concluded that in the case of Cartago, the hazard-related data 
available is somewhat unsuitable for conducting a study of this nature. 
 
Requirements Availability (Case Study:  Cartago) 
Hazard zonation 
MMI values MMI map developed by Morales and Aguilar (1993) from the School 
of Geology at the University of Costa Rica 
Building inventory 
Structural type Not available in digital form (only available in individual paper files) 
No. of floors Not available in digital form (only available in individual paper files) 
Land-use IGN 1:10,000 series year 1991 
Age of construction Not available in digital form (only available in individual paper files) 
Population 
Age group National population census 
Commuting patterns Not available 
Vulnerability 
Damage curves Percentage of expected damage (Sauter and Shah 1978) 
Risk 
Salary Average monthly income, retirement age, pension to last salary 
relationship 
Cost of construction Metre square cost of new construction issued by the Board of 
Engineers and Architects of Costa Rica  
 
Table 5.1:  Summary of Input Data Required  
 
Structural type, number of floors and land-use are the key data that the building inventory 
should contain.  The land-use map allows the classification of buildings according to their 
level of importance during the post-disaster response phase.  Moreover, in case there is no 
information related to the day population densities, the land-use map, together with data 
from the population census, is a crucial input for deriving this map. 
 
The structural type classification of the inventory should be consistent with the classification 
used in the vulnerability (damage curves) study (in the Cartago case, the classification 
developed by Sauter and Shah (1978)). The number of floors in a building should be 
collected based on whole numbers rather than according to the classification made in the 
vulnerability (damage curves) study, the reason being that this data is relevant for other 
purposes as well.  In the case of buildings with non-average floor heights, the approximate 
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building height should be collected as well.  The age of construction should be, in theory, 
available in whole years, to allow the calculation of a depreciation value (market value).  It 
can later be classified according to the vulnerability study in case this highlights important 
benchmarks related to the implementation of building codes or other building regulation 
enforcement.  In the case of Cartago, for example, the most recent building code was 
implemented nationwide in 1987.  A class grouping all buildings of a given structural type 
and constructed between 1987 and 2002 can be used in the vulnerability assessment to 
yield more accurate results in the risk assessment. 
 
The night population densities are easily derived (at census tract level) from census data 
since the basic unit is the household and the percentage of overnight workers is minimal (in 
most cities usually less than 2%).  The day population densities can be very accurately 
calculated in cases where the population census is complemented by attribute data on the 
number of students and staff of every educational and health facility and a “business 
census”, which typically contains information about the line of work and number of staff in 
commercial and industrial establishments.  In the case of Cartago, the business census is 
unavailable and therefore the census data along with a detailed land-use map provide an 
alternative for generating a daytime population density map.  The number of persons per 
age group is key to the calculation of the day population densities, as different age groups 
carry out different activities throughout the day.  For example, in the case of Cartago a 
questionnaire was used to identify the mobility patterns and it was concluded that those 
remaining in residential areas during the day are typically all those below the age of 4, most 
of those above the age of 60, plus a fraction of those between the ages of 19 and 60.  
Similarly, if data on the number of students per educational facility is not available, the age 
group data can be used to estimate the densities within the educational areas.  In the case 
of Costa Rica, the census data identifies in each census tract the number of persons that 
attend school in the following age groups: ages 5 to 6 (kindergarten students), ages 7 to 12 
(primary school students), ages 13 to 19 (secondary school students), 20 to 29 and above 
30 (higher education students).  
 
Additionally, national or regional centres must be identified and dealt with somewhat 
separately.  These types of centres are unique in the sense that they house people that 
reside somewhere else.  Typical examples include specialised hospitals, hotels, jails and 
universities.  In the case of Cartago, for example, the Technological Institute of Costa Rica 
(ITCR) attracts 7,500 students, most being non-Cartago residents.  The population that 
attends these centres must be identified and the figure must be assigned specifically to the 
corresponding polygon and not reached by making inferences based on the census data.  
Figure 5.3 illustrates the operations used for estimating the day population densities. 
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Figure 5.5:  Flowchart of Day Population Modelling  
 
For calculating the cost of buildings, the cost of construction per square metre, as well as the 
approximate height of floors, is necessary.  Whenever buildings have floors with highly 
irregular heights (i.e. churches, roofed sports facilities), the standard cost per square metre 
of construction must be calibrated on the basis of floor height.  In cases where the market 
value of the buildings cannot be extracted from cadastral files, the age of construction along 
with the maintenance level of the building can be used to calculate the depreciation of the 
building over time on the basis of the cost of construction per square metre.  
 
For estimating the lost human capital, the average age of the population, the retirement age, 
the monthly salaries and the ratio of pension to last salary are necessary. 
 
5.3  DATA CAPTURE 
 
A data capture methodology has been designed with the objective of producing a spatial 
database containing relevant building attributes for the purpose of earthquake risk 
assessment.  The reason why this methodology is necessary lies in the nature of cadastral 
databases.  In most cases, cadastral databases are designed solely for registration and 
taxation purposes and therefore the classification of buildings contained in these databases 
tends to be useless for earthquake risk assessment. 
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Figure 5.6 illustrates the proposed methodology for creating a building inventory spatial 
database.  
 
 
 
Figure 5.6: Flowchart of Building Inventory Data Capture Methodology  
 
5.3.1  Classification of Buildings 
 
The first step involves classifying land-uses according to their strategic importance.  A 
classification is necessary as it is not economically feasible to conduct a thorough analysis of 
the seismic response of all buildings.  It is, however, more than a financial issue as in many 
cases the technical staff that would be required for such an assessment to be carried out 
within a reasonable time frame are unavailable in the numbers required.  Since rescue and 
relief are crucial in keeping casualties to minimum levels, a sensible solution is to classify 
buildings in three classes (i.e. essential primary, essential secondary and regular) and a data 
capture method can be applied to each category.  
 
Essential buildings can be described as those that a city cannot afford to lose in a disaster.  
Hospitals and clinics, the fire brigade, police headquarters as well as the town hall are such 
buildings, which are vital not just for emergency rescue and relief but also for maintaining 
public order, as looting is a common problem following a disaster.  One could view these 
land-uses as “essential primary”.  Schools, community centres and churches are also 
Essential facility?
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Local knowledge?
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important since following a disaster these buildings tend to be used by emergency officials 
for housing the displaced population.  These land-uses could be classified as “essential 
secondary”.  Other types of land-uses that require special consideration include housing for 
the elderly and rehabilitation centres.    
 
                            Data Collection Method 
Importance Analytical/ 
Mathematical 
Extensive 
Screening 
Sidewalk 
Screening 
Regular   √ 
Essential primary √   
Essential secondary  √  
 
Table 5.2:  Capture Methods  
 
The mathematical analysis of structural behaviour offers the most reliable results for the 
purpose of vulnerability assessment.  On the negative side, it requires highly qualified staff 
(i.e. structural engineering specialists) and is extremely time-consuming.  Moreover, 
computer simulation of the structural response is dependent upon the availability of 
construction plans (blueprints).  Furthermore, if doubt exists related to compliance with the 
approved construction plans, laboratory testing of building materials (e.g. concrete fc) in a 
specialised laboratory might be necessary.  Extensive screening is obviously less reliable 
but it is more time-efficient and cost-efficient.  Essential buildings could therefore be 
subdivided into two categories: “first-order” buildings could be assessed using mathematical 
modelling, while “second-order” buildings could be assessed by extensive screening (refer to 
Table 5.2). 
 
There are various ways of carrying out ground surveys for non-essential buildings.  A 
common method is the “rapid sidewalk screening of buildings”, a method which is widely 
used in the USA.  This method involves the collection of information based on a survey 
sheet agreed a priori.  In its most simplified form, this method requires approximately a 10-
minute inspection per building.  In the case of Cartago, for example, surveying the housing 
building stock would involve around 5,000 hours.  This method has obvious limitations, such 
as the time required and the uncertainty posed by inferences based on analysing only the 
building façade.  On the other hand, this method is realistic in the sense that no written 
consent from the owner is required as it does not involve entering the property.   
 
The alternative method proposed here for capturing data on non-essential facilities for 
building inventory generation involves combining remote sensing and ground video images 
produced from a moving vehicle.   
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Large Format Vertical Small Format Oblique 
 
 
Figure 5.7:  City Centre of Cartago: Mixed Land-Uses and 
Mixed Use of Building Materials and Structural Types  
 
 
Figure 5.8: Industrial Estate in Cartago: Single Land-Use and Homogeneous Building Materials and 
Structural Type (Pre-Cast Reinforced Concrete)  
 
 
 
Figure 5.9: Low-Income Housing in Cartago: Single Land-Use and Homogeneous Building Materials 
and Structural Type (Reinforced Masonry) 
 
5.3.2 Remote Sensing 
 
The generation of a building inventory can be achieved using remotely sensed imagery such 
as high-resolution satellite imagery (e.g. IKONOS) and aerial photographs (either vertical or 
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oblique).  The analysis of heights, textures, patterns, tones, size and shadows can be 
combined with local knowledge to identify homogeneously built areas.  These areas are 
easily identified in survey photographs typically produced by national survey authorities and 
which tend to be available at scales of at least 1:20,000.  The most common examples of 
homogeneous areas are industrial and housing estates (see Figures 5.8 and 5.9).  In cases 
where homogeneous areas are identified, the size of the ground survey can be decreased 
as, based on the analysis of a single building, generalisations can be made about the 
characteristics of these homogeneous areas without hampering the accuracy of the results.   
 
It must be noted, however, that the resolution of conventional aerial survey photographs still 
remains higher than that of commercially available satellite imagery such as IKONOS and 
QUICKBIRD.  However, since the resolution of satellite imagery continues to increase at a 
rapid pace and the prices per scene and minimum purchase orders continue to decrease 
due to increased competition, satellite imagery might soon become the preferred source of 
remotely sensed imagery used in urban applications. 
 
Another aspect to consider is that the production of conventional vertical survey photographs 
requires not only dedicated aircraft carrying highly sophisticated camera systems but also 
highly trained personnel.  This therefore means that often missions cannot be carried out at 
short notice.  In cases where recent conventional survey photographs are not readily 
available, simple options such as small format oblique photography from the window of a 
small aircraft are worth considering.  Such a technique uses relatively inexpensive “off-the-
shelf” equipment and can be rapid to implement.  Moreover, if the photographs are needed 
solely for the purpose of delineating homogeneous areas, contracting conventional 
photographic surveys is probably excluded from a cost-benefit point of view.   
 
5.3.3  Ground Data Capture  
 
In the first instance, remote sensing (i.e. photographs or satellite imagery) is used to identify 
homogeneously built areas in which a single sampled building allows one to infer the 
characteristics of the whole area.  Video images produced from a moving vehicle on the 
ground allow one to make inferences about the characteristics of buildings.  This technique 
could have a drawback in the sense that large vehicles parked along the sidewalk might 
block the view of the building’s façade − although making the recordings early in the morning 
can minimise this.     
 
A global positioning system (GPS) and digital video can be used in a first stage to produce 
an image of a building’s façade of known location.  In a second stage, the required attributes 
are extracted from the analysis of the image.   
 
 
 
  85
This data capture method offers six main advantages: 
• The recording is multi-functional 
• The recording process is not too time-consuming 
• The recording process requires little technical expertise 
• The costs involved are within the reach of municipalities in developing countries 
• The location (x,y coordinates) of every image can be established in an automated way 
 
 Since the classification and other interpretation issues can be decided a posteriori, the 
recording is multi-functional in the sense that it can be used for a variety of purposes and not 
just  for  urban  earthquake  risk  assessment.    For  example,  to  impose  fines  on  illegal 
construction or advertisements, local governments often have to trace the year in which a 
particular illegal act took place.  This is necessary as typically in these cases the 
enforcement of a law or regulation lapses after a given period of time.  The video recordings 
would therefore be an important source of information, especially if they are carried out 
periodically.  
 
 
 
Figure 5.10:  Example of Portable Equipment  
 
Citywide coverage can be achieved in a few days with a single driver, one vehicle, one 
digital camera and a GPS unit (refer to Figure 5.10).  Preferably, two digital video cameras 
should be used as this allows the recording of building façades from both sidewalks at the 
same time.  The GPS is used to provide the location in x,y coordinates at a given time.  Most 
GPS units are able to internally record positions in a “track log” at intervals of 1 second.   
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The coverage of the image depends on two factors:  
• The angular view of the camera system (which in turn depends upon its detector array 
and lens focal length) 
• The distance from the camera (vehicle’s window) to the property line (see Figure 5.11) 
 
Careful consideration should be given to this issue as in cases where the sidewalk is narrow 
the coverage will be limited.  In the case of Cartago, given a minimum distance from camera 
to property line of around 4 m and a given lens angle of view, maximum vehicle speed 
should be in the order of 17 km/h.  
 
 
Figure 5.11:  Coverage Calculation (elevation on left; plan on right) 
(dimensions indicated are approximate) 
 
 
cw = 2·pld·Tan(½ β) 
ch = 2·pld·Tan(½ α) 
 
cw = pld·daw / fd 
ch = pld·dah / fd 
Where:  
cw  = coverage width 
ch  =  coverage height 
daw  =  detector array width 
α  =  vertical angle of view 
dah  =   detector array height 
fd  =  focal distance 
pld  =  property line distance 
β  =  horizontal angle of view 
 
For the GPS-derived coordinates, most budget (handheld) GPS units are nowadays capable 
of providing positional accuracy to within 6 to 12 m (Garmin 2000). 
 
However, it is possible to improve upon this positional accuracy yet further by employing 
differential GPS techniques.  This may be achieved either in real-time mode (where the GPS 
also receives a broadcast "correction" signal) or during post-processing (where data from a 
reference station is utilised).  Unfortunately, such techniques may be beyond the means of 
an untrained operator. 
 
Another important advantage of the GPS is that provided that there are four or more 
satellites in view, approximate altitude can be recorded, and in cases where no contour 
street
sidewalk
property line
sidewalk
dah
daw
fd
fd
street
pld=4m
pld=4m
ch=4m
cw=5m
α = 51° β =65°
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mapping is available, this could be used as the source for creating digital elevation models 
(DEMs).  However, the altitude measurement from simple GPS receivers is considerably 
less accurate than the planimetric accuracy. 
  
Since essential facilities and homogeneous areas are surveyed by using different methods 
and since only areas that contain buildings are in need of video recording, it is necessary to 
filter out some sections of the road from the ground video capture phase.  The sections of 
road that should be excluded are those that lie next to vacant areas, essential facilities or 
homogeneous areas.  To obtain the route map, the road map is first buffered and then 
overlaid with three other maps (i.e. essential, homogenous and vacant).  This filtering is 
useful because it cuts down not only on the time needed to record the video images but also 
on the time required for interpreting them.  Figure 5.12 illustrates the portions of the initial 
route that will require interpretation. 
 
 
Figure 5.12:  Limitation of Extent of Video Image Interpretation  
 
5.3.4 Data Manipulation 
 
It is important to note the 1:N (one to many) entity relationship that occurs, since it is 
possible that more than one image is associated with one location (two video cameras, one 
each (window) side, recording at the same time).  Moreover, the vehicle could be stationary 
due to traffic jams or traffic lights so there could also be many images associated with each 
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window side for one location.  The relationships are therefore 1:N, where membership of 
“Location” in the “contains” relationship is obligatory, while membership of both “Image left 
window" and “Image right window” is non-obligatory (refer to Figure 5.13).  This 
characteristic is very important, as it leads one to conclude that the only attribute that could 
be distinctive about the images is the date (date/time) of recording.  This is important from 
the point of view of selecting an attribute that could be used as an identifier, but also 
important at a later stage when optimisation is needed in order to eliminate redundancies 
and duplicates from the database.   
  
 
 
 
Figure 5.13:  Entity-Relationship Model 
 
The interpretation is carried out after the recording has been made and therefore, depending 
on the financial resources and also on the manpower available, there is the option of 
interpreting all the images or sampling a given number of random locations within the non-
homogeneous built-up areas (see separate section on sampling). 
 
Regarding the video images, digital video cameras nowadays offer single mode (video only) 
or dual mode (video plus digital stills).  Even when only single mode cameras are available, 
individual still images (i.e. JPG, TIFF) can be obtained from the video by means of digital still 
capturing software packages.  Moreover, another even lower-cost alternative is possible by 
using digital still cameras, provided that the camera offers continuous shooting mode to 
capture an image (i.e. JPG, TIFF).  However, inexpensive digital still cameras rarely have 
the capability to record images at sufficiently rapid intervals or to store sufficiently large 
numbers of images. 
 
The method of linking up the GPS position data to the video images is surprisingly simple 
and reliable, provided the internal clock information of both devices is used (refer to Figure 
5.14).  This is very convenient as it makes it unnecessary to real-time link the GPS and the 
video camera to a laptop computer during the field ground capture phase.  By resetting the 
clock of the video to match the clock information values (i.e. 
year/month/day/hour/minute/second) of the GPS device, it is possible to easily establish 
where a given image was captured.   
 
To ensure that the individual images (i.e. JPG, TIFF) can be hyper-linked to the GPS points’ 
attribute table in an automated manner (refer to Figure 5.15), the images must be named 
contains
Image
left window
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right window
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N
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after the video’s time code.  For the Cartago case study, video capture software capable of 
naming individual files after the time code of the video (i.e. scene’20010921 08.08.30.JPG) 
was purchased (refer to Figure 5.15).  Whenever two video cameras are used at the same 
time (one on each side of the vehicle), the time code must make reference to the window 
side (left/right).  To identify the window side, the filename is modified by adding an extra 
character (i.e. Rscene’20010921 08.08.30.JPG). 
 
The GPS data (i.e. x, y, date, time, leg length, speed, heading) is easily downloaded into a 
computer and a table can be created to both display and manipulate the data.  Some 
"macros" are necessary to: 
 
• Combine the date/time columns into a single column 
• Add the extension name of the file (i.e. “.JPG”) 
• Add any prefix necessary to match the time-code format used by the video capture 
software (i.e. “scene”) 
• Strip down any unwanted characters  
 
 
Figure 5.14:  Use of GPS and Digital Video for Building Inventory Generation  
(adapted from Montoya (2002)) 
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Figure 5.15:  Series of Captured Images from Digital Video  
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Amongst many functionalities, most geographical information system software packages are 
able to use the x,y columns of the table to produce a point map, which opens up a wide 
range of possibilities for computer-based spatial analysis. 
 
The analysis or interpretation of the images provides new attributes that then lead to an 
expansion of the GPS points’ attribute table.  In the Costa Rican case, leading structural 
engineers have indicated that due to the building stock characteristics (Chen, Chen et al. 
2001; Sauter and Shah 1978) the structural type and the age of construction are enough to 
assess seismic building vulnerability.  In other countries, however, other attributes that might  
be necessary and could be extracted from the image include building height and 
configurational asymmetries, to name the most common ones.   
 
 
Figure 5.16:  Flowchart of Point Offset Procedure for Thiessen Map Generation 
 
In cases where the parcel or building boundaries are available in digital form, the attributes 
obtained from the interpretation of the still images can be assigned directly to the 
corresponding polygon.  When no digital parcel or building boundaries are available, 
however, a possible alternative is to use the GPS points to generate Thiessen polygons.  To 
obtain these Thiessen polygons, the GPS points are first converted into a polyline to allow 
an offset procedure to be carried out according to the average road width.  Once the polyline 
has been offset both to its right and to its left, the two polylines are converted to points (refer 
to Figure 5.16) and these are next interpolated to obtain the Thiessen polygons.  These 
Thiessen polygons are used for spatial analysis until the final stages when data is 
aggregated to the census tract level before it is supplied to decision-makers.  It must be 
noted that preferably parcel boundaries should be generated from photogrammetric sources 
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and the generation of Thiessen polygons should be seen as a last resort when no digital 
parcel boundaries are available. 
 
5.4  STRATIFIED SAMPLING  
 
Through ground video recording, it is possible to obtain video images of the entire city.  
Sampling should be considered carefully, as in a relatively small city like Cartago, with a 
population of less than 150,000, the total number of images generated by the digital video is 
approximately 20,000.  There might be cases when, given the cost, time and availability of 
interpreters, a decision is made not to interpret all the images.  This section explores the use 
of random sampling techniques to produce a building inventory.  Figure 5.17 illustrates the 
steps required in a sampling process.   
 
Random sampling is a type of probability-based sampling.  In this technique, every building 
in the building stock has a known, non-zero probability of being included in the sample.  The 
advantage of probability-based sampling over other types of sampling methods is that it 
allows the quality of the estimation and the estimation method to be measured.     
 
 
Figure 5.17:  Steps in the Building Sampling Process 
 
A sampling survey is composed of a sample design (which images are to be sampled and 
how the data will be used for making inferences) and a survey instrument (how the 
measurements are to be made, what is to be observed).  To achieve success in a survey, 
both these aspects must be carefully constructed and implemented.  The sample design 
deals with both the sampling plan (the way in which the sample is selected) and the 
estimation procedure (the formulas that will allow the production of estimates and 
inferences). 
 
The most commonly used sample is known as a “simple random sample”.  The drawback of 
this sampling technique is that there is always the possibility that the images selected for the 
sample will be unrepresentative.  In this section, a method that decreases the sampling error 
(the uncertainty that arises from working with a sample rather than with all the images) will 
be explored.   
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Sampling frame construction
Sampling design selection
Data specifications
Data collection
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Unlike simple random sampling, stratified random sampling offers the advantage that the 
random sample is not left entirely to chance.  Burt and Barber (1996) define a stratified 
random sample as that obtained by dividing the population into classes or strata, and then 
selecting a simple random sample from each.  
  
Blalock (1979) considers that, in simple terms, stratified sampling can be applied to yield 
greater accuracy for the same cost or to involve less cost for the same accuracy.  In 
developing countries where financial resources are scarce, stratified sampling therefore 
constitutes an interesting alternative.  Trochim (2001) indicates that stratified random 
sampling has two major advantages: 
 
• It ensures that one will be able to represent not only the overall population (in this case 
the images) but also the key subgroups of the population, especially small minority 
groups (in this case adobe mud-brick buildings, which have the highest vulnerability but 
occur less frequently). 
• It generally has more statistical precision than simple random sampling.  If the strata or 
groups are homogeneous, the variability within the strata is lower than the variability for 
the building stock as a whole. 
 
 
Figure 5.18:  Conceptual Diagram of Stratified Random Sampling  
(adapted from Burt and Barber 1996) 
 
The basic idea behind stratified random building sampling is illustrated in Figure 5.18.  The 
urban area is divided into a set of strata before sampling takes place.  The divisions must be 
both exhaustive and mutually exclusive.  In other words, each image must appear in one and 
only one stratum.  This type of sampling method is ideal for urban areas as in most cases 
some sort of spatial stratification already exists.  Existing stratifications should be carefully 
analysed before being adopted, otherwise there is the danger that the stratified sampling will 
yield the same accuracy as a simple random sample.  For example, in the case of Costa 
Rica, according to its National Statistics and Census Institute (INEC), a census tract is a unit 
consisting of between 40 and 60 houses of homogenous building characteristics (i.e. size, 
building material) and has a population that is also homogeneous in terms of its socio-
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economic characteristics.  The census tract therefore constitutes an ideal stratum for 
conducting a stratified random sampling leading to a building inventory for seismic 
vulnerability determination.  There is, however, a drawback in the sense that the census 
tract’s boundaries are delimited based on the analysis of housing (and its occupants), while 
other land-uses are not taken into account.   
 
Generally speaking, one should select a simple random sample in each census tract 
according to a chosen sampling fraction.  One issue that must be carefully analysed relates 
to the sampling fraction, as there are two possible options.  With proportional stratified 
random sampling the same sampling fraction is applied to all census tracts irrespective of 
their size (number of images).  On the other hand, with disproportional stratified random 
sampling the sampling fractions applied to each census tract will differ.  In disproportional 
stratified sampling different sampling fractions are used to manipulate the number of cases 
selected in order to improve still further the efficiency of the design.  
 
To analyse the case of Cartago, the census tract map has been overlaid with the route map 
(refer to Figure 5.12) to generate statistics about the number of images per census tract.  To 
analyse the whole of Cartago, a full interpretation would involve approximately 6,500 
images.  The mean number of images per census tract is 26, with values ranging from 1 to 
nearly 230 and a standard deviation of 19.  Since the standard deviation is high, applying a 
proportional sampling fraction of one to five, for example, would translate into a minimum 
sample size of one image (since there are census tracts that only have one image) and a 
maximum sample size of 46.  With proportional sampling, the total number of images to be 
interpreted would be approximately 1,300.  The other option is to carry out a disproportional 
sampling − in other words to select an equal number of images from each census tract.  With 
a disproportional sampling size of one to five of the mean number of images, the total 
number of images to be interpreted would be approximately 2,500 images. 
 
5.5 CONCLUSIONS 
 
It was concluded that given an earthquake hazard scenario, it is possible to model 
population and building risk based on the combination of widely available data (e.g. census 
data, land-use maps) together with data that can be produced rapidly, easily and 
inexpensively.  Due to the high damage rates of older buildings, stratification based on a 
map of urban growth (produced from remotely-sensed data) should be used as a 
mechanism to achieve higher statistical precision.  
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Chapter Six:  NATIONAL PLANNING POLICY AND 
LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
 
This chapter analyses the legal framework in terms of both urban planning in general and 
disaster management.  The objective is to identify the institutions and individuals involved, 
as well as the responsibilities and programmes or regulations currently available.  The 
following chapter introduces the case of the city of Cartago in Costa Rica.  
 
6.1  INTRODUCTION 
 
The objective of this section is to present the strengths and weaknesses of the legal 
framework in the field of urban development and disaster mitigation.  To carry out this type of 
analysis, the seven principles of good urban governance stated by the United Nations 
Development Programme (1997) provide an insight into individual goals that the framework 
as a whole should be able to achieve: 
 
• Sustainability in all dimensions of urban development 
• Subsidiarity of authority and resources to the closest appropriate level 
• Equity of access to decision-making processes and the basic necessities of urban life 
• Efficiency in the delivery of public services and promoting local economic development 
• Transparency and accountability of decision-makers and all stakeholders 
• Civil engagement and citizenship 
• Security of individuals and their living environment   
 
In Costa Rica, written accounts of urban development regulations can be traced back to 
regulations for founding cities in the reign of Charles V of Spain and more recently to Braulio 
Carrillo’s laws of 1841.  However, this section will focus on the current legal framework that 
regulates urban development and disaster mitigation.  It is useful to start by identifying the 
stakeholders involved in this process according to the various levels of government (refer to 
Figure 6.1).  At the national level, the main institutions involved are: 
 
• The Parliament (Asamblea Legislativa)  
• The Cabinet (Poder Ejecutivo)  
• The National Housing and Urbanism Institute (INVU)  
• The Federated Board of Engineers and Architects (CFIA) 
• The National Cadastre 
• The National Statistics and Census Institute (INEC) 
• The National Insurance Institute (INS)  
• The National Commission for the Prevention of Risks and Response to Emergencies 
(CNE) 
  96
• The Ministries of Housing and Human Settlements (MINVA), Health (MS), and 
Transportation (MOPT) 
• The Constitutional Court (Sala Cuarta) 
• Other important institutions include private or public banks 
 
National Provincial Municipal District Individual
 
 
Figure 6.1:  Levels of Decision-Making 
 
Even though the country is divided into provinces, which in turn are divided into 
municipalities, the provincial governments have no significant task and therefore this level of 
government is often bypassed.  Moreover, some ministries such as the Ministry of Health 
and the Ministry of Education have defined their own planning regions.  This is obviously 
highly unsuitable from the point of view of data sharing and information networking.  
Similarly, the district level seems to exist only for the purpose of electing representatives to 
the district assemblies of political parties, as no planning is carried out at this level nor do 
regulations exist for this spatial unit.  Strangely and contradictively, the district level is the 
smallest spatial unit at which the National Statistics and Census Institute (INEC) is willing to 
grant access to spatially referenced data. 
 
At the local level, the institutions involved are the municipalities, non-government 
organisations, community-based organisations and individuals.   
  
Next, a review will be carried out related to the roles of the various institutions involved in 
urban development and urban disaster management, according to the various laws. Figure 
6.2 describes the relationships amongst the various stakeholders involved in the urban 
development process, which will be described in detail in the following sections.  
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Figure 6.2:  Stakeholders in the Regulation of the Construction Process 
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6.2  ORGANIC LAW OF THE NATIONAL HOUSING AND URBANISM INSTITUTE (INVU) 
 
INVU was created in 1954 and its role includes supervising and encouraging planning, as 
well as providing housing.  Despite its legal status as an “autonomous institute”, its board of 
directors is composed of a member from the Ministry of Labour plus four Cabinet 
appointees, which raises a question over its level of autonomy.   
 
Apart from its role in overseeing the urbanisation process (see Section 6.3 for details), this 
institution is also in charge of providing the homeless (particularly the low-income) with 
adequate shelter.  INVU also offers savings programmes geared towards housing 
construction or purchase, which have proved very popular with middle-income groups.  
Another important INVU objective is to stimulate those industries that could in some way 
help to solve the housing and urban problems in general.   
 
The legal framework allows both INVU and the Ministry of Health to carry out gradual 
elimination of those houses and other types of constructions that are considered dangerous 
or unsanitary.  Interestingly, these two institutions are allowed to carry out this duty either 
jointly or separately.  
  
Unfortunately, one of the major challenges facing INVU relates to its financial situation.  The 
institution is financed through the national budget but its financial situation can be described 
as precarious.  Recently, INVU has started charging a fee of 1% on the cost of urbanisation 
projects  (sites and services only), which could help to improve matters. 
 
6.3  URBAN PLANNING LAW 
 
The Urban Planning Law has been revised on a number of occasions since it was first 
issued in 1968.  This document discusses the purpose of planning and the mechanisms by 
which it should be carried out in Costa Rica.  In this document planning is seen as the 
activity that aims to achieve a) an orderly expansion of urban centres, b) equilibrium 
between urban and rural development through an adequate distribution of population and 
economic activities, c) an efficient development of urban areas to make best use of natural 
and human resources and d) an adequate investment in public works.  INVU plays an 
important role in the field of urban disaster management since its responsibilities include: 
 
• Producing, revising and updating a National Urban Development Plan 
• Coordinating private and public projects directly linked to the plan 
• Advisory services to municipalities and other institutions carrying out planning at a local 
level 
• Enforcing urban development laws  
• Guiding and controlling the urban development process 
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In terms of guiding and controlling the urban development process, INVU has several 
important duties and also the right to step in if necessary.  Firstly, all strategic municipal 
development plans must be approved by INVU prior to their adoption at the local level.  
Secondly, all neighbourhood site plans, including land subdivision plans, must be approved 
by INVU following preliminary approval by the municipality.  Thirdly, INVU has the right to 
order the suspension of construction work in cases where the municipality has failed to 
enforce regulations.  If necessary, INVU has the right to immediate police support to ensure 
compliance with regulations. 
 
INVU must prepare, revise and update a National Urban Development Plan.  Strangely, this 
policy document must be approved by the Cabinet rather than by Parliament.  It must be 
forwarded to the municipalities as well as any other relevant institutions. 
 
One of the objectives of the National Urban Development Plan is to provide advice to 
Parliament and other national, regional or local government institutions on the prioritisation 
of the various projects or issues.  At a local level, specific regulations that INVU encourages 
municipalities to produce, enforce and update include a strategic municipal development 
plan known as plan regulador, and zonation regulations and standards related to 
neighbourhood site design, land subdivision, urban renewal and construction techniques and 
materials.  
 
This law recognises that it is the task of municipalities to carry out planning and urban 
development controls within their jurisdiction.  Amongst the most relevant objectives of these 
municipal strategic plans and regulations are: property protection against proximity to 
dangerous or annoying uses, harmonious relationships between the various land-uses, 
convenient access of properties to public roads, adequate subdivision of land, adequate 
community facilities and public services, reservation of areas for future public uses, and 
rehabilitation of areas and prevention of their deterioration.  To achieve these objectives, 
municipal strategic plans must contain the following: 
 
• Development policy, including principles and norms on which the plan is based, as well 
as the objectives arising from the area’s needs and growth. 
• Population profiles, including growth projections and distribution, as well as norms 
related to recommended densities.  It is unclear, however, whether by “distribution” “age” 
or “gender” or both are meant. 
• Land-use types (e.g. housing, commercial, industrial, educational, recreational, 
institutional). 
• Analysis of location and size required for the following services:  educational facilities, 
libraries, museums, public markets, parks, playgrounds, hospitals and clinics, etc.   
• Analysis of needs and location of the following infrastructural services:  water supply, 
sewerage drainage, rain drainage and solid waste disposal. 
 
  99
• Housing and housing renewal in terms of needs as well as with reference to areas that 
must be preserved, rehabilitated or refurbished. 
 
For the elaboration of municipal strategic development plans, local governments have 
several options.  They can develop the plans themselves, they can ask INVU to develop the 
plans or they can contract the plans to private companies through open bids coordinated by 
the Ministry of Economy.  These three mechanisms allow municipalities with limited financial 
or human resources to find a suitable way of producing a strategic local government 
development plan.   
 
For the adoption of a municipal strategic development plan, the local government is obliged 
to arrange a meeting in which citizens are informed of the details of the plan.  Even though 
there is no process of public consultation in the form of an open vote, citizens can follow the 
process of plan preparation and can also appeal against the plan in court.  Following this 
process, the plan goes to INVU for its approval and finally to the municipal council, where it 
must be approved by a majority of the votes.  The plan becomes official once it has been 
published in the official journal (La Gaceta).  One interesting aspect is that these plans are 
not submitted to the National Emergency Commission for the Prevention of Risks and 
Response to Emergencies for approval.  
 
The Zonation regulations are key in urban disaster management in Costa Rica.  These 
regulations comprise a map depicting the various zones, plus related metadata.  Most 
importantly, a zonation regulation indicates where certain uses of land, buildings and other 
structures (e. g. agricultural, residential, industrial, commercial, public) are permitted.  Other 
important measures that can be incorporated into a zonation plan (these are not compulsory) 
include the following: 
 
• Target densities can be set for residential areas.  This is important as recent experiences 
such as the Kobe earthquake highlight the increased fatalities in high-density areas, 
especially when there are no open spaces available for evacuation purposes.   
• Maximum “plot coverages” can be set to guarantee some open space within a plot.  A 
plot coverage of 60% in a plot of 400 m2, for example, would translate into a maximum 
240 m2 of roof area, leaving 120 m2 as open space.  This is an important disaster 
mitigation tool as it can be used to force people to allow room for a garden where they 
can go in the case of an earthquake event.   
• In the case of single-family dwellings, minimum plot sizes can be set in terms of plot area 
as well as minimum width and width/length relationships.  For example, current 
regulations allow a minimum width of 6 m and a maximum width/length relationship of 
one to seven.  This tool could be used to avoid extremely long parcels that could make 
evacuation to the roads difficult in the case of earthquakes. 
• Maximum building height is also an important aspect in earthquake mitigation.   
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• One important aspect of a zonation regulation relates to what the law describes as 
“special zones”.  These are zones where development should be contained or avoided.  
Amongst the cases mentioned are airports, historical heritage, natural resource 
conservation, and flood-prone and “dangerous” areas.  Interestingly, there is no 
elaboration on what is meant by “dangerous” areas. Even though one could argue that 
natural hazards can be included under the heading “dangerous areas”, the Urban 
Planning Law is somewhat vague in terms of natural disaster mitigation.  It would seem 
that this law has not been updated to reflect current views and priorities agreed 
internationally and supported by leading organisations such as the United Nations and 
the World Bank. 
 
A certificate of zonation compliance is required from the municipality before preliminary 
building permits or commercial or industrial patents can be obtained.  From this it can be 
inferred that prior to purchasing or renting a plot, one must first verify with the municipal 
planning office whether the intended use of that plot is permitted.   
 
Another type of regulation is known as Urban Renewal. Its aim is conservation, 
rehabilitation or renovation of urban areas considered to have deteriorated or to be defective 
or decayed and that pose a threat to security, sanitation or the general well-being.  All areas 
that a municipality considers to be in need of renewal will have land subdivision or building 
restrictions imposed upon them unless changes are made to improve the situation.  The 
importance of these regulations is that they grant municipalities the right to expropriate land 
that can be redeveloped and sold to either the same or new owners.  This is important 
because it highlights the disaster management measures of expropriation and 
redevelopment.  Under the Urban Planning Law, both INVU and the municipalities can carry 
out expropriations. 
 
INVU has issued standards related to construction, land subdivision and neighbourhood 
design.  These are compulsory unless a municipality issues its own regulations.  Since the 
Municipality of Cartago does not have tailor-made regulations, those contained in Law 7554 
and related documents must be applied and enforced. 
 
The Land Subdivision and Urbanisation regulations standardise access to roads, land 
subdivision and block design, and set land allocation requirements for common public 
spaces such as parks and community facilities.  These regulations include minimum 
standards for the construction and design of roads; sidewalks; paved surfaces; water, 
rainwater and sewage pipelines; as well as electricity supply and street lighting.  All 
subdivision of land in urban areas must first be approved by the municipality and later 
approved and registered at the National Cadastre.  Some examples of measures included in 
these regulations that are of relevance to disaster management are:  
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• Donation of between 5 and 20% of the land for parks and community activities.  This is 
important not only from the point of view of recreation but also from the point of view of 
evacuation during earthquakes − also temporary shelter can be built to house displaced 
families whose houses have suffered damage.   
• A general prohibition on building within 10 m of either side of a river basin (5 m in the 
case of a creek). 
• A ban on construction on terrain steeper than 25% to prevent future landslide problems. 
• A slope stability study to be carried out on areas steeper than 30%. 
• Drainage works in terrain steeper than 10% to avoid slope instability. 
• Maximum road gradient of 20% to ensure access of emergency equipment and easy 
evacuation. 
• Minimum road widths to ensure the access of fire engines and ambulances. 
 
The Construction regulations are the most important regulations in terms of earthquake 
disaster prevention in Costa Rica and the most widely enforced due to a variety of factors, 
which will be described in more detail later in this chapter.  Under this regulation, buildings 
are divided into three categories: 
 
• Group A includes buildings where large losses of property or human life could occur, or 
those that are relevant during emergency situations, such as hospitals, public buildings, 
fire stations, police stations, jails, buildings for storing exceptionally valuable objects, 
buildings bigger than 400 m2 where large numbers of people are concentrated, 
transportation terminals, pump stations, buildings for storing toxic, explosive or 
radioactive material, electric power plants and telephone exchanges.  
• Group B includes houses, education facilities, buildings smaller than 400 m2 where large 
numbers of people are concentrated, buildings for storing valuable items, industrial 
buildings not included in Group A, other buildings where people go to work but not 
included in Group A, fences higher than 2 m and structures whose failure could put other 
structures at risk.  
• Group C includes isolated constructions and non-permanent buildings not used for 
housing or public use and not included in Groups A or B.   
 
The calculation of design capacity depends not only on the traditional calculation of vertical 
and lateral loads3 but also on coefficients assigned according to the classification described 
below (group A=1.20; group B=1.00; group C=0.70).  It is clear that this construction 
regulation attempts to ensure higher structural design standards according to the occupancy 
and strategic importance of the building.  This highlights the fact that structural design is not 
                                                 
3 CU=0,75(1,4CP+1,7CT)+CV, where CU relates to both gravitational and wind forces that buildings 
must be able to withstand (known as “design capacity”); CP relates to structural weight load, CT 
relates to temporal weight load, and CV to wind load.  
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being carried out in isolation; there is an explicit attempt to combat homelessness and 
ensure that response activities will not be hampered. 
 
The Federated Board of Engineers and Architects (CFIA) have issued three major codes 
(seismic, hydraulic and electric).  The present seismic code was issued in 1986 − although 
following the 1990 earthquake in Limón, it was considered that the boundaries of the macro-
zonation (see Figure 6.3) should be revised.  The code states that in the absence of a 
particular norm, other norms such as those of the American Society for Testing of Materials 
(ASTM) and the American Concrete Institute (ACI) should be applied.  Strangely, even 
though flooding is a more serious problem in Costa Rica than earthquakes, the construction 
regulations hardly mention anything related to flood-proof construction.   
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.3:  Seismic Zones (Colegio Federado de Ingenieros y de Arquitectos de Costa Rica 1986) and 
(Oviedo and Solís 2002). The map on the left illustrates the zoning of the 1986 Seismic Code; the map 
on the right illustrates the 2002 code.  The new zonation resulted from recent research and the 
expansion of the earthquake catalogue due to the 1991 Limón earthquake.  This map dictates minimum 
standards that should be applied to 1 and 2 storey buildings.  As a result of the change in code, in some 
areas buildings constructed in compliance with old code are nowadays below the minimum standards. 
 
One aspect that has vast implications for law enforcement relates to building permit fees.  
There are several institutions that issue preliminary plan approval, but it is the municipality 
that issues the final building permit.  A fee of 1% of the cost of the project (according to a 
valuation made by CFIA) must be paid to the municipality by the owner or developer.   There 
are only two exceptions: government projects are exempt and low-income housing projects 
that have been issued a “social interest status” by the Ministry of Housing and Human 
Settlements pay a fee of 0.25%.  These fees are a very important source of revenue for 
municipalities and this helps to explain why municipalities are so efficient in tracking down 
those construction sites that lack building permits.  This incentive, however, does not 
guarantee the efficiency of municipalities in carrying out the inspection of the building 
Zone 3
Zone 2
Zone 1
Zone 3
Zone 2
Zone 1
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process from the point of view of controlling the quality of building materials and construction 
techniques.  It is here that CFIA plays a major role in ensuring the quality of construction and 
building materials (see Section 6.6). 
 
6.4 LAW OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR THE PREVENTION OF AND 
RESPONSE TO EMERGENCIES (CNE) 
 
The National Emergency Law was passed in 1969 and it constitutes the basis under which 
the National Emergency Commission was founded.  This decree resulted from the needs 
identified due to the 1963 and 1965 eruptions and lahars caused by the Irazú volcano in 
Cartago, as well as the 1968 eruptions of the Arenal volcano in Alajuela.  Twenty people 
died due to a lahar that destroyed the neighbourhood of Taras in the north-western part of 
Cartago.  The eruptions of Arenal claimed the lives of 120 people and caused considerable 
farming losses. 
 
The Civil Defence Office was created in the 1960s; at first it was part of the President’s office 
but it later became part of the Ministry of Public Works and Transportation (MOPT).  A 
commission was formed by several members of the Cabinet with the task of administrating 
an emergency fund.  This law not only allowed the commission to make “exceptional” use of 
public funds in the case of “calamity” but also to plan, direct, control and coordinate 
programmes related to protecting, safeguarding and reconstructing all those areas declared 
“emergency zones”.  In 1983, the law was modified, replacing the word “calamity” with the 
word “contingency”, thereby giving the commission more scope for action.   
 
The commission suffered a great drawback in terms of its public image in the early eighties 
due to a corruption case related to the misappropriation of a considerable portion of the 
emergency funds.   
 
In 1986, a decree granted the commission the status of “institution” with its own offices and, 
although it was still legally part of the Ministry of Public Works and Transportation (MOPT), it 
functioned as an autonomous institution.  The role that was given to CNE by this new decree 
included administrating projects funded by the emergency fund, responding to emergencies, 
as well as conducting education and awareness campaigns. 
 
To cover operational costs, the commission is nowadays funded through the national 
budget.  The commission has a great political responsibility and, at the same time, it is highly 
vulnerable to decisions made by central government due to the composition of its board of 
directors.  This board must be composed of eight members representing the following 
sectors:  health, public works, housing, social aid, environment, security and the Red Cross.  
Apart from the representative of the Red Cross, the other seven members are Cabinet 
appointees (typically ministers or presidents of autonomous institutions), and, as is the 
present case, there is usually not a single representative from the opposition parties. 
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During the 1990s, the two main CNE achievements were the separation of “response” from 
mitigation and the strengthening of local emergency committees, which are now regarded by 
CNE as the “warhorses” of emergency activities. 
 
In 1999, a new law was passed and the commission officially became the “National 
Commission for the Prevention of Risks and Response to Emergencies”, although its 
acronym remained CNE.  CNE considers itself more of a coordinating than an executing 
entity.  In its view, this allows the institution to carry out integral actions, avoiding the 
duplication of functions and waste of resources.  Preparation and prevention programmes 
and projects are developed jointly with ministries, autonomous institutions, aid organisations, 
universities, foreign agencies and other organisations involved in the field of disasters.  To 
achieve its objectives, the commission carries out the following actions: 
 
• Prevention, reduction and preparedness by coordinating necessary technical and 
scientific research, as well as by issuing norms and conducting education or awareness-
raising campaigns at both the institutional and the community level. 
• Response by coordinating work of national and foreign institutions as well as by 
coordinating damage assessment, humanitarian assistance and recovery work by local 
emergency committees and other government and non-government institutions. 
• Rehabilitation and reconstruction by coordinating and executing the regulatory plan.  
This plan should include the assessment of damage as well as the elaboration of policy 
on the allocation of resources and responsibilities to the various institutions involved in 
the reconstruction process. 
 
CNE should in theory issue two important documents: a National Emergency Plan and a 
Regulatory Plan for Emergency Response, the first one being a general policy document 
while the second one should be area-specific.  However, when such a document was 
requested at the planning department of the Municipality of Cartago, the officers claimed that 
they were not aware of its existence for their city and that the only document they possessed 
was a hazard atlas produced on 1:50,000 scale. 
 
CNE is obliged to point out those areas of “imminent emergency risk” where no projects of a 
construction, enlargement or modification nature should be authorised in either full or partial 
form.  This document should be sent to the municipality concerned, the Federated Board of 
Engineers and Architects of Costa Rica (CFIA), as well as to the National Housing and 
Urbanism Institute (INVU) and any other institutions involved in authorising construction and 
development works.  All these institutions are obliged to observe and enforce these 
documents.  It is evident that this information should be reflected in the zonation plan issued 
by the municipality to guide and control urban growth or redevelopment.  CFIA is obliged to 
inform all its members of documents sent by CNE.  The law makes explicit mention of the 
liability of those institutions and government staff members that overlook these documents, 
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and this obviously constitutes an important pillar of urban disaster management.  In the case 
of individuals who build in areas identified as of “imminent emergency risk”, the law allows 
CNE to coordinate both expropriation and demolition works.   
 
A Regulatory Plan for Emergency Response can only be issued following the declaration of 
a “state of emergency”.  A state of emergency can only be called by the President or the 
Minister of the Presidency.  Following this declaration, CNE is responsible for developing a 
plan in consultation with the various institutions involved.  The plan should contain the 
following items: 
 
• Description and assessment of damage to humans and property, either already suffered 
or forecasted 
• Mitigation measures 
• Material and human resources (e.g. police, rescue brigades, demolition units) necessary 
to face the event 
• Middle-term measures such as the rehabilitation of affected areas, and the suppression 
and prevention of the causes of imminent risk 
• Distribution of tasks amongst the involved stakeholders 
 
6.5 CENTRE FOR PREVENTION OF NATURAL DISASTERS IN CENTRAL AMERICA 
(CEPREDENAC) 
 
CEPREDENAC was established in 1988 to coordinate and promote international co-
operation and the exchange of information, experience and technological advice, with the 
objective of reducing natural disaster impact, and thus contributing to improved decision-
making on planning and management in Central America.  It therefore constitutes the 
umbrella organisation for natural disaster mitigation in Central America.  CEPREDENAC is 
part of the Central American Integration System (SICA), an institution fostering the 
integration of Central America and overseeing agreements entered into by the governments 
of these nations.   
 
SICA has declared the years 2000 to 2004 Central American Quinquennial for the Reduction 
of Vulnerabilities and Disaster Impact. Every country is expected to identify a target goal that 
should be achieved within the five-year period.  It is suggested that emphasis should be 
placed on revising the legal framework to include prevention activities.  The strategic plan of 
the Quinquennial is very comprehensive and worth mentioning as it provides a good 
example of an attempt to carry out sustainable disaster mitigation.  The strategies are set 
according to 10 sectors: health, food and nutrition, education, housing and human 
settlements, farming, industry, transport, energy, environments and others.  The strategic 
issues to be developed under each sector are listed in Table 6.1. 
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Sector Strategies 
Health • Reduction of physical vulnerability of hospitals and water supply 
• Prevention, monitoring and control of epidemics and transmitted diseases 
• Preparation for response 
• Vaccination campaigns 
• Water safety and sanitation 
• Regional medication policy 
• Capacity-building on environmental health prevention 
Food and 
Nutrition 
• Detecting and monitoring food and nutrition requirements of vulnerable groups 
• Awareness campaigns on food hygiene 
• Production and consumption of nutritionally improved food by vulnerable groups 
• Quality control of food produced both locally and abroad 
Education • Setting up formal and informal education programmes on prevention and reduction 
• Training teachers in prevention and reduction 
• Vulnerability reduction of educational facilities 
Housing and 
human 
settlements 
• Updating and promotion of land-use norms based on vulnerability 
• Updating and implementation of rural and urban spatial plans 
• Updating of construction norms 
• Quality control of building materials 
Farming • Identification of crops resistant to drought and flood 
• Setting up an information system on the global or regional impact of climate 
phenomena on prices and international markets for relevant farming products 
• Promotion of irrigation and water storage projects in drought-prone areas 
• Setting up a plague forecast system based on climate change 
• Monitoring stocks of farming products to ensure nourishment and nutrition in the 
case of disaster or disaster alert 
• Design of a mechanism for the storage of basic products to be used in the case of 
disasters 
• Encouragement of sustainable farming practices 
• Establishment of a drought monitoring and warning system  
Industrial • Location, relocation or adaptation of plants and industrial production in suitable 
sites 
• Protecting the environment and the human settlements from industrial waste  
Transport • Vulnerability reduction of infrastructure (i.e. ground, air and maritime transport) 
Energy • Vulnerability reduction of energy generation, transmission and distribution at a local 
level but also for regional interconnecting lines 
• Reduction of the effects of droughts on hydro-electric generation 
Environment • Protection and recovery of slopes, agricultural frontiers, river basins, wetlands, 
coastal zones, forests protecting water resources, pollution control as well as 
transport and disposal of toxic waste 
 
Table 6.1:  CEPREDENAC Strategy 
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One of the challenges for CEPREDENAC relates to carrying out its duties in the light of the 
popular rejection of the idea of economic and political regional integration.  As is the case 
elsewhere where integration has been or is being attempted, the Central American 
governments support integration mainly for trade reasons, while the general population 
rejects it mainly on historical grounds.  In Costa Rica, for example, popular support for a 
Central American Union is extremely low. 
 
6.6 CIVIL CODE 
 
Since 1888, the Civil Code has established the responsibilities related to the design and 
construction of buildings and bridges.  This document is a fundamental pillar in risk 
prevention in Costa Rica and one that has helped enormously in avoiding high earthquake 
risk levels.  The Civil Code states that both the designer and the building contractor face 
liability for property damage for a period of five years commencing on the date that the 
building is handed over to its owner by the building contractor.  The only exception 
contemplated is in cases where the construction process has been delayed due to financial 
problems attributed to the owner.  The designer is liable for errors in the construction plans 
while the building contractor is liable for faulty execution of the work and for using building 
materials different to those stated in the construction plans and building specifications. 
 
The Civil Code has been supplemented by the Organic Law of the Federated Board of 
Engineers and Architects of Costa Rica (CFIA).  This law not only gives more details about 
the responsibilities of both the individuals or companies involved in the design and 
construction but also sets the responsibilities of the client or future owner. 
 
6.7 LAW OF THE FEDERATED BOARD OF ENGINEERS AND ARCHITECTS OF COSTA 
RICA (CFIA) 
 
This institution was founded in 1941 under the name “Board of Engineers” but it was not until 
1971, when Parliament issued the Organic Law of the CFIA that it was granted a major role 
in earthquake vulnerability prevention.  According to this law, this institution is in charge of 
regulating all building design and construction projects undertaken in Costa Rica.  The most 
important roles of this institution are: 
 
• Capacity-building of its members and the general public, in the form of courses on new 
regulations, building practice and new technology 
• Granting preliminary construction approvals (the final building permit is issued by the 
municipality) 
• Issuing building codes (e.g. seismic building, electricity and hydraulic sanitation codes), 
• Enforcing codes 
• Providing guidance and advice to both public and government institutions if requested 
• Protecting the interests of its members  
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• Punishing members for unlawful or unethical acts  
• Resolution of conflicts between members and clients 
 
Individuals as well as companies carrying out consulting and construction in the field of 
buildings or neighbourhood design must be registered with the Board.  Registration is 
therefore compulsory; individuals conducting work without registration face prosecution.  On 
the other hand, members who have violated building regulations or have violated the “Ethics 
Code” face up to two years of suspended membership, which translates into inability to carry 
out work and therefore to earn a living.   
 
Phases Sub-phases 
Plans and documents • Preliminary studies 
• Preliminary project  
• Construction plans and related construction specifications  
• Budgeting 
Control and execution • Inspection 
• Technical direction (includes inspection, programming and 
control) 
• Supervision 
• Administration 
Others • Basic studies 
• Investment fiscalisation 
• Supervision 
 
Table 6.2:  Phases in the Construction Process 
 
The reason why this law complements the Civil Code of 1888 lies in the establishment of 
professional responsibility according to a variety of phases.  An engineer or architect can be 
responsible for either an entire project or for single phases.  Basically the phases that are 
identified can be broadly grouped into plans/documents and control/execution of works.  
Table 6.2 gives an insight into the variety of tasks that can be carried out. 
 
According to this law, all construction, reconstruction and land subdivision works must be 
designed and directed by a member of the Board. A contract between the client and the 
professional is compulsory and must be registered at CFIA in order to apply for a municipal 
construction permit or to request land subdivision.  This contract, known as a “consulting 
contract” (contrato de consultoría) is very important in urban disaster mitigation as it records 
the responsibilities of architects, engineers and land surveyors and therefore sets the scene 
for liability.   
 
Some of the phases described before are of a compulsory nature while others are optional.  
Obligatory phases that must be contracted out to a member of the Board are preliminary 
studies and project design, construction plans (including specifications) and technical 
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direction.  Some phases are optional (e.g. detailed budgeting) while others (e.g. 
administration) could be carried out by the client/owner himself.  The person or company 
carrying out the preliminary studies is responsible for the soil mechanics study (the 
Foundations’ Code specifies the minimum requirements for a soil profile).  This stage is very 
important as an incorrect soil profile could lead to an unsuitable structural design and 
therefore, to property damage.  A preliminary project poses little possibility of liability, as this 
phase comprises the plan and façade design as well as a very rough estimate of costs.  The 
person or company responsible for the construction plans and related construction 
specifications is highly liable as this phase comprises the structural, electric and hydraulic 
designs which if faulty could lead to property damage.  For the actual construction process, 
the person acting as technical director has the greatest responsibility as he oversees the 
construction process and reports back to the owner and to the Board through a black book 
that is then kept for a period of five years.   
 
The Board is financially sound due to yearly membership fees paid by its members and the 
fees that must be paid to obtain CFIA preliminary building permits.  In most cases, this fee 
represents 0.10% of the value of a given construction permit, the valuation being set by 
CFIA itself.  The only projects exempt from these fees are government projects that have 
been given “social interest” status by the Ministry of Housing and Human Settlements.  
These projects are typically low-income housing projects funded by government-owned 
banks. 
 
6.8 LAW FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN ANTI-SEISMIC CODE FOR CIVIL WORKS 
 
This law states that all constructions and civil works carried out in Costa Rica must comply 
with minimum design and anti-seismic construction norms.  The Cabinet issues minimum 
norms by means of regulations based on the advice and opinion of the Federated Board of 
Engineers and Architects (CFIA) in its role of “obliged collaborator”.  The objective is to 
protect life as well as to ensure the functioning of essential facilities and to minimise property 
damage following a seismic event. 
 
The objectives of these norms are to ensure that buildings and civil works designed and 
constructed will: 
• Withstand minor earthquakes without damage 
• Withstand moderate earthquakes with only some non-structural damage  
• Withstand earthquakes of major intensity without collapsing and with only some 
structural damage that can be preferably repaired 
 
This law is important not only because it states seismic design targets but also because it 
limits to some extent the liability that professionals could face for various types of earthquake 
magnitudes.  There is no mention, however, of what is meant by the three types of 
earthquake (minor, moderate, major) and one could therefore claim that this lack of definition 
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could lead to conflicts.  One important feature of the code is a ban on construction within 
50 m of active faults.  This is important from the point of view of ground rupture (refer to 
Chapter 3). 
 
Another significant aspect of the code is the minimum temporary design load established 
based on the use or function of the building (refer to Table 6.3).  This highlights an issue 
commonly overlooked by municipal planning offices, related to the granting of permits for 
change of building use.  Such changes can lead to higher vulnerability since structural 
elements and floors can be subjected to higher loads than originally intended.  
 
Use of Floor Load 
(kg/m2) 
Residential 250 
Office 300 
Commercial, warehouses or factories – light weight goods 500 
Commercial, warehouses or factories – medium weight goods 650 
Commercial, warehouses or factories – heavy weight goods 800 
Gathering places without fixed seats 500 
Gathering places with fixed seats 400 
Car parking  400 
 
Table 6.3:  Minimum Temporary Design Loads (extract from: Colegio Federado 
de Ingenieros y de Arquitectos de Costa Rica 1986) 
 
6.9 NATIONAL STATISTICS SYSTEM LAW 
 
This law was issued in 1998 and its importance lies in the “public interest” character given to 
the production and diffusion of timely and reliable statistics, considered as a basis for 
efficient private and public management.  The National Statistics System (SEN) is created 
with the National Statistics and Census Institute (INEC) as coordinating entity and is 
composed of public sector institutions.  The role of SEN relates to rationalising statistical 
activities. One of the weaknesses of this document, however, is the lack of mention of the 
institutions that should be part of SEN.  Interestingly, there does not seem to be any 
representation of the private sector clients or users of this information at SEN.  
 
The most relevant aspect of this law for the purpose of this research is the concept of 
confidentiality, and there seems to be a serious misinterpretation of the law by INEC’s 
Information Centre.  The law states that data supplied by individuals or companies can only 
be published as “global figures”, unless there is written consent from the individual or the 
company who has provided the data to the census surveyor.  The contradiction between the 
legal framework and actual practice lies in the definition of “global figures”.  The law states 
that “global figures” relate to those that contain figures on three or more individuals or 
companies.  Since INEC prevents the general public from having access to data at the 
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census tract level for “confidentiality reasons”, one can conclude that a problem of 
interpretation or implementation of the law exists.  This database is highly relevant to the 
planning process, not only because of the nature of the information contained but also 
because of its level of detail. 
 
Another important aspect relates to the obligation of institutions belonging to SEN to hand in 
any requested data.  Not only are they obliged to do this, they must also supply truthful and 
timely data; the law indicates that failure to do so might lead to sanctions.  Regarding the 
periodicity of the census surveys, the law establishes that there will be at least one housing 
and population census every 10 years and an economic and farming census every five 
years.  Of interest to the research are the household census and the construction permit 
statistics, although the law does not state their periodicity. 
 
Having said that, because of inadequate emergency planning, one cannot take it for granted 
that a census will be carried out in the programmed year.  The 1994 National Population and 
Housing Census was postponed until the year 2000 as the decision was made to divert 
funds to reconstruction activities to repair property and infrastructure damage caused by 
Hurricane Caesar.   
 
6.10 CONSTITUTIONAL JURISDICTION LAW AND PARLIAMENTARY OMBUDSMAN 
LAW 
 
In the attempt to achieve transparency and accountability in urban development (two 
important principles of good governance), two relatively recently established institutions play 
a major role: the Parliamentary Ombudsman (Defensoría de los Habitantes) and the 
Constitutional Court (Sala Cuarta).   
 
The Parliamentary Ombudsman was established in 1992 (the Swedish Ombudsman 
established in 1809 was the inspiration for this).  The role of this institution is to protect the 
rights or interests of individuals or companies against the arbitrary acts of the public sector.  
The Ombudsman reacts to complaints of violations deriving from the action or lack of action 
by public sector officials.  This institution has been very active in the fight against corruption 
and is one that has considerable popular support. 
 
The Constitutional Court was established in 1989 and its role relates to guaranteeing the 
supremacy of norms and constitutional principles, as well as their uniform interpretation and 
application.  This institution also resolves conflicts related to the competence (who does 
what) between the various levels of government or institutions.  The “confidentiality law” 
applied by the National Statistics and Census Institute (INEC) is a good example of a case 
that should be presented at the Constitutional Court.  It could be argued that the Census 
Bureau misinterprets the law and by denying access to census tract information, it is 
hampering urban disaster management and urban planning in general.   
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6. 11  CONCLUSIONS 
 
One could argue that liability and incentives constitute important push-pull factors in urban 
disaster management (see Figure 6.4).  From the analysis of the legal framework, it can be 
concluded that the framework is comprehensive and that the linkages between the various 
institutions are efficient in ensuring enforcement and compliance.  The creation of the 
Parliamentary Ombudsman and the Constitution Court has ensured that misinterpretation, 
neglect or omission by government institutions can be tackled.  Moreover, there are two 
other important factors that ensure enforcement and compliance: accountability is ensured 
over a five-year period of liability for property damage (which forces institutions and 
individuals to act lawfully), while construction taxes constitute an important financial 
incentive for institutions to oversee the development and construction processes.     
 
 
 
Figure 6.4:  Liability and Incentives in Urban Development 
 
With the decentralisation of duties from central to local government under way, municipalities 
will be more financially sound in the future.  This process is important as for decades local 
governments have argued that they are unable to carry out inspection and planning properly 
due mainly to financial constraints.  The National Urbanism and Housing Institute (INVU), a 
leading organisation in guiding urban development, has been severely financially 
constrained for decades and this constitutes a serious weakness that must be addressed.   
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Chapter Seven:  THE CASE OF CARTAGO 
 
This chapter introduces the case of the city of Cartago in Costa Rica.  First, a review will be 
made related to the history of the city in terms of its urban development, the evolution of 
construction techniques and materials, the perception of seismic events and the impact of 
natural disasters.  Finally, a review of available datasets will be made from the point of view 
of opportunities and constraints.  In Chapter Eight the methodological aspects related to data 
inputs for risk assessment will be discussed and the earthquake risk assessment results will 
be presented. 
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Figure 7.1:  Location of Major Cities in Costa Rica  
 
7.1  JUSTIFICATION OF CASE SELECTION 
 
The city of Cartago in Costa Rica constitutes an interesting case study due to its high 
susceptibility to hazards and to the way natural disasters have shaped its history and urban 
development process.  It lies 1,439 m above sea level in what is known as Costa Rica’s 
Central Valley.  Cartago is located in a very fertile part of the valley known as the Guarco 
Valley (see Figures 7.1 and 7.7).  The fertility is a consequence of the periodic eruptions of 
the Irazú volcano.  The city is the agricultural centre in the Guarco Valley; its inhabitants are 
known as paperos (potato people) since most of the potatoes harvested in Costa Rica are 
grown on the foot slopes of Irazú.  According to the 2000 National Population Census by the 
National Statistics and Census Institute (INEC), the province of Cartago has a population of 
432,923.  While 125,000 live in the city of Cartago, some people commute each day to San 
José (22 km away) for work.   
 
The Municipality of Cartago is a typical Costa Rican municipality in terms of financial and 
human resources.  In order to guarantee the transferability of risk assessment within the 
Costa Rican context − one of the objectives of the research − a decision was made not to 
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study a city that had data available as a result of some exceptional research project or 
wealthy nearby research institute.   
 
7.2  HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
 
Little is known about pre-Columbian cities in Costa Rica.  According to Troyo (1998), there 
are around 3,000 small archaeological sites of ceremonial, residential, burial, raw material 
extraction or instrument elaboration nature in the Costa Rican territory.  These sites confirm 
that human occupation of present Costa Rican territory dates back to 10,000 B.C.   
 
Many authors seem to agree that the population in today’s Costa Rica was very small at the 
time of the arrival of the Spaniards, and most consider mineral wealth and location to be the 
explanations for this.  In ancient times, trade was carried out using gold as currency, while 
jade was used as a symbol of status.  Many jade figures have been found during 
archaeological excavations; however, Costa Rica lacks jade and has very limited gold 
deposits.  This helps to explain the very low indigenous population and the limited level of 
development compared with the grand Mesoamerican (e.g. Aztec, Mayan) and South 
American civilisations (e.g. Inca, Tihuanaco).  According to Thiel (in Fonseca and Barrascout 
1998), there were only 27,200 inhabitants between 1522 and 1569, while Baker (2001) 
quotes a figure of around 20,000.  So far, the only author that has questioned these figures 
is Ibarra (in Solís 1996), who quoted a figure of around 400,000 inhabitants.   
 
In terms of location, Troyo (1998) believes that the boundary of the Mesoamerican 
civilisation was where Honduras lies today, while the boundary of the South American 
civilisation lies between Bogotá and Armenia (Colombia), with the Andes as the boundary to 
the east.  Costa Rica was, in what she describes as the “Intermediate Area”, a type of “no-
man's land”. 
 
 
 
Figure 7.2:  Typical Costa Rican Native Palenque (Fonseca and Garnier 1998) 
 
  115
The population was hierarchically organised into cacicazgos.  The cacicazgo was a socio-
political structure whose leaders, known as caciques, based their power upon a mythical 
ancestral origin combining political and religious power.  Ibarra Rojas (1990) considers that 
during the XVI century, there were at least 13 caciques in the country and communication 
and trading amongst them was carried out on a regular basis.  Agriculture was the most 
important economic activity.  Their diet was based mainly on maize, roots and beans and 
supplemented with wild fruits, fish and animals.  
 
People thought of themselves as being part of nature; therefore there was equilibrium in their 
relationship. The types of materials used for the construction of their buildings, as well as the 
layout of their villages, was of a very “organic” nature.  The layout of the villages was very 
irregular.  Buildings were commonly constructed on top of either a rectangular or a circular 
rock platform.  The size of these platforms ranged between 6 and 35 m in diameter.  The 
height of the platform ranged from a few centimetres to around 2 m.  The average yearly 
precipitation in Costa Rica is 3,300 mm; therefore the elevation of buildings by means of 
rock platforms highlights the extent to which the weather was taken into account.  The walls 
were frequently composed of wood or bamboo sticks and sometimes they were plastered 
with clay.  In some cases, floors were of fine baked clay.  In buildings known as palenques 
(see Figure 7.2), the palm tree or straw roof extended all the way to the floor.  Because of 
the non-lasting character of these building materials, only a few of the platforms remain.  
Even though people were highly skilled in baking clay objects for various purposes, there is 
no evidence that suggests the use of clay tiles as roofing material.  The avoidance of heavy 
roofing materials seems to suggest that earthquakes were taken into account and there was 
therefore an explicit attempt to live in harmony with the environment. 
 
In 1492, the Spanish discovered what to them was an unknown continent on their way to 
India.  Following this fortunate discovery, the Queen of Castile and the King of Aragón 
launched the Spanish Conquista.  This discovery was not only an act of good luck but also 
one that bailed Spain out of a precarious financial situation.  Expelling the Moors and the 
Jews had been both a religious success and a financial disaster.  Spain’s finances suffered 
greatly following this forced expulsion as both the Moorish and Jewish communities were 
highly wealthy.  This unexpected “New World” provided not only an opportunity to recover 
from economic recession but also an opportunity to create a vast empire controlling major 
trading routes that would provide them with economic and military supremacy over the rest 
of Europe. 
 
Christopher Columbus landed on the east coast of Costa Rica (present-day Limón) in 1502 
on his fourth voyage to the “Americas”.  Having seen a few inhabitants wearing golden 
collars, he named the land Costa Rica, meaning “rich coast”.  Expeditions followed, only to 
discover that this name did not quite reflect the mineral wealth of this land.  After several 
expeditions, the word spread that this land lacked gold, silver and precious stones.  
Furthermore, the area also lacked inhabitants to act as servants or slaves and therefore the 
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Spanish became more interested in territories to both the north and to the south, such as 
Nicaragua and Panama, where people and gold were in better supply.  As Baker (2001) 
points out, for the next four decades Costa Rica was virtually left alone. The conquest of 
Peru by Pizarro in 1532, as well as the first of the great silver strikes in Mexico in the 1540s, 
turned eyes away from southern Central America. Guatemala became the administrative 
centre for the Spanish Main in 1543, when the Captaincy-General of Guatemala, answerable 
to the Viceroy of New Spain (Mexico), was created, with jurisdiction from the Isthmus of 
Tehuantepec to the empty lands of Costa Rica.  Since this province was the most distant 
from the headquarters in Guatemala City, contact was weak and the province enjoyed 
relative freedom.  Baker (2001) even points out that in fact money became so scarce that the 
settlers eventually reverted to the native method of using cacao beans as currency.  This 
helps to explain the different process of colonisation that took place in Costa Rica, when 
compared with other nearby countries such as Guatemala and Mexico.  The economy 
evolved slowly under conditions that favoured neither the development of large colonial-style 
haciendas nor the feudal system of other Spanish enclaves, the nearest example being 
Nicaragua.  The Spanish founded some villages along the Caribbean coast, but most of 
these enterprises failed because of the lack of native people to do the work and because of 
British pirates who were constantly looting these Spanish coastal villages with the aid of 
indigenous people.   
 
The natives were exploited under a system of forced labour that used them as guides for 
exploration, as carriers of goods and/or as food suppliers.  Eventually, the Spanish moved 
inland and founded the city of Cartago, amongst others.  In 1564 Vásquez de Coronado, 
founder of Cartago, brought a group of settlers willing to establish themselves on the land 
and enough cattle to ensure their success.  In 1542 “New Laws” were issued by Spain, 
prohibiting slavery and institutionalising the encomienda system (also known as 
repartimiento).  Indigenous people were distributed amongst the Spaniards and were forced 
to either work for their “masters” or pay in cash or kind instead.  However, it was not until 
1568 that, due to the constant rebellions by indigenous people, Governor Perafán de Rivera 
decided to implement the encomienda system in Cartago.  From 1569 to 1611 the natives 
paid their master, or encomendero, a tribute in the form of agricultural products and 
handicrafts (ceramic and textile goods).  To fulfil the quota, they were exploited to the 
extreme, thus provoking a dramatic decrease in population.  Fonseca and Quirós (1993) 
consider that this is the reason and not, as has been traditionally believed, that diseases 
caused a high mortality rate amongst the natives during the first century of Spanish rule. 
 
The layout of Cartago was carried out simultaneously with the issuing of the Law of the 
Indies4; therefore it is unlikely that there was knowledge in Cartago about the details of such 
                                                 
4 In 1523, Charles V issued a series of preliminary norms related to the criteria for site selection for 
founding new cities.  In 1573, Philip II issued the “Laws of the Indies” related to the selection of sites 
specifically for founding cities in the New World, but also giving specific standards for street layout and 
street width, as well as the location of the main square, churches and residential, commercial and 
institutional buildings. 
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a law.  The layout, however, does comply with this law, which indicates that there were 
already some agreed principles on how to found cities and how to design their structure. 
 
Although Cartago was founded in 1564, present-day Cartago dates from 1575 − the original 
site was abandoned as it had been founded on extremely muddy terrain.  The settlement 
was therefore relocated about 2 km northeast of the original site.  Figure 7.3 illustrates the 
layout of the city of Cartago as designed by Alonso de Anguciana in 1572. The layout was 
based on a grid of square blocks of 100 x 100 varas (1 vara = 0.83 m).  Squares were 
typically divided into four plots (refer to Figure 7.3); “distinguished” families received two 
adjacent plots close to the main square while ordinary citizens received only one plot.  When 
all the lots were occupied, other squares would be laid out.  Eventually these plots started to 
be subdivided, mainly for inheritance purposes.   
 
Villages were first linked using existing indigenous paths.  These paths, however, had to be 
widened by the Spaniards to allow the transit of horses and carriages (the indigenous people 
did not use horses).  The “Royal Trail” linked Cartago with the province of Nicaragua, the 
“Mules Trail” linked Cartago with Panama, while the “Matina Trail” linked Cartago with the 
village of Matina, located near present-day Limón (refer to Figure 7.1). 
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Figure 7.3:  Cartago’s Road Layout Design by de Anguciana in 1572  
(adapted from Ponce 1993)  
 
In 1590 Velázquez Ramiro founded a hamlet nearby under the name of San Juan de los 
Naboríos.  This hamlet, as well as the Puebla de los Pardos (hamlet of the “dark skinned”) 
confirms the existence of an apartheid system.  The Spanish, the “creoles” (half-Spanish 
half-indigenous people) and the indigenous lived in different parts of the city.  As the terrain 
is flat and there are no major geographical features, the irregular street layout of the Puebla 
de los Pardos seems to suggest that this part of town was neglected by the Spanish. 
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Cartago grew at a slow pace.  According to Ponce (1993), by 1608 only 57 houses had been 
erected; in 1650 there were 70 houses and by 1690 87 houses (see maps adapted from 
Peraldo and Montero 1994 in Figure 7.4).  A full century after its founding, Cartago had less 
than 100 houses and only one church, which, according to Baker (2001), were all destroyed 
by the eruption of the Irazú volcano in 1723.  No great infrastructural works were carried out 
during the colonial era due to limited capacity and the size of the population.  According to 
Fonseca and Garnier (1998), at the end of the XVIII century there were only 60,000 
inhabitants in the province of Costa Rica.  Another important factor was the fleeing of native 
people from Cartago into remote mountains to avoid exploitation.  This caused a major 
problem of labour supply for the Spaniards.  Moreover, the Spanish government did not build 
any grand buildings or fortifications because of the limited strategic importance that this 
province had for the Crown.  Water supply was provided by means of mills located along the 
rivers and open channels that conducted the water into the city.  It was not until 1800 that 
these open channels were covered with flat protective stones.  The streets were not paved 
until 1782.    
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Figure 7.4:  Occupation of Building Blocks during First Century 
 (adapted from Peraldo and Montero 1994) 
 
During the first years after their arrival in the New World, the Spanish were forced to solve 
their shelter problems by using the most widely available materials: mud, wood and straw.  
During the XVI century, houses built of mud walls with palm tree or straw roofs were 
predominant in Cartago.  Later on, as the village progressed economically and more skilled 
people arrived and settled down, traditional Spanish materials and construction techniques 
were applied (mud bricks plastered with lime stucco, carved wood and clay tile roofs).  
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Figure 7.5:  Typical Adobe Walls  
 
According to Troyo (1998), the use of clay tile roofs in Cartago can be traced back to 1607.  
In terms of construction materials, mud was probably the only common denominator 
between the Spaniards and the natives.  While the natives used it to cover up gaps between 
the various pieces of wood or bamboo that composed the walls, the Spanish used it to 
construct heavy bricks from mud, straw and manure, known as adobe.   
 
Adobe was used in Spain as it was conducive to a very pleasant indoor temperature.  
However, while this might have been an issue in Spain during summer, it was definitely not 
so in Cartago, where temperatures range between 12 and 24 degrees Celsius throughout 
the year.  On the other hand, heavy adobe walls were very vulnerable to earthquakes, 
especially if topped by heavy wooden rafters and a clay tile roof.  It can be concluded that 
there was little adaptation in terms of construction techniques or building materials by the 
Spanish settlers.  This is surprising as it was not the case with other European settlers that 
moved into the New World.  The reason might lie in the compliance with a set of laws issued 
in Spain by a king who never visited the New World and consequently issued laws 
containing some standards that were inappropriate from the point of view of earthquake 
hazards.  This is by no means surprising as earthquakes do not occur in Spain and 
earthquake-proof construction was therefore unheard of. 
 
With the exception of one single house, stone was only used in Cartago for the construction 
of churches.  It was not until the end of the XVII century that stone construction was 
introduced, but it was seldom used until the middle of the XVIII century, when the 
commercial boom due to tobacco exports improved the financial situation and allowed the 
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use of more expensive materials.  This method differed from adobe in that ditches were 
excavated and a foundation was first built.  Stone walls were always plastered with lime 
stucco. 
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Figure 7.6:  Cartago’s Road Layout in 1690 (adapted from Ponce 1993) 
 
Wood was of very high quality and in good supply.  It was not used for building walls during 
colonial and early republican days, however, because of the shortage of nails and tools such 
as saws, hammers and axes.  The use of wood was restricted; it was used mainly for doors, 
columns and rafters. For example, only very wealthy families could afford wooden floors. 
 
As pointed out by Solís (1996), the anti-colonial feeling was not as deeply rooted in Costa 
Rica as in other parts of Latin America.  The system did not create deep conflicts or 
contradictions and, to some extent, economic deprivation prevented the natives from being 
massacred, as there was hardly anything worth looting.  Ethnic tension was never as high as 
in other parts of the Spanish Empire, mainly due to the lack of population at the time of the 
arrival of the Europeans.  The only complaints arose from the commercial sector, whose 
members felt limited by the trade restrictions imposed on them by the Spanish Crown.  
There was therefore no reason for a violent struggle.  The Declaration of Independence was 
signed in the city of Guatemala on the 15th of September of 1821 and ratified in Cartago on 
the 29th of October at the expense of not one single drop of Costa Rican blood. 
 
Soon after independence, a series of important changes took place.  At the time of 
independence, most of the population lived in or around the capital city of Cartago.  During 
the XVIII century, though, the Creole peasants started conquering the forest in a wave of 
colonisation towards the western side of the Central Valley. The cities of Heredia (1706), 
San José (1737) and Alajuela (1782) were founded.  Next, in a circular pattern, the 
properties around them were cleared and planted.  San José had become the economic 
centre due mainly to the tobacco boom during the second half of the XVIII century and 
coffee exports during the XIX century.   
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During the first half of the XVIII century, the capital was moved to San José.  There are three 
reasons that explain this decision:  
 
• Cartago had suffered great physical and economic losses through earthquakes and 
lahars 
• Cartago had been left behind by San José in terms of economic and demographic 
growth  
• Cartago had lost in the civil war with San José and Heredia 
 
In terms of the civil war, the conservative and aristocratic leaders of Cartago and Heredia 
had found themselves at odds with the more progressive republican leaders of San José and 
Alajuela.  While Cartago and Heredia wanted to join Mexico, San José and Alajuela wanted 
to join the Central American Federation.  The local quarrels quickly developed into a civil war 
in which Cartago and Heredia were defeated.  Interestingly, more lives were lost during the 
war that broke out between the leading cities than in the independence process. 
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Figure 7.7:  Location of the Various Cities in the Central Valley 
 
Fernández and Céspedes (1910) point out that after the seat of government was removed 
from Cartago in 1823, the city seemed to be dying, its population falling to about 3,000 
inhabitants by 1890.   
 
Although the populations of San José, Alajuela and Heredia rose, the country remained 
mostly rural.  According to Samper (in Solís 1996), even in 1927, 81% of the population of 
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Costa Rica was rural.  For this reason, many authors, such as Baker (2001), have described 
Costa Rica as a “rural democracy” characterised by individuals who were extremely 
individualistic and somewhat egalitarian. 
 
The earthquake of 1841 destroyed Cartago and killed 31 people.  Out of a total of 600 
houses, 291 collapsed, while the rest were heavily damaged.  Only four houses built of rock 
masonry withstood the earthquake properly. From a total of seven churches, five collapsed 
and two were heavily damaged.  The main church, which had already been heavily damaged 
by a tremor in 1781, was destroyed in 1841.  The Church of Los Angeles located in the 
Puebla de los Pardos, which had already been damaged by the 1715 earthquake, was one 
of the two that were heavily damaged in 1841.  It was then destroyed by the 1910 
earthquake.  Another earthquake, this time in 1811, damaged the town hall.  
  
Following the earthquake of 1841, President Braulio Carrillo issued a series of decrees with 
very concrete objectives: 
 
• Reconstruction of Cartago  
• Regulation of existing construction practices and design  
• Planning the funding sources for the construction of public buildings such as churches, 
town halls, jails and military headquarters 
 
These decrees defined which buildings had to be constructed and where they would be built.  
It also specified a minimum street width of 16 varas (1 vara = 0.83 m).  This measure did not 
prove particularly popular as some inhabitants lost part of their plots, and compensation 
procedures had to be put in place.  Another important issue was limiting the height of houses 
to one floor only.  To ensure proper ventilation and a uniform urban landscape, the heights 
were standardised at four and a half varas (3.7 m).  Only two churches would remain (La 
Parroquia and La Soledad), while the remains of the other churches would be used to 
reconstruct these two as well as neighbourhood chapels.   
 
The decision relating to the reconstruction of only two churches was overlooked. It was not 
easy to extinguish two important colonial religious institutions: the Franciscan cloister, 
headquarters of the only missionary order in the province of Costa Rica, and the Church of 
Our Lady of Los Angeles, former colonial brotherhood, place of pilgrimage and sanctuary to 
native Cartago since 1782.  These churches, along with La Soledad, El Carmen and San 
Nicolás were rebuilt between 1845 and 1865.  Strangely, the last church to be rebuilt was 
the parish church.  Its reconstruction did not start until 1861 and was then abandoned in 
1910, when people gave up after an earthquake ruined what had been erected so far, 
thinking that this constituted a divine message (see Figure 7.8). 
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Figure 7.8:  Ruins of the Parish Church at Cartago 
 (its reconstruction abandoned after the 1910 earthquake) 
 
The other important issue contained in these decrees was the section entitled “Instructions 
for Rebuilding with Strength”.  This section of the decree constitutes the first written account 
of building regulations in Costa Rica.  This was developed based on an analysis of 
construction systems used since 1823.  Three main construction systems were regulated:   
 
• Wood-frame walls 
• Wooden poles anchored to the ground 
• Stone and mud-brick walls 
 
One important step forward was the ban on the adobe construction system and its 
replacement with the bahareque system (see Figure 7.9).  The bahareque consists of a 
wooden and bamboo frame infilled with mud and clay tile fragments.  This system was 
considerably more resistant to earthquakes. 
 
The 1841 norms of Carrillo highlight not only the role of the government in guiding city 
growth and redevelopment but also the status of relations between State and Church during 
the XIX century, with an increasingly stronger government.   
 
The next important event was the deadly and destructive 1910 earthquake.  The casualty 
rate was extremely high.  Fernández and Céspedes (1910) point out that one in eight 
inhabitants perished (1,500 out of the 12,000 inhabitants).  This constituted the third time 
that Cartago lay in ruins. The same authors make a very relevant remark related to the 
property losses.  They mention that adobe, of which most houses in the city were 
constructed, crumbled easily, while the few houses that remained standing were those built 
with wooden frames. 
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Figure 7.9:  Typical Bahareque Wall 
 
A very significant step forward was made following this event.  The population reconstructed 
their buildings with wood or corrugated metal sheets, materials that had not been used as 
wall material before (refer to Figure 7.10).  Only in Cartago can it be observed that houses 
had a mixture of adobe and corrugated metal walls, the corrugated metal replacing the part 
of the building that collapsed during the 1910 earthquake.  The other interesting aspect is 
that clay tile roofs were replaced with corrugated metal sheets in an effort to lower the 
vertical load on the walls.  The traditional Spanish architecture was therefore being slowly 
abandoned or modified due to geological phenomena. 
 
 
 
Figure 7.10:  Mixed Adobe and Corrugated Metal Walls 
 
Another important and rather indigenous measure derived from the experiences of the 1841 
and 1910 earthquakes relates to the erection of tembloreras.  The temblorera was a room 
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built with wooden walls that was added to an adobe or a bahareque house, typically in the 
back garden.  In times of seismic activity, families would move into this “earthquake-proof” 
room.  This measure, however, protected them mainly against aftershocks and provided little 
protection from the initial shock. 
 
From 1910 to the 1950s, wood became a very popular building material.  Wood is highly 
resilient in the event of earthquakes, although in a country averaging a 90% humidity level 
fighting decay proves problematic.  Nowadays, houses are constructed mostly of reinforced 
concrete masonry or pre-cast concrete panels roofed with corrugated metal sheets.  Wood is 
reserved for floors, doors and doorframes due to its high cost.  This type of construction 
system is widely used for four main reasons: 
 
• Concrete is a long-lasting material 
• Concrete offers security against burglary (dry-wall boards, wooden or corrugated 
metal walls are easy to disassemble) 
• Concrete walls can be flood-proof if plastered adequately  
• Reinforced concrete is good at withstanding earthquakes  
 
 
 
Figure 7.11:  Typical Reinforced Concrete 
Residential Construction 
 
From the historical analysis of events and measures, it can be concluded that in terms of 
building vulnerability to earthquakes, it has taken Cartago nearly 500 years to return to 
square one.  During pre-colonial days, both the choice of materials as well as the 
construction system guaranteed that buildings were highly resistant to earthquakes.  With 
the arrival of the Spaniards and the adoption of traditional Spanish architecture (adobe walls 
and heavy clay tile roofs), the building stock became highly vulnerable.  A slow and 
painstaking process of evolution then took place over a period of 150 years, starting with 
Braulio Carrillo’s decrees of 1841.  Buildings currently being constructed are highly resistant 
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to earthquakes, although the materials and techniques used differ from those used by native 
people 500 years ago.  Figure 7.12 graphically depicts the evolution of building vulnerability 
to earthquakes in Cartago. 
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Figure 7.12:  Evolution of Building Vulnerability in Cartago throughout its History (conceptual) 
 
7.3 HUMAN PERCEPTION OF DISASTERS 
 
Human perception of hazards is extremely important in urban disaster management as it 
allows the selection of measures that will be accepted and therefore complied with by the 
community.  In Cartago, there are two written accounts that give an insight into the changes 
in relation to human perception of hazards that have taken place.  The first account is known 
as the “Iztarú Legend” and it is important because it gives an insight into the human 
perception of hazards before the arrival of the Spanish.  The Guarco Valley was in those 
days inhabited by two main groups, one located in the northern part of the valley and ruled 
by Cacique Coo, while the other one was located in the southern part of the valley and was 
ruled by Cacique Guarco.  It must be noted that this legend dates back to shortly before the 
arrival of the Spaniards, as it is known that Juan Vázquez de Coronado met Cacique 
Guarco.  Coo and Guarco were engaged in a fight for supremacy over the valley.  Guarco 
slowly gained territory from Coo.  When Coo died, Aquitaba succeeded him.  Aquitaba was a 
strong fighter but, when faced with the loss of considerable ground to Guarco, he took his 
daughter Iztarú to the highest mountain in the northern part of the region and had her 
sacrificed to the gods in return for triumph in war.  Shortly after, during a fierce battle, 
Aquitaba implored aid from the sacrificed Iztarú.  Legend has it that Aquitaba’s plea resulted 
in fire, ashes and rocks that came down the mountain, forcing Guarco’s fighters to flee.  
Furthermore, from one side of the mountain “a river of hot water” (probably a lahar) came 
down and destroyed Guarco’s village. Alvarado et al. (in Peraldo and Montero 1994) 
consider the natural event described in this legend to be true as Spaniards refer to arriving at 
the “valley of desolation”, a valley covered by ashes and trees without foliage. According to 
Peraldo and Montero (1994), it would appear that this legend was documented by Spaniards 
who heard it first hand from Cacique Guarco. 
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The second story is a written account dating back to colonial days that clearly describes how 
people raised in the Spanish traditions and beliefs perceived natural events.  The account 
relates to a description of the damage caused by an “earth tremor” that took place in July of 
1746 and was documented by an inhabitant of Cartago in the archives of the Church of Our 
Lady of Los Angeles.  The witness describes the earthquake as taking place between two 
and three o’clock in the afternoon and lasting around four minutes.  Following the description 
of the tremor, he makes a very interesting remark related to the cause of the earthquake: 
“earthquakes of that sort are signs of divine indignation and are very well deserved 
punishment for our enormous sins”.   
 
According to La Prensa (2001), in 2001 70.3% of the population still viewed themselves as 
belonging to the Catholic Church, although there has been a sharp decline in mass 
attendance and a tendency towards a decrease in the number of “believers” (in 1995 the 
figure was 84%).  There are many who still view disasters as a divine punishment.  
Therefore this perception of natural disasters as an “Act of God” should be a consideration in 
disaster mitigation strategy formulation.  Moreover, Cartago is the religious centre in Costa 
Rica due to the “Legend of La Negrita”. This tells of a statue of the Virgin Mary that appeared 
and re-appeared many times to a native woman in the Puebla de los Pardos (the part of 
town reserved for the natives) during early colonial days.  Since then, every year on the eve 
of the 2nd of August around half a million people (approximately one in eight Costa Ricans) 
make the pilgrimage to the Church of Our Lady of Los Angeles in Cartago.   
 
7.4  NATURAL HAZARDS 
 
In summary, Cartago lies on relatively flat land (refer to digital elevation model in Figure 
7.14) and suffers from both hydro-meteorological and geological hazards.  However, 
although earthquakes have definitely caused greater loss of human life and property losses 
within its urban area throughout history, one of the most interesting issues relates to the 
various triggering effects that occur in Cartago (refer to Figure 7.13).  For this reason, it is 
difficult to describe these phenomena individually.  The following sections attempt to explain 
the natural phenomena that pose a threat to Cartago, although the risk assessment to be 
carried out in Chapter Eight focuses on earthquakes only. 
 
Volcanic Eruption  
Earthquake Landslide
Fire
Mudflow
Lahar
Severe
Rain  
 
Figure 7.13:  Triggering Effects of Natural Phenomena in Cartago 
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The most important river in Cartago is the Reventado River, which under normal conditions 
carries such a small quantity of water that it can hardly be referred to as a “river”.  This river 
originates near the crater of the Irazú volcano and crosses the city from north to south.  
Figure 7.15 illustrates the river network in relation to the built-up areas, based on photo 
interpretation of scale 1:20,000 aerial photographs dating from the year 1998. 
 
 
 
Figure 7.14:  Digital Elevation Model  
 
Although some flooding occurs, Cartago does not suffer from severe floods despite annual 
precipitation of around 2,400 mm.  The National Emergency Commission for the Prevention 
of Risks and Response to Emergencies (CNE) considers, however, that the recurrence of 
these floods in this area has increased due to several factors: 
 
• Development carried out in the floodplains 
• Disorganised and unplanned urban development 
• Lack of compliance with urban and forestry laws 
• Deforestation along the river basins  
• Decrease in the hydraulic capacity of the basins due to dumping of solid waste 
 
Cartago is located in one of the most seismically active regions in the country.  An important 
fault system located 3 km from the city (see Figure 7.15) is thought to be responsible for 
shallow earthquakes that devastated the city both in 1841 and 1910.   
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Figure 7.15: Seismic Faults and River Network in Cartago 
 
The Irazú volcano is one of the most active volcanoes in the Central Valley.  It has caused 
earth tremors that could be felt in Cartago.  Historical records confirm volcanic activity in 
1724, 1917, 1918, 1919, 1924, 1933, 1939, 1940, 1961, 1963 and 1965 (Comisión Nacional 
de Prevención de Riesgos y Atención de Emergencias (CNE) 2002).  It is estimated that the 
last time that Irazú erupted lava was around 14,000 years ago.  In fact, some scientists 
argue that the 1910 earthquake was not caused by a sudden release of energy from the 
Coris, Guarco and Agua Caliente Faults but that the earthquake was actually caused by the 
volcano’s activity. 
 
According to CNE, the following are the expected effects that a seismic event could cause in 
Cartago: 
 
• Seismic amplifications in the city of Cartago and surrounding areas where soil is silty 
(limoso) or not well compacted  
• Landslides such as the one at San Blas, which could block river basins and trigger 
mudflows into the city  
• Ground rupture  
• Ground settling in those areas that have been improperly infilled   
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Figure 7.16 depicts the expected peak ground accelerations (PGA) for Cartago, represented 
as percentages, according to research by Flores and Schmidt (2000). 
 
 
 
Figure 7.16:  Peak Ground Acceleration (source: Flores and Schmidt 2000) 
Note: The original source was in the form of contour lines.   
 
The city has been washed away by lahars (mudflows of volcanic origin) several times 
throughout its history as the river basin has become blocked by ash thrown into the air by 
the Irazú volcano.  The last lahar event occurred in 1963 and claimed the lives of 23 people.  
Lahars along the basin of the Reventado River could bury and wash away the infrastructure 
that is located alongside the basin (e.g. RECOPE oil duct, electric mainlines, several rail 
bridges, Orosí aqueduct), as well as an industrial area and human settlements.  Cartago’s 
soil characteristics indicate these lahar deposits and, according to senior experts from the 
School of Geology at the University of Costa Rica, one of the major concerns is the 
possibility of liquefaction (settling of the terrain) caused by badly compacted ashes, which 
could cause considerable damage to buildings.  Ash-falls could cause the collapse of weak 
roof structures, although due to the north-easterly direction of the prevailing wind, this would 
tend to affect San José considerably more than the city of Cartago.  Gas emissions could 
affect the population as well as farming activities (both agriculture and livestock). 
 
The San Blas landslide (only 1.5 km. north of the centre of Cartago) is one of the most 
important landslides in the Central Valley.  It is caused by three factors: a steep terrain 
characterised by badly compacted soil and its location in an area suffering from high 
precipitation.  This landslide poses a direct threat to agricultural land and an indirect threat to 
  131
urban areas, since the Reventado River lies at its foot slopes. If the river basin became 
blocked by debris from the landslide, a mudflow could be triggered and could seriously 
damage vital and costly infrastructure along the river basin.  Possible effects caused by 
landslides in Cartago include the destruction of roads and houses and damage to farming 
land in its urban fringe, as well as the triggering of mudflows due to the blocking of river 
basins.  Landslides are also likely to take place in areas where slopes have been modified 
through quarrying or for building roads.  This is not likely to affect the urban area but rather 
the urban fringe to the north of Cartago where the terrain is hilly.  Recently, CNE installed an 
early warning system on the Reventado River. 
 
 
 
Figure 7.17:  Squatter Occupation of the Floodplain 
inside the Perimeter of the Reventado River Dyke 
 
One important issue relates to the squatter occupation of both the floodplain of the 
Reventado River and the area within the perimeter of the dyke itself.  This dyke was built in 
response to the casualties of the 1963 lahar.  Note that in Figure 7.18 a gap in urban growth 
appears where development existed in 1945.  This area was cleared after the 1963 lahar 
event and families were relocated.  A dyke was built shortly after but the 1989 growth map 
shows some development inside this area.  As Figure 7.17 illustrates, this development is in 
the form of squatter settlements.  Despite several relocations carried out by the authorities, 
squatter settlements keep sprouting up in that location as word has spread that due to the 
hazard level of the area, families that settle there are given access to land and subsidised 
housing more rapidly than elsewhere in the Central Valley.  The construction of the dyke 
itself has been questioned in terms of its adequacy and maintenance levels, although an 
early warning system has been put in place upstream to provide some alert to the authorities 
and the families which live within its perimeter.   
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Figure 7.18:  Urban Growth of Cartago 
(The mapping was carried out based on vertical survey photographs and small format oblique photographs.  The 
red line illustrates the perimeter of the dyke constructed in the 1960s to protect the city from future lahars.) 
 
CNE has issued recommendations for urban development in Cartago, particularly with 
respect to floods and earthquakes.  The recommendations regarding flood hazards include 
the following: 
 
• The Municipality of Cartago should not allow urban development in the floodplains and 
should request any person wishing to obtain a building permit in these areas to obtain 
clearance first with the Fluvial Department of the Ministry of Public Works as well as with 
the Forestry Department of the Ministry of Agriculture.   
• Promote awareness campaigns to avoid contamination of the rivers and the dumping of 
solid waste, and establish community work in the field of basin cleaning and 
maintenance. 
• Plan proper neighbourhood drainage schemes for rain and sewage water.  
• The municipality should encourage the participation of other government institutions, the 
private sector, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), community-based organisations 
(CBOs) and the population itself in the cleaning and maintenance activities.  
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• Groups should be organised to carry out periodic monitoring of the basins near 
populated areas in order to prevent the population being surprised by unexpected flash 
floods and lahars.   
 
The CNE recommendations for urban development in the field of seismic risk prevention 
include: 
 
• Prevent the issuing of construction permits for steep terrain.  This should be extended to 
those areas that have a history of soil instability. 
• Follow up on construction permits to intervene in those cases where construction 
materials or practices prove to be unsuitable. 
• Control of permits for landfills which usually do not meet the adequate conditions. 
• Avoid the issue of building permits for areas specified under the “Decree of the 
Reventado River” or located very close to the river basins that have had avalanche 
occurrence. 
• Give special consideration to community infrastructure (e.g. solid waste sites, aqueducts, 
roads) in terms of their planning and design.   
 
7.5 AVAILABLE DATASETS 
 
This section will first analyse data produced by government institutions from the point of view 
of urban disaster management.  Next, the use of data to support the planning process in 
Cartago will be reviewed.   
 
7.5.1 National Housing and Population Census 
 
The National Housing and Population Census is carried out every 10 years by the National 
Statistics and Census Institute (INEC) − although the Ministry of Education is heavily 
involved since schoolteachers carry out the actual surveying.  Information is collected at 
household level but data is aggregated at the census tract level.  
 
An analysis of census tracts throughout the world reveals that the concept of “census tract” 
varies slightly.  In Costa Rica, a census tract is a spatial unit that groups approximately 40 
houses in urban areas and around 60 houses in rural areas.  The boundaries of the census 
tract are modified when the number of houses has increased or decreased above or below 
the threshold. Unfortunately, this change in the spatial boundary somewhat limits the use of 
this dataset for analysing changes. The shape of the census tract units tends to be very 
irregular and there seem to be no guidelines for defining the shape (see Figure 7.19).  
Census tracts can be aggregated at the district level, a unit that very seldom changes its 
boundaries, although its size limits its suitability for most types of urban analysis.  Due to 
their characteristics and sizes, it could be argued that the district level is adequate for 
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metropolitan (big urban) planning, whereas the census tract is suitable for urban planning 
but not adequate for neighbourhood planning.    
   
Despite a controversial application of a confidentiality law that currently causes access to the 
census tract level dataset to be denied, it is important to review this dataset as there is 
considerable scope for mapping relevant themes.  Moreover, the issue of denial of access to 
this dataset might change in the near future, as government institutions consider that this 
case can be legally contested on the grounds of misinterpretation of the law.  Several 
important themes contained in this census could be used in combination with the risk 
zonation process. This data integration to guide decision-making will be discussed in detail 
in this chapter and Chapter Eight. 
 
In terms of data format, the attribute data is entered into a digital database.  The maps 
containing the boundaries of the census tracts are in analogue format. It is considered 
feasible for municipalities to digitise these polygons as this activity is not time-consuming 
and does not require highly qualified staff. 
   
Figure 7.19:  Aggregation of Census Tracts to District Level 
 
  135
7.5.2 Hazard Mapping 
 
As discussed in Chapter Five, it is the responsibility of CNE to map hazard areas, to inform 
each local government of these hazards and to provide basic guidelines.   
 
One of the biggest drawbacks identified relates to the type of mapping available at CNE.  
Most of the maps are produced at 1:50,000 scale, which is unsuitable for urban planning.  
On the other hand, the maps produced in most cases cannot be described as hazard 
zonation but rather as geological or geomorphological maps.   
 
The biggest problem relates to the seismicity of Cartago, as its “hazard map” includes the 
fault lines and location of historical earthquakes instead of a micro-zonation with either PGA 
or intensity values.  This information is unsuitable as it has little to offer an urban planner. 
 
7.5.3 Municipal Cadastre and Strategic Plan 
 
The National Cadastre in Costa Rica is presently undergoing decentralisation.  According to 
its plan, the central cadastre should be transformed into modern multi-functional municipal 
cadastres that can be used for a number of activities such as urban development, 
infrastructure planning, agrarian reform, tourism development, natural resource 
conservation, improved land-use and improved revenue collection. In general, the data 
collected contains basic details of:  
• The owner (name, national ID number, phone, fax, address)  
• The parcel (parcel ID, location, area in square metres, land-use) 
• Building permits (e.g. date, value of construction)  
• Taxes (e.g. water, solid waste, sidewalk, sewerage)   
 
It is rather doubtful, however, whether the goal of a multi-functional cadastre can be 
achieved using the attribute information that is being collected by the Cadastre Department 
of the Municipality of Cartago.  It would therefore appear that due to financial limitations the 
local government is focusing on revenue collection.  
 
The Municipality of Cartago is presently digitising parcels and entering basic attribute 
information in a database.  At the time of the last visit (in July 2000), it was their view that the 
biggest difficulty in the analogue-to-digital conversion of the cadastre was computer 
hardware and human resource allocation. 
 
Despite a relatively coherent regulatory framework and in a highly hazard-prone area such 
as Cartago, it is unfortunate that little hazard-related information is being used for granting or 
denying building permits.  The strategic plan for Cartago produced by the National Housing 
and Urbanism Institute (INVU) in 1974 has not been updated and it is presently being 
overlooked as it is obsolete.  On the other hand, the National Emergency Commission for 
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the Prevention of Risks and Response to Emergencies (CNE) supplied the municipality with 
a “hazard atlas” which is unsuitable from the point of view of both the information contained 
and the scale. 
 
7.5.4 The National Geographic Institute (IGN) 
 
The National Geographic Institute produces aerial survey photographs (large format) on 
average every 10 years.  The photographs taken of urban areas are usually at scales of 
either 1:20,000 or 1:30,000.  The institute also produces 1:50,000 topographic map sheets 
which are periodically updated in the case of urban areas, but in the case of rural areas can 
be as much as 30 years old.   
 
Regarding higher resolution base mapping, a very good 1:10,000 topographic and land-use 
map was produced in 1991 (but only for the Central Valley).  However, at this moment it 
seems uncertain whether this series will be continued as the institute is unfortunately very 
poorly funded.  The classification of land-uses in this series (see Table 7.1) is very extensive 
and it therefore constitutes a very important dataset for urban land-use and disaster 
planning. 
 
      a.  Residential 
i. Residential elderly 
ii. Residential higher density 
iii. Residential special 
iv. Other residential 
 
b. Industrial 
i. Agro-industrial 
ii. Other industrial 
 
      c.    Commercial 
 
d. Institutional 
i. Banks 
ii. Cemetery 
iii. Hospital 
iv. Clinic 
v. Community hall 
vi. Fire brigade 
vii. Town hall 
viii. Jail 
ix. Police 
x. Library 
xi. Infrastructural 
xii. Religious 
xiii. Red Cross 
e. Recreational 
 
f.  Education 
i. Education primary 
ii. Education secondary 
iii. Education higher 
 
g.  Other 
i. Forest 
ii. Forest non-primary 
iii. Greenhouse 
iv. In process of urbanisation  
v. Wetland 
vi. Agricultural 
vii. Vacant  
 
Table 7.1:  Classification of Land-Uses in 1991 Land-Use Mapping 
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Figure 7.20:  Land-Use Map Based on 1991 Analogue 1:10,000 Sheet (digitised from IGN map) 
  
7.5.5 The National Insurance Institute (INS) 
 
During the late seventies, the National Insurance Institute contracted a team headed by 
Franz Sauter, the country’s leading structural engineer (and co-author of the National 
Seismic Code), to prepare a method for estimating earthquake insurance premiums.  Sauter 
developed his own attenuation function for converting the PGA values into Modified Mercalli 
Intensity (MMI) values (refer to Chapter Three).  As part of this research, Sauter’s group 
developed vulnerability curves (refer to Figure 7.21) given in MMI values.  The curves 
represent a very valuable damage dataset despite two weaknesses:  
  
• The curves have been developed on the basis of building type without considering the 
building height parameter.   
• The curves only provide a mean damage ratio rather than being subdivided into damage 
severity levels.  This is particularly relevant for the purpose of casualty estimation as 
casualties tend to occur in heavily damaged buildings. 
 
The other relevant dataset this author developed is the earthquake probability for the most 
important cities in the country.  Earthquake probabilities for Cartago are presented in Figure 
7.22.   
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1. Adobe (mud-brick) 
2. Un-reinforced masonry (low quality) 
3. Reinforced concrete frames (without seismic design) 
4. Steel frames (without proper design) 
5. Reinforced masonry (medium quality without seismic design) 
6. Reinforced concrete frames (without seismic design) 
7. Shear walls (with seismic design) 
8. Wood-frame dwellings 
9. Steel frames (with seismic design) 
10. Reinforced masonry (high quality seismic design) 
 
Figure 7.21:  Vulnerability Curves for Costa Rica (Sauter and Shah, 1978) 
 
7.5.6  Other Institutions 
 
The School of Geology of the University of Costa Rica in San José produces hazard 
zonations, although they only carry this out in selected areas and for academic purposes.  
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The scale of such studies is not appropriate for urban planning as these are being produced 
at 1:50,000 scale, although a zonation on mudflow zonation was found at 1:25,000 scale. 
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Figure 7.22:  Earthquake Probability in Cartago (Sauter and Shah, 1978) 
 
7.5.7  National Spatial Data Infrastructure Initiative 
 
The PROCIG (Central American Project for Geographic Information) initiative constitutes the 
first regional initiative for setting up a spatial data infrastructure in Central America.  In Costa 
Rica, IGN (the National Geographic Institute) has become actively involved since November 
2000 and, along with personnel from CATIE (International Centre for Tropical Agriculture), 
has carried out a characterisation survey.  This survey forms the basis for the development 
of a national geo-spatial data infrastructure.  Twenty-one institutions that either develop or 
manage geographical information were interviewed.  Although a considerable amount of 
work remains to be done, this constitutes an important step in setting up standards, 
encouraging the production of metadata and encouraging the exchange and dissemination 
of data. 
 
7.6 CONCLUSIONS 
 
The analysis of the historical evolution of the building stock in Cartago illustrated the serious 
consequences of rejecting indigenous building materials and practices.  It was also 
concluded that awareness-raising and educational campaigns in Cartago should be 
designed taking into account both indigenous and religious views on natural phenomena.  
Given the limited baseline information available in Cartago and its spatial characteristics, it 
was concluded that the results of the risk assessment should not be presented to decision-
makers at the parcel level.   Data should therefore be aggregated to the census tract level to 
keep the uncertainties under control. 
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Chapter Eight:  RISK IN CARTAGO’S URBAN PLANNING 
PROCESS 
 
The present chapter presents the results of using remote sensing for the identification of 
essential buildings and homogeneous areas, the risk assessment results and finally the 
implications that these results have for the future urban planning and disaster management 
of Cartago.  The last section illustrates how risk assessment is used for guiding future 
growth and for the redevelopment of built areas.  Due to the limitations of available hazard 
information, the first three sections in this chapter were carried out based on the macro-
zonation of the Great Metropolitan Area (GAM) performed by Morales and Aguilar (1993).  In 
the last section, however, the study of Mortgat, Zsutty et al. (1977) was used as it was the 
only one available that provided various probability scenarios for this city.  This study 
assigns an intensity value for the city as a whole and it therefore fails to recognise site 
effects.  The data was used despite this limitation as it serves to demonstrate how the risk 
assessment results are transferred into a cost-benefit analysis of mitigation strategies.  The 
next and last chapter in this dissertation presents the conclusions and recommendations for 
further research. 
 
8.1  ESSENTIAL BUILDINGS 
 
A land-use map showing essential buildings was created (see Figure 8.1) by reclassifying an 
existing land-use map into three classes: 
 
• First-order buildings:  the fire brigade, police station, jail, town hall, Red Cross, 
hospitals/clinics 
• Second-order buildings:  religious, educational, community hall   
• Regular buildings:  all other land-uses with the exception of wetlands, forest, agricultural 
fields or greenhouses, vacant land including that which is in the process of urbanisation 
 
Type of Building Ground Floor Area (in ha) No. of Buildings Percentage 
Essential – first order     24 50    1.5 
Essential – second order     97 96    6.0 
Regular  1495 -  92.5 
Total 1616  100.0 
 
Table 8.1:  Buildings Classified According to Relevance for Emergency Activities 
 
From the reclassification of land-uses, it can be concluded that on approximately 7.5% of 
urban land in Cartago there are buildings that could be key in the rescue and relief phases of 
the disaster cycle; on the remaining 92.5% of urban land there are regular buildings.  A total 
of 146 essential buildings were identified; 50 of the first and 96 of the second order. Size 
varies according to the type; first-order buildings have an average plot size of 0.50 ha while 
second-order buildings average 1 ha.  According to the methodology described in the 
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previous chapter, analytical assessment of building response would have to be conducted 
on 50 buildings, while extensive screening would be performed on 96 structures.   
 
Given the technical and human resources available in the municipality, it seems unlikely that 
these detailed surveys could be carried out with local manpower.  It would also seem 
unlikely that the local government could afford to contract private consultants to carry out 
these assessments, given the time that this would require and the consulting tariffs involved.  
The establishment of strategic links with key academic organisations could be the 
mechanism to make these assessments possible.  Provided there is adequate guidance and 
supervision, these otherwise time-consuming and costly datasets could be generated.  
Undergraduate civil engineering students could provide cost-free labour for performing the 
extensive screening of second-order buildings as part of their practical assignments.  
Similarly, postgraduate structural engineering students could model the seismic response of 
first-order buildings as part of their thesis work.  Regular buildings − which constitute the vast 
majority − could be surveyed by municipal inspectors and by undergraduate architectural 
engineers or construction technologists.  The Instituto Tecnológico de Costa Rica (ITEC) 
could be a key player in making risk assessment possible since it is located in Cartago and it 
offers a graduate degree in construction technology. 
 
 
 
Figure 8.1:  Distribution of Buildings According to their Importance for Emergency Operations 
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Essential buildings of the second order are those that have been identified as having 
potential as roofed temporary accommodation. Proximity to temporary accommodation is 
relevant from a pragmatic point of view, as fear of theft of house contents means most house 
owners refuse to move to temporary accommodation far from their parcels.  This is a 
consideration that should not be overlooked by emergency planners as looting is a 
phenomenon that cannot be tackled by the police alone.  Often limited police numbers 
dictate that guarding supermarkets and food warehouses takes priority over guarding 
residential areas. 
 
Figure 8.2 gives an insight into the residential areas that are near potential roofed temporary 
accommodation.  Due to time constraints and the relatively regular street layout of Cartago, 
buffers have been used, although network analysis (also referred to as “cost”) is the method 
that would provide the most accurate results.  Of residential areas 21% are within 100 m of 
temporary accommodation while 9% are more than 500 m away.  The alternatives for 
sheltering those who are too far away from roofed temporary accommodation are tents in 
open sports fields, squares or on vacant land.  Such camps are only feasible if minimal 
facilities are either already available or can be rapidly set up (e.g. portable toilets, cistern 
tanks).   
 
 
 
Figure 8.2:  Proximity to Temporary Accommodation  
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Distance Area Percentage 
Within 100 meters 231.9 21.10 
100 to 249 meters 425.7 38.73 
250 to 499 meters 347.3 31.60 
500 to 999 meters   70.4    6.41 
1000 to 1999 meters  22.5   2.05 
2000 to 4000 meters     1.2   0.11 
 
Table 8.2:  Distance from House to Temporary Roofed Accommodation 
 
8.2 HOMOGENEOUS AREAS 
 
Since the most recent survey photographs available at the National Geographic Institute 
date from 1998, small format oblique photographs were produced with the aim of identifying 
recent development in the urban-rural fringes that had taken place between 1998 and 2001.  
An interpretation was carried out to identify the homogeneous areas (refer to Chapter Five) 
in order to quantify the human resources needed to carry out the ground survey. 
 
Homogeneous Areas % of Homogeneous Area (in Ha) 
Area No. 1 24.97  39.2 
Area No. 2 11.02  17.3 
Area No. 3   3.50    5.5 
Area No. 4 20.19   31.7 
Area No. 5   0.51    0.8 
Area No. 6   0.57    0.9 
Area No. 7   0.89    1.4 
Area No. 8   5.41    8.5 
Area No. 9   0.76    1.2 
Area No. 10   0.76    1.2 
Area No. 11   0.70    1.1 
Area No. 12   0.96    1.5 
Area No. 13   2.61    4.1 
Area No. 14  1.85   2.9 
Area No. 15   2.42    3.8 
Area No. 16   1.97    3.1 
Area No. 17   7.71   12.1 
Area No. 18   13.18   20.7 
Total 100.00 157.0 
 
Table 8.3:  Homogeneous Areas 
 
Based on the interpretation of the aerial photographs it can be concluded that approximately 
9% of the urban area can be classified as homogeneous.  A total of 18 different areas were 
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identified (refer to Figure 8.3), their sizes ranging between 1 and 39 ha (see Table 8.3), their 
average size being 9 ha.  The areas are basically composed of three land-uses:  industrial 
estates, low-income housing and squatter settlements.  The largest of these areas is the 
industrial estate Zona Franca, which accounts for approximately 25% of homogeneous 
areas.  This is one of several industrial estates built by the national government with the dual 
idea of attracting foreign investors and relocating existing industries from city centres to the 
outskirts of the main urban areas.  Typically, buildings have been constructed using pre-cast 
concrete components produced by a single manufacturer.  The case of low-income housing 
projects is very similar, as these are usually government projects which rely on prototype 
units built with either reinforced masonry or pre-cast concrete panels.  Low-income housing 
based on pre-cast concrete panels has been the preferred method lately because of the 
guaranteed quality of the final product.  Consequently, due to the uniformity within each of 
these areas, a single sample could be selected without compromising the interpretation 
accuracy of the results.  Although the layout of the houses is not uniform in squatter 
settlements, the types of building materials used (e.g. corrugated sheets, wood) as well as 
construction techniques (wood-frames) are similar.  In light of the extremely low vulnerability 
of wood-frame structures, these areas could be considered as homogeneous from a 
pragmatic point of view.  Nevertheless, it is also important to map these areas as the high 
wood content and deficient electrical wiring mean they are likely to suffer from fire following 
an earthquake. 
 
 
 
Figure 8.3:  Identification of Homogeneous Non-Essential Built Areas  
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In Cartago, the standard block has an area of about 1 ha.  A block contains approximately 
25 plots averaging 400 m2.  A full ground survey implies a ratio of 25 buildings per ha while 
in homogeneous areas the ratio is only 0.12 buildings in need of survey per ha.  
Consequently, the delineation of uniform areas by means of remotely sensed images proved 
useful for cutting down on the number of buildings to be sampled by a factor of 
approximately 200.  A full survey would involve approximately 41,000 buildings; however, by 
identifying the homogeneous areas and surveying only one building, nearly 4,000 buildings 
need not be surveyed.  At five minutes per building, this implies a reduction of about 330 
hours of ground survey time. 
 
Elsewhere in the Central Valley, there has been a steady increase in the number of middle-
income and high-income people who have chosen to buy or rent a housing unit in a 
condominium for security and cost reasons.  Cartago, being the most conservative city in the 
region, has not experienced this phenomenon yet.  This “condominium phenomenon”, 
however, is expected to reach Cartago in the near future.  Consequently, it is soon expected 
that the percentage of urban homogeneous land will increase substantially. 
 
It could be argued that local governments should actively promote the construction of 
industrial, commercial and residential estates.  Housing estates are beneficial to both 
government and owners.  From an owner’s point of view, estates represent a better deal as 
they offer increased security. Not only that, the cost per square metre of construction is 
lower due to two factors: a) optimisation in the use of labour and tools and b) discounts on 
building materials thanks to bulk purchases.  From a local government’s point of view, the 
administration costs involved in issuing construction permits, inspecting the building process 
and periodically surveying for purposes of tax and risk estimation are lower for estates.   
 
8.3 RISK ASSESSMENT RESULTS 
 
8.3.1 Hazard Assessment 
 
The analysis of the slope map highlights the relative flatness of the study area, as the mean 
slope is only 6.14 degrees.  Moreover, 27.7% of the study area has no slope at all (0.00), 
while nearly 48% of it has slopes below 5 degrees (refer to Table 8.4).  The highest slopes 
occur to the northwest of the city in La Carpintera, a protected wildlife area (refer to Figure 8. 
4), and to the northeast. 
 
 Slope (in Degrees) Cumulative Percentage 
  0.00 27.70 
  5.00 48.28 
10.00 83.23 
20.00 94.36 
 
Table 8.4:  Slope (in Degrees) 
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Apart from the relevance of contour lines for the assessment of local site effects (refer to 
Chapter Three), there is a regulation in the Construction Code that bans construction on 
slopes steeper than 25%.  Construction should therefore be banned in approximately 10% of 
the study area (refer to Figure 8.4).  Most of this land, however, is located within La 
Carpintera and since it is officially a “wild-life protected area”, construction is banned and 
illegal occupation is highly unlikely as park rangers carry out systematic monitoring. 
Moreover, due to the lack of road access and the distance to “social infrastructure” (e.g. 
schools, clinics), this land is highly unattractive, even to the most dispossessed.  Monitoring 
efforts by the municipal government to avoid illegal construction on steep land should 
therefore be concentrated on the northeast and south of the city. 
 
 
 
Figure 8.4:  Regulation to Prevent Damage due to Landslides 
 
According to the mapping developed by Morales and Aguilar (1993), the study area has the 
following ground shaking levels:  42% of the area (2,481 ha) falls under Modified Mercalli 
Intensity (MMI) VII while 58% (3,385 ha) falls under MMI VIII (refer to Figure 8.4).  The 
hazard intensity scenario map was overlaid with the map depicting the urban and rural 
areas.  In terms of the urban areas, 54% of the urbanised land falls under MMI VIII while 
46% falls under MMI VII.   
 
Contrary to popular belief, this study area is not considerably higher in intensity values than 
the rest of the Greater Metropolitan Area (GAM) (refer to Table 8.5).  As can be observed in 
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Figure 8.5, the study of Morales and Aguilar (1993) on intensity levels in the GAM reveals 
that the higher values actually occur to the far west of this area, while Cartago lies in the far 
east.  From the analysis of statistics generated from this map, it can be concluded that the 
median intensity in the GAM is VII while that of the study area is only one intensity level 
higher (VIII).   
 
MMI Intensity Value % Land in Study Area - Cartago % GAM Land 
VI   0.00   6.55 
VII 42.30 63.23 
VIII 57.70 26.12 
IX   0.00   4.10   
Median Intensity   VIII VII 
 
Table 8.5.:  MMI Values in Study Area and in GAM 
 
 
 
Figure 8.5.  Map of Hazard Intensity Values of the Study Area 
 
These figures highlight the problem of an incorrect perception of risk due to a lack of 
understanding of a) the difference between hazard and vulnerability, and b) hazard 
probability (return periods).  The earthquake hazard alone is not to be blamed for the large 
losses suffered in Cartago (the last one in 1910), rather it is a problem of higher vulnerability.  
Property loss is generally due to the physical characteristics of the elements at risk while 
casualties have occurred either due to the buildings’ vulnerability or poor education (e.g. 
relating to evacuation drills or safe areas). 
 
This inaccurate perception of hazard levels in the Greater Metropolitan Area is by no means 
surprising.  Except from the book Geological Atlas of the Great Metropolitan Area (which is 
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readily available for purchase in bookshops), hazard zonation maps are not widely 
publicised in Costa Rica by the local government or by the National Emergency Commission 
(CNE).  More diffusion of hazard zonation maps is needed, along with education of the 
population. 
 
To avoid damage due to ground rupture, the Seismic Code explicitly bans construction within 
50 m of active faults, although it fails to provide a definition of “active fault” or mention the 
institution that issues an official “fault map” to use for enforcement purposes.  The School of 
Geology of the University of Costa Rica, after carrying out a comprehensive survey on the 
Coris and Guarco Faults in Cartago, issued a recommendation to avoid construction within 
150 m of these active faults.  Figure 8.6 illustrates the location of such buffers.  Until very 
recently, however, this regulation could not be observed or enforced as there was 
controversy related to the location of these fault lines.  Recently, after a field survey and 
mapping carried out by the School of Geology of the University of Costa Rica, the location of 
the fault lines was verified on the ground.  This said, the Municipality of Cartago can issue a 
construction ban of this sort as part of a zonation map and this can only be properly enforced 
as long as an accurate digital map of these fault lines is available.   
 
 
 
Figure 8.6:  Regulations and Recommendations to Prevent Damage from Ground Rupture 
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The ban issued in the Seismic Code applies to 178 ha (3.03% of the study area), while the 
recommendation by the School of Geology applies to 339 ha (8.81% of the study area).  
Approximately 20% of the area under the ban is urbanised while 31% of the area under the 
recommendation has been developed.  These figures at first seem disappointing but one 
must take into account that the ban was issued in 1986.  An overlay of the buffer map with 
the growth map (refer to Figure 8.7) allows one to conclude that the rate of development 
inside this 50 m buffer area has decreased substantially since the issue of the ban and that 
despite the uncertainty related to the exact location of the fault, the local government has 
managed to deter development in this area.  For example, during the “1946 to 1974 period”, 
0.38% of development in the study area took place inside the area subject to the 
construction ban, whereas during the “1992 to 1998” period the figure decreased to 0.03%.  
In other words, construction inside this area relative to the study area was reduced by a 
factor of approximately 10. 
 
8.3.2 Vulnerability Assessment and Elements at Risk  
 
Buildings 
 
Table 8.6 contains an extraction of the relevant damage data developed by Sauter and Shah 
(1978).  The increase in damage resulting from ground shaking levels is visible in this table.  
It highlights differences in damage between buildings without any form of seismic resistant 
design (types 1 and 2), those with deficient seismic design (types 3 to 5) and those properly 
designed (types 6 to 10).  The increase in damage between MMI VII and MMI VIII for 
buildings without any form of seismic design ranges between 28% and 34% (an average 
factor of 2.38x), for those buildings with deficient design it ranges between 12% and 20% (an 
average factor of 2.96x) and for those with appropriate designs it ranges between 4% and 
12% (an average factor of 3.96x).  The implications of selecting one structural type over 
another are clearly visible in this table. For example, the difference in damage between 
adobe (mud-brick) buildings and reinforced masonry with seismic design for MMI VIII is an 
astonishing factor of 10.   
 
Nowadays only wooden frames and buildings with seismic design (types 6 to 10) can be 
constructed.  It is important to note the factor of 2.8 in the damage of the weakest type of 
building (reinforced concrete frames) in relation to that of the strongest type (reinforced 
masonry with seismic resistant design).  This is highly relevant to urban planners and policy-
makers as it would suggest that a mechanism to guarantee lower property losses is simply 
to encourage some types of seismically resistant designed buildings over others.  This can 
be achieved by means of a combination of awareness campaigns within the engineering 
community and the general public, and tax incentives such as the application of different 
construction permit rates or annual property tax depending on the type of building type used. 
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  Percentage of Damage Building Types 
MMI VII MMI VIII 
Difference 
 
1.    Adobe 22 50 2.27x 
2.    Un-reinforced masonry 16 40 2.50x 
3.    Reinforced concrete frames lacking seismic design 13 33 2.50x 
4.    Steel frames lacking seismic design   6 18 3.00x 
5.    Reinforced masonry lacking seismic design   5 17 3.40x 
6.    Reinforced concrete frames with seismic design   4 14 3.50x 
7.    Shear walls with seismic design   3   7 2.33x 
8.    Steel frames with seismic design   2   7 3.50x 
9.    Wooden frames   3   8 2.60x 
10.  Reinforced masonry with seismic design    1   5 5.00x 
 
Table 8.6:  Implications of Ground Shaking Intensity on Building Damage  
 
 
 
Figure 8.7:  Urban Growth 
 
These figures also indicate that adobe (mud-brick), un-reinforced masonry and reinforced 
concrete without proper seismic resistant design should be a major concern.  During 
fieldwork, for example, one adobe (mud-brick) building used as a pub/disco was identified 
only a few hundred metres from the town hall.  These types of structures are incompatible 
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with such a land-use due to the high population concentrations and therefore the high 
casualties that could occur.  There are a considerable number of these buildings in Cartago 
and unfortunately the local government lacks any form of inventory containing the location 
and present land-use of these structures.  The digital cadastral database that is in the 
process of being set up is useless for this purpose as it does not contain data on building 
type.  In the case of the pub/disco, it would record the land-use simply as “commercial”.  In 
the study area, since there has been a progressive improvement in buildings’ response to 
earthquakes, a map of urban growth (see Figure 8.7) is particularly useful in identifying those 
areas where the older (and therefore weaker) buildings are located.  This would make it 
possible to concentrate search efforts on a reduced area rather than wasting time searching 
in areas where such structures do not exist.  In Cartago, the search for mud-brick and un-
reinforced masonry buildings should therefore be restricted to an area equivalent to 15.98% 
of the urban land, the reason being that these types of buildings were not built after 1910, 
when the earthquake losses suffered caused a sudden shift towards wooden frame 
construction.  Unfortunately, as Table 8.7 also illustrates, presently 32% of urban land is 
located on MMI VII and 68% on MMI VIII.  The percentage of older buildings on MMI VIII 
land is unfortunately six points higher than the average. 
 
Development Period Area in 
Hectares 
% of Urbanized 
Area 
% of Land on 
MMI VII 
% of Land on 
MMI VIII 
Before 1945   258.32  15.98 26 74 
1946 to 1974   341.14  21.11 38 62 
1975 to 1991   859.77  53.19 32 68 
1992 to 1998   157.03    9.72 23 77 
Total urban  1626.16 - 32 68 
 
Table 8.7:  Urban Growth  
(source:  1:10,000 IGN Series 1991 and aerial photographs of various years) 
 
Despite the urban growth map being a valuable source of information for delimiting the 
perimeter where older structures are located, new building types also exist within the “before 
1945” period.  This is because some structures have been demolished and replaced by new 
ones constructed using state-of-the-art building materials and techniques.  In Cartago this 
phenomenon is particularly visible as the demolition of buildings following the 1910 
earthquake left many vacant pockets.  Moreover, demolishing old buildings in Cartago has 
always been relatively easy as the National Heritage Law only protects about 10 structures.  
Table 8.8 highlights the mix of building types that exists within the various development 
periods identified, based on ground observations.  For practical reasons, the development 
periods were defined based on available aerial photographs. 
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Development Period  Building Type 
> 1945 1946 - 1974 1975 - 1998 1992 - 1998 
1.   Adobe walls 30.0   0.0  0.0  0.0 
2.   Un-reinforced masonry 33.0   0.0  0.0  0.0 
3.   Reinforced concrete frame lacking seismic design  0.0 20.0  3.0  0.0 
4.   Steel frames lacking seismic design  3.0   2.0  2.0  0.0 
5.   Reinforced masonry lacking seismic design  0.0  33.0 40.0         0.0 
6.   Reinforced concrete with seismic design  5.0  20.0        10.0 15.0 
7.   Shear walls with seismic design   4.0    0.0   3.0   5.0 
8.   Wooden frames  20.0  15.0   5.0   0.0 
9.   Steel frames with seismic design   0.0    0.0   2.0   5.0 
10. Reinforced masonry with seismic design   5.0 10.0 35.0 75.0 
   
  Table 8.8:  Percentage of Building Types According to Growth Periods  
(source:  ground observations) 
 
The urban growth map is also relevant for making projections based on the analysis of past 
annual growth rates.  Projections are useful in Cartago to identify the point in time when all 
vacant land of low hazard intensity levels will be consumed by development.  This is 
important as the alternatives to consider then could be either to allow development on land 
with higher hazard intensity levels or to promote densification of existing urban areas.  
 
Population  
 
Census information provided the necessary inputs for generating a population density map 
for the night scenario.  For the generation of the day population density map, a questionnaire 
was designed with the objective of establishing mobility patterns.  Table 8.9 presents the 
results of the survey.  However, regional centres have to be assessed separately in cases 
where the population they host comes from outside the area of study.  In Cartago, the only 
“regional centre” worth considering for the production of a daytime population density map is 
the Instituto Tecnólogico de Costa Rica (ITEC).  This institution is the only state-owned 
technological higher education entity in the country and it has a population of 7,500 students.  
Figure 8.8. illustrates the difference in population densities (expressed as population per ha) 
per census tracts and Table 8.9 provides a summary of the main findings (for an insight into 
the spatial modelling of the daytime population densities, refer to Chapter Five).  The maps 
clearly illustrate that the population is more evenly distributed during the night than during 
the day when there is a tendency towards a concentration of population in the inner city.  
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Figure 8.8:  Population Density (Night Scenario (top) and Day Scenario (bottom) 
(values expressed as persons per ha) 
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Day Population Age Groups Percentage Night Population 
Residential Educational Others5 
0-4   9.88   12368 9269   3090         0 
5-9 10.79   13507         0 13497         0 
10-14 11.26   14096         0 14085         0 
15-19 10.29   12882     644 10297   1931 
20-24   9.00   11267   2252   2252   6755 
25-29   7.76     9714   1456     679   7571 
30-64 35.42     44341 10633     886 32786 
above 65   5.60     7010   5604         0   1401 
Total  125085 29857 44785 50443 
 
Table 8.9:  Distribution of Population during the Daytime 
 
 Day Scenario Night Scenario 
 Per Ha Per Census Tract Per Ha Per Census Tract 
Minimum   0.00       0.00     0.00   0.00 
Maximum 391.04 8009.40 390.19 391.06 
Average 35.79 269.35   81.12 224.05 
 
Table 8.10:  Population Densities for the Night and Day Scenarios  
 
Table 8.10 highlights the large differences in total population per census tract. For example, 
the most extreme case relates to a census tract that during the day has 20 times more 
population than the census tract with the highest night population. 
 
8.3.3. Risk Assessment 
 
Table 8.11 illustrates the damage expected for each building type expressed both as area 
and as percentage.  The percentage can be understood as either the percentage of the 
structure that will suffer total damage or the percentage of damage expected on each 
building of that structure type.  Adobe (mud-brick) and un-reinforced masonry buildings are 
expected to suffer very high damage since 100% of these buildings are located on MMI VIII 
soil.  Reinforced concrete frames lacking seismic design should also be of concern as the 
expected damage to this building type is high.   
 
The figures presented in this table provide a general impression and they are meaningful 
from the point of view of developing details for zonation mapping (this is further developed in 
the following chapter).  This data, however, is not suitable for assessing the rescue, relief or 
reconstruction implications or strategies as these require an insight into the area affected per 
damage severity level.    
                                                 
5 Includes institutional, industrial and commercial 
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Building Type Total Area 
(in Ha) 
Damaged Area 
(in Ha) 
Average 
Damage (in %) 
Adobe walls   77.50 38.75 50.00 
Un-reinforced masonry    85.25 34.10 40.00 
Reinforced concrete frame lacking seismic design     94.02           30.28 32.21 
Steel frames lacking seismic design    31.77    5.60   0.00 
Reinforced masonry lacking seismic design 456.48  75.27 16.49 
Reinforced concrete with seismic design   190.68  26.05 13.66 
Shear walls with seismic design     43.98    3.03   0.00 
Wooden frames    145.82  10.03   6.88 
Steel frames with seismic design     25.05     0.56   0.00 
Reinforced masonry with seismic design   465.72   22.63   4.86 
Total 1616.27 246.30 15.24 
 
Table 8.11:  Building Damage by Building Type  
 
Table 8:12 illustrates the area affected per damage severity level.  The severity levels used 
were those developed by the Applied Technology Council.  As this table demonstrates, 
according to the damage figures by Sauter and Shah (1978), at the level of shaking intensity 
present in the study area some degree of damage is expected to all types of buildings.  
Approximately 44% of the buildings will suffer only slight damage while just 16% are 
expected to suffer heavy damage.  These figures are highly relevant as they give an insight 
into the alternatives from a reconstruction point of view.  This data is also highly valuable to 
relief workers as it can be used along with population density figures to estimate the number 
of people in need of temporary short-term and long-term accommodation.  
 
Category of 
Damage 
Percentage of 
Damage 
Area 
(in Ha) 
Number of 
Buildings 
Percentage 
of Buildings 
Slight 0.01 – 0.99      0.00         0   0.00 
Light 1.00 – 9.99  703.94 17600 43.56 
Moderate 10.00 – 29.99  658.06 16450 40.72 
Heavy 30.00 – 59.99  254.04   6350 15.72 
Major 60.00 – 99.99      0.00         0   0.00 
Destroyed 100.00      0.00         0   0.00 
Total  1616.04  40400  
 
Table 8.12:  Building Damage per Severity Level  
 
This building risk is the input for the generation of the population risk figures along with 
population vulnerability ratios.  Since Costa Rica has not developed population vulnerability 
ratios, the ones developed by Emergency Preparedness Canada (1997) were used in the 
case study.  These vulnerability ratios are given per damage severity level and for three 
different types of injury:  minor injury, major injury and death.  This breakdown into three 
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classes is convenient from the point of view of planning for rescue and planning for health 
service delivery.  
 
 
Figure 8.9:  Building Damage Ratios 
 
The summary of injuries for the day and night scenarios is presented in Table 8.13, while a 
comparison of minor injury density between the day and night scenarios is presented in 
Figure 8.10.  The difference in the injuries between these two scenarios is a factor of 1.29x.  
Figure 8.10 clearly illustrates that there are higher concentrations of injuries in the inner city 
during the day compared with the night. 
 
These injury figures should be compared with those related to the capacity of the medical 
infrastructure network to determine whether the local facilities are able to cope with the 
degree of casualties expected or whether there is a need to network with other hospitals and 
clinics located in nearby urban areas.  In Cartago, the Max Peralta hospital has a total 
number of 261 beds and a morgue with capacity for six bodies.  It is therefore clear that the 
hospital would be overwhelmed and networking with the nearest hospitals (Calderón 
Guardia in San José and Turrialba hospital) would be necessary.  The Calderón Guardia 
hospital has a capacity of 622 beds while the Turrialba hospital has a capacity of 261 beds.  
If bridges are damaged and water levels are high in the river basins, the transfer of patients 
is only possible by helicopter since Cartago has no airport − thus the importance of 
infrastructure risk assessment becomes obvious. The same type of assessment must be 
performed for other types of emergency organisations, such as the fire brigade and the 
paramedics.   
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Figure 8.10:  Minor Injuries (expressed as injuries per ha) 
Night Scenario (top) and Day Scenario (bottom) 
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Injury Level Day Scenario Night Scenario 
Minor injuries 631 489 
Major injuries  84   66 
Deaths  21  16 
Total 736 571 
 
Table 8.13:  Number of Injuries per Injury Level and Type of Scenario 
 
8.4 COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS OF MITIGATION STRATEGIES  
 
This section illustrates how risk assessment is incorporated into the urban planning process 
from the point of view of both prevention and reduction.  To guide future development, the 
modification of tax rates by means of hazard intensity and vulnerability is discussed.  
Regarding redevelopment in existing built-up areas, two reduction scenarios are used to 
illustrate how risk assessment is used as an input in a cost-benefit analysis, as well as how 
the results of this analysis are likely to be interpreted by decision-makers. 
 
8.4.1 Development Scenario 
 
When considering land available for future expansion, 52.24% of the vacant land that is not 
affected by a natural hazard-related construction ban falls under MMI VII, while the 
remaining 47.76% falls under MMI VIII.  Careful planning is therefore necessary as ideally 
the vacant land under MMI VII should have priority over the rest of the land.  The issue of 
construction types is also important − Table 8.6 highlights the difference in damage rates 
between seismically designed construction types.  The important decision for the 
Municipality of Cartago is whether to ban or encourage construction in a given area, or 
whether to combine both approaches.  From the natural hazard point of view, the current 
legal framework bans construction on slopes greater than 25%, along active faults and along 
rivers.  The remaining bans are either related to technological hazards, aesthetics or 
inadequate light, ventilation and circulation.   
 
Since there are only two levels of ground shaking intensity in the study area, banning 
construction on MMI VIII land would be difficult, especially without an official large-scale 
micro-zonation map to back this decision.  Achieving the development of certain building 
types in particular locations requires an aggressive approach by the local government.  To 
be successful, both the developer and the future owner should benefit from a financial 
incentive scheme.  An alternative in Cartago is to use the damage ratios developed by 
Sauter and Shah (1978) to establish modifiers on the value of the construction permit and 
annual property tax on new buildings.  The application of different construction permit rates 
depending on location and construction type probably has little effect on individuals who 
already own a plot and want to erect an individual building.  On the other hand, it would have 
a definite effect on commercial developers as it would constitute a strong weight factor with 
obvious implications for profit margins.  Conversely, future building owners who are 
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shopping around normally do not have any great understanding of construction types, but 
they would be encouraged to purchase those constructions bearing the lowest annual tax.  
The developer would therefore be forced to respond to market preferences. 
 
 
Figure 8.11:  Zonation for Development 
 
 
 VII VIII 
Building Types Damage Ratio Modifier Damage Ratio Modifier 
Rc frames-sd6 0.04 2.50 0.14 7.50 
Shear walls-sd7 0.03 2.00 0.07 4.00 
Steel frames-sd9 0.02 1.50 0.07 4.00 
Wooden frames8 0.03 2.00 0.08 4.50 
Rm-sd10 0.01 1.00 0.05 3.00 
 
Table 8.14:  Proposed Modifiers to the Construction Permit Rates  
 
Table 8.14 illustrates the proposal for establishing different construction permit rates 
depending on construction type and intensity of ground shaking.  The construction type with 
the lowest damage ratio has been selected as the base value.  The implementation of this 
method would require the updating of the construction type list because important building 
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types such as pre-cast construction panels are now a very popular choice but were not 
included by Sauter and Shah − probably as they were not widely used during the mid-
seventies.  In the case of buildings with mixed structural types, the rates would have to be 
applied to the dominating structural type.  It is not expected that this would add to the 
administration costs of the local government as the responsible engineer and architect 
already carry out the assessment of the structural type at the time of the application for 
building permits. 
 
8.4.2 Redevelopment Scenario 
 
At first glance, it would appear that re-strengthening adobe (mud-brick buildings) should be a 
priority in Cartago.  Unfortunately, due to the lack of cohesiveness of the type of mud-brick 
used in Cartago (consisting of mud, straw, broken pieces of clay tile and even egg white!), 
the material does not bear any form of re-strengthening.  The only option would be to attach 
a mesh to both sides of the wall and cover it with plaster.  This is a method that is already 
being used; the Peruvian city of Trujillo is an example.  Although this hardly decreases the 
damage to the building, it does provide the dwellers with a few extra seconds for evacuation.  
This alternative is therefore valuable from the point of view of population risk rather than both 
building and population risk. 
 
Two reduction scenarios have been developed based on those building types that have the 
highest damage ratios (refer to Table 8.6) per intensity level.  It must be noted that since 
detailed hazard zonation maps do not exist for all the hazard scenarios, Sauter's flat peak 
ground acceleration (PGA) values (refer to Figure 7.22) are used in this section.  In other 
words, from this point onwards it will be assumed that for all probability scenarios, the study 
area falls under one motion intensity. 
 
• Scenario A contemplates the replacement of all adobe structures and un-reinforced 
masonry buildings with reinforced masonry structures, as well as the steel bracing of all 
reinforced concrete frames without seismic design.  This reduction scenario therefore 
covers an area of 256 ha, which is equivalent to 15.8% of the urban area. 
• Scenario B contemplates only the steel bracing of all reinforced concrete frames without 
seismic design.  This reduction scenario involves re-strengthening buildings, covering an 
area of 94 ha, roughly 5% of the urban area. 
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Millions of US$ Return 
Period Unmodified Scenario A Scenario B 
1     0.95     0.00     0.95 
11   109.30     13.77     41.32 
29   272.33   164.65   246.95 
64   516.68   338.97   477.19 
137   761.02   513.30   707.43 
227 990.88   686.11   923.89 
363 1220.74   858.92 1140.35 
619 1450.60 1031.73 1356.81 
1007 1680.46 1204.55 1573.28 
 
Table 8.15:  Total Building Losses per Mitigation Scenario  
 
The total figures presented in Table 8.15 point out the maximum possible losses that could 
take place in Cartago.  Despite a return period of 1,007 years, authorities should be aware 
that at any point in time, the city could be confronted with an event that has the potential to 
destroy 506 ha of buildings, which represents approximately US$ 1.7 billion-worth of 
property.  The losses from this event would represent 34.70% of the building property of the 
city of Cartago.  Consequently, this would constitute a major catastrophe which, given the 
size of emergency services in Cartago (for a basic description of the health infrastructure of 
Cartago, refer to Section 8.3.3), would involve the pooling of resources over a wider area.  In 
this sense, this catastrophic risk scenario highlights the regional dimension of disaster 
management. 
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Figure 8.12:  Total Building Losses 
 
On the other hand, annual figures are crucial as a standardisation of risk scenarios allows 
planners to put things into perspective.  In Cartago, due to the variety of natural and 
technological hazards, the conversion of losses into yearly values is a key input for strategic 
disaster management.  Figure 8.13 clearly illustrates that, in terms of annual building losses, 
high probability events cause higher losses compared with medium and low probability 
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events.  An important finding of this analysis is that, contrary to popular belief, the 137-year 
return-period earthquake thought to have an epicentre a few kilometres from the centre of 
town is not the most damaging one.  The most damaging event is the 11-year return-period 
event, which has a PGA value of 0.12 g, closely followed by a 29-year return-period 
phenomenon with a mere 0.08 g ground motion value. 
 
As can be observed from Table 8.16, the reductions achieved by implementing the two 
mitigation scenarios under consideration are not constant throughout the hazard scenarios 
(return periods) due to the response of buildings to ground motion. On average, mitigation 
scenario A yields a reduction factor of 0.46 (standard deviation of 0.28) while scenario B 
provides a 0.12 reduction factor (standard deviation of 0.19).   
 
Millions of US $ 
Reduction Factor 
(1:  highest, 0:  lowest) Return 
Period Unmodified Scenario A Scenario B Scenario A Scenario B 
1 0.95 0.00 0.95 1.00 0.00 
11 9.94 1.25 3.76 0.87 0.62 
29 9.39 5.68 8.52 0.40 0.09 
64 8.07 5.30 7.46 0.34 0.08 
137 5.55 3.75 5.16 0.33 0.07 
227 4.46 3.09 4.16 0.31 0.07 
363 3.36 2.37 3.14 0.30 0.07 
617 2.34 1.67 2.19 0.29 0.06 
1007 1.67 1.20 1.56 0.28 0.06 
 
Table 8.16:  Annual Building Losses and Mitigation Reduction Factor  
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Figure 8.13:  Annual Building Losses 
 
As Figure 8.14 illustrates, despite a return period of 1,007 years, at any point in time, the city 
could be confronted with an event that has the potential of causing approximately 116 
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deaths, approximately 463 people with major injuries and 3,424 with minor injuries (0.8%, 
3.1% and 2.28% of the population respectively).  Appendix V highlights the variation in the 
number of casualties depending on the time of the day for the various probability scenarios.   
 
 
 
Figure 8.14:  Total Casualty Losses 
 
For the estimation of human capital losses, the following figures were used (refer to total 
figures in Table 8.17 and detailed annual figures in Appendix VI): 
 
• Average population age of 27 (Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Censos 2001) 
• Retirement at 65 
• Life expectancy of 77 (Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Censos 2001) 
• Monthly income of US$ 442 (Ministerio de Planificación y Política Económica 2002) 
• Pension of 80% of last salary 
• Annual inflation rate of 3% 
 
    
Inflation Rate 
 
   0 % 1% 2% 3% 4% 5% 6% 
     
Earnings Age 27 - 65 235,443 286,228 351,578 436,078 545,800 688,792 875,718 
Pension Age 66 - 77   57,955   90,292 140,221 217,074 335,003 515,417 790,594 
Total  293,398 376,520 491,800 653,152 880,803 1,204,208 1,666,312 
 
Table 8.17:  Calculation of Lost Human Capital (values in US$) 
 
For the calculation of losses attributed to major casualties, it was assumed that one in 10 of 
this class was permanently disabled while the rest had a period of one year of hospitalisation 
and recovery.  For minor injuries, a period of two weeks of work leave was assumed. 
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Figure 8.15:  Annual Casualty Losses 
 
Interestingly, as Figure 8.15 and Table 8.18 illustrate, the analysis of annual casualty losses 
yields a different result to that of annual building losses.  Low probability events cause higher 
losses than high probability events do.  Once again, the 137-year return-period earthquake 
is not the most damaging one.  The most damaging is the 363-year return-period event, 
which has a PGA value of 0.28 g, closely followed by a 227-year return-period phenomenon 
with 0.24 g ground motion value.  On average, mitigation scenario A yields a reduction factor 
of 0.74 (standard deviation of 0.25) while scenario B provides a 0.18 reduction factor 
(standard deviation of 0.28).   
 
Millions of US$ Reduction Factor Return 
period Unmodified Scenario A Scenario B Scenario A Scenario B 
     1 0.04 0.00 0.04 1.00 0.00 
    11 0.08 0.01 0.01 0.91 0.91 
    29 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.24 0.08 
    64 0.12 0.06 0.12 0.52 0.01 
  137 0.10 0.04 0.10 0.55 0.00 
  227 0.16 0.03 0.14 0.80 0.12 
  363 0.17 0.02 0.14 0.85 0.15 
  619 0.14 0.02 0.12 0.88 0.16 
1007 0.11 0.01 0.09 0.89 0.17 
 
Table 8.18:  Annual Population Losses and Mitigation Reduction Factor  
 
For the calculation of the benefits of both mitigation scenarios, the following assumptions 
were made: 
• Both adobe and un-reinforced buildings are demolished and rebuilt.  Although the 
demolition and clearance of rubble implies a cost, this is balanced by the re-use of 
materials such as timber and roofing.  Therefore, the cost will be calculated at 100% of 
the replacement cost. 
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• It is assumed that the cost of bracing reinforced concrete frames without seismic design 
is approximately 10% of the replacement cost of the building. 
 
The mitigation costs of scenario A are US$ 521.65 million while for scenario B the figure is 
only US$ 28.49 million. 
 
 Annual Benefit  
Population Buildings Total Benefits Return 
Period Scenario A Scenario B Scenario A Scenario B Benefits A Benefits B 
1 0.04 0.00   0.95   0.95   0.99 0.00 
11 0.09 0.09   8.68   8.68   8.77 6.27 
29 0.02 0.01   3.71   3.71   3.73 0.89 
64 0.06 0.01   2.78   2.78   2.84 0.63 
137 0.06 0.00    1.81   1.81   1.87 0.39 
227 0.12 0.02   1.37   1.37   1.49 0.32 
363 0.14 0.03   1.00   1.00   1.14 0.25 
617 0.13 0.03   0.68   0.68   0.81 0.18 
1007 0.10 0.02   0.47   0.47   0.57 0.13 
Total 0.76 0.21 21.45 21.45 22.21 9.05 
 
Table 8.19:  Benefits of Mitigation Scenarios 
 
Table 8.19 demonstrates that the building losses outweigh human capital by a factor of 
about 16.  This is an important finding as it has implications in terms of policy-making.  For 
example, if there is a clear policy to give priority to life, a weight should be applied to human 
capital as part of the cost-benefit analysis of mitigation scenarios.   
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Figure 8.16: Cost-Benefit Analysis per Mitigation Strategy 
 
This analysis also illustrates how at first glance mitigation scenario A appears the most 
attractive.  However, from the analysis of the cost and benefit figures, it could be argued that 
scenario B is more efficient (refer to Figure 8.16) as there is a 23.5 to 1 cost-benefit factor in 
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the case of scenario A while the factor is only 3.15 in the case of scenario B.  A way of 
interpreting these results is to view scenario A as being long-term, as only after 23.5 years is 
a cost-benefit of 1:1 reached.  Conversely, scenario B constitutes a short-term scenario as it 
achieves a cost-benefit of 1:1 in 3.15 years. 
 
The cost-benefit values above are partial figures, as important factors were not taken into 
account due to lack of damage data (loss of building contents, interrupted business, costs of 
temporary accommodation for displaced persons, costs of the rescue and the relief itself, to 
name just the most important).  
 
8.5 CONCLUSIONS 
 
It was concluded that a detailed and updated land-use map, a map of urban growth, damage 
curves and a map of population densities are the most important “urban” datasets for urban 
disaster management.  It also was concluded that Remote Sensing is an important tool not 
only for generating datasets such as the map of urban growth but also for cutting down on 
the extent of ground data collection.  The results of the population risk assessment illustrated 
the effect that the time of the day has on the spatial distribution of casualties.  Finally, it was 
concluded that unless mitigation alternatives are analysed on a cost-benefit analysis and are 
standardised based on probability data, there is the possibility that a wrong alternative will be 
adopted.   
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Chapter Nine:  CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
This chapter draws conclusions based on the previous eight chapters and presents 
recommendations for further research.  The conclusions relate to methodology development 
for urban disaster management in general, and more specifically to data capture of elements 
at risk.  An action plan related to geo-information for disaster management, and some 
guidelines for disaster management in Cartago are also presented.   
 
9.1 CONCLUSIONS 
 
9.1.1 Data Capture Methodology 
 
The approach adopted is pragmatic, in the sense that, given the human and financial 
constraints typical of developing countries, it involves an initial classification of buildings 
based on their relevance for emergency and relief operations and it proposes different data 
capture methods accordingly.  Those areas that do not include relevant buildings undergo a 
second classification designed to reduce the extent of the data capture phase.  The 
classification of buildings (regular, essential second priority, essential first priority) was 
designed based on three types of data capture methods (rapid visual sidewalk screening, 
extensive screening and analytical modelling).  It is thought that this data capture would be 
easy to coordinate and implement given that three very distinct levels of expertise in 
structural response exist within the professional community: a) architects and construction 
technologists, b) civil engineers and c) structural engineers.  This classification also takes 
into account the levels of human resources availability, as structural engineers tend to be 
very scarce. 
 
The first main conclusion regarding this approach is that it is dependent upon the availability 
of up-to-date large-scale land-use maps and aerial photographs.  The land-use maps are 
necessary to identify emergency-related buildings, while the aerial photographs are needed 
to delineate homogeneous areas.   
 
The mission planning phase proved straightforward provided that a centre road line map was 
available, but for optimal results the direction of traffic circulation should also be considered.  
One could argue, however, that if such a detailed network map is unavailable, the costs and 
time involved in generating one would be prohibitive if it was for the sole purpose of 
preparing for image capture. 
 
For the purpose of urban planning it was concluded that, despite the great advances in 
remote sensing, building risk cannot be assessed based on remotely sensed images alone 
and that ground observations are necessary to complement them. However, if building types 
and construction practices are consistent within distinct development periods, remotely 
sensed images can be used to conduct a risk assessment at a metropolitan or regional level 
as long as results are aggregated to the district level.     
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It would be stating the obvious to highlight the usefulness of GIS for the input, management, 
manipulation, analysis and visualisation of spatially referenced data as there are plenty of 
examples that have already demonstrated this.  What is important at this point is to draw 
attention to two aspects of GIS, one relating to scenario development and the other to the 
emerging mobile technologies. 
 
In the case study, the initial stages of data manipulation proved very time-consuming.  
However, the greatest strength of GIS proved to be its ability to handle the “what if” type of 
scenarios.  Converting the original forecast into a scenario that, for example, illustrated “what 
if all buildings with reinforced concrete frames without proper seismic design are braced?” 
was carried out in very little time. 
 
Mobile GIS enables both the collection of data as well as its processing to be carried out 
directly in the field.  During fieldwork, an off-the-shelf and low-cost alternative for collecting 
data on the characteristics of building façades was tested with very successful results.  A 
budget GPS unit was used in combination with a digital video camera and a laptop 
computer.  The coupling of these devices proved possible and straightforward and it was 
concluded that these technologies have great potential in pre-disaster data collection, 
although it is probably during the post-disaster damage reconnaissance phase that they 
would be of highest value.  Since digital video cameras are widely available and are 
relatively inexpensive, it is thought that this method is a viable option from a financial point of 
view, especially in medium and small municipalities in developing countries.  This method 
proved very flexible and it can be used for many applications, even in non-urban contexts. 
 
9.1.2  Data Production and Integration  
 
Hazard Zonations 
 
In Costa Rica, a micro-zonation of the Great Metropolitan Area (GAM) is urgently needed as 
approximately 54% of the population lives and works in this small area of approximately 
1,775 km2, which represents 3.5% of the area of the country.  Moreover, it is expected that 
by the year 2025, the population of the GAM will increase to 75% of the total population.  As 
discussed before, there is a seismic zonation of the GAM at scale 1:200,000.  Unless hazard 
zonations are carried out at large scales, however, issues such as local site conditions 
cannot be incorporated, leading to inaccurate risk assessments and inadequate strategies in 
the field of planning of urban expansion.  This therefore implies that detailed contour and 
soils mapping must be generated for the whole of this region.  So far, contour mapping is 
available for the entire GAM area at 1:10,000 scale, and it would be ideal if soil maps were 
available at the same scale − however, a scale of 1:25,000 could be a reasonable 
compromise.  Specific mention of hazard probability should be made as it was observed that 
several hazard zonations did not include details about the probability of the event within the 
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map itself.  Since risk assessment consists of a sequence of analyses carried out by 
different teams of scientists, the individual groups of scientists should make explicit mention 
of all basic components in order to smooth the process. 
 
Institutions such as the Ministry of Natural Resources and the Environment (MINAE), the 
National Commission for the Prevention of and Response to Emergencies (CNE), the School 
of Geology of the University of Costa Rica (UCR) and the Central American School of 
Geology are key in the elaboration of these zonations.  The university would play a leading 
role as undergraduate and postgraduate students could conduct part of the required 
mapping as part of their final assignment or thesis, provided that adequate supervision was 
given.  Apart from local and regional government planning and management entities, the 
National Insurance Institute would benefit greatly from these maps.  The establishment of a 
partnership between these institutions could make both the funding and the human and 
technical resources available for the elaboration of these maps. 
 
An inconsistency between literature on the topographic effects on building damage and the 
Costa Rican Seismic Code of 1986 was identified.  The literature indicates that a correlation 
exists between large topographic changes and damage to buildings, and that a ban on 
construction along all scarps should be enforced.  While the code does impose a ban on 
construction within 50 m either side of active faults, it makes no mention of a similar ban 
affecting scarps.  This is an issue that should be addressed by the National Federated Board 
of Architects and Engineers (CFIA), which was the author of the 1986 National Seismic 
Code, and the School of Geology of the University of Costa Rica (UCR).  Such a ban would 
represent another important element to be incorporated in a development zonation. 
 
Vulnerability Functions 
 
The literature review identified the most important characteristics having an effect on building 
damage to be:  structural type, building material, building configuration foundations, number 
of storeys and a benchmark related to the implementation of seismic codes and relevant 
regulations.  Unfortunately, of these listed items, foundations present the greatest difficulty in 
the process of vulnerability assessment.  As they are not visible, they cannot be incorporated 
in methodologies dealing with data capture by means of rapid sidewalk or extensive 
screening.  In this sense, foundations may be regarded as the “weakest link” in this process 
and this explains why some professionals in the field of structural engineering view risk 
assessment with considerable scepticism.  That said, risk assessments carried out in 
California and later verified based on the damage observed from the 1994 Northridge 
earthquake suggest that the omission of foundations in risk assessment methodologies did 
not lead to higher error.  This phenomenon may be the result of particular foundations being 
used for particular building types. Consequently, so long as this is the case, the reliability of 
the forecast is not compromised.   
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Nowadays, since there is consensus regarding the effects of soil and topography on building 
damage, a wide range of foundation types can be associated with a particular building type.  
It can therefore be concluded that the assumption that all buildings of a given type will have 
a given foundation type will become less valid in the future, and hence this criterion should 
be incorporated in building vulnerability methodology.  This implies not only the need for 
architects or engineers to specify the type of foundation during the construction permit 
application, but also the development of quantitative data that enables the modification of the 
“basic damage rate” for a building type according its foundation type.   
 
A finding of the Cartago case study was that to a certain extent the plan and vertical 
configuration of buildings could be assessed through remotely sensed and ground images.  
However, the distribution of rigidity (refer to Appendix III) could not be assessed by either of 
these methods.  Unfortunately, even if all three types of configuration criteria (plan, vertical 
and structural rigidity) could be assessed, there is still a lack of historical damage data, and 
therefore quantitative vulnerability functions need to be developed.  Mobile GIS could be the 
technology to bridge this gap, as it would speed the process of post-disaster data collection 
and therefore enable the collection of more building attributes before the start of demolition 
work.   
 
In Costa Rica, damage curves have been available since the 1970s.  However, the following 
three improvements must be made: 
 
• The incorporation of the number of storeys, since buildings of different heights shake at 
different frequencies 
• The expansion of the list to include recently adopted structural types such as pre-cast 
concrete panels 
• An indication regarding the judging of constructions which consist of mixed building types 
 
Having said that, from the point of view of data collection and its interpretation, this list of 
building types should be as concise as possible. 
 
Since the previous damage curves were developed for the National Insurance Institute 
(INS), it is thought that this organisation could expand its role by improving and periodically 
updating the damage curves. 
 
Elements at Risk Database and Mapping 
 
The case study highlighted both the strengths and weaknesses of the data available and the 
extent to which this data could be exploited for risk assessment.  The establishment of 
baseline data is one of the most important and neglected functions of emergency information 
management in Cartago.  Effective emergency decision-making requires data collected by 
damage reconnaissance teams to be compared with the baseline data representing the 
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“normal” (pre-disaster) situation.  Of the datasets used, the local government generated 
none.  In the future, this situation will probably change as the local government will operate a 
digital cadastre and this will not only make it possible to generate a few information products 
but it will also encourage officials to generate other data layers.  A more proactive role is 
required from the municipality, while a more supporting role is required from the national 
urban planning entity, which has until now largely monopolised urban plan making. 
 
The case study illustrated the vast number of buildings involved in full surveys and the need 
for conducting stratifications to narrow down the extent of the ground surveys.  The national 
government should therefore make the necessary budget allocations for the production of 
remotely sensed images, as these are the most useful products for stratification purposes.  
The National Geographic Institute (IGN) should not only have recent photographs available 
but it should also make efforts to avoid the discontinuation of the 1:10,000 series of land-use 
maps of the Great Metropolitan Area (GAM).  These maps have so far only been produced 
in 1991 and despite the success of the series, it is thought to be heading for discontinuation 
due to its cost.  If, however, there is a decision to discontinue the series from a cost-benefit 
point of view, an alternative would be to explore the expansion of the land-use classification 
of the cadastre. This institute should also engage in the coordinate transformation of not only 
the 1:10,000 series but also the 1:50,000 scale series, as due to the old projection used 
these maps do not match data collected using GPS.  This issue is increasingly important as 
GPS is an increasingly important tool in the pre-disaster collection of data, but it will be 
widely used by disaster reconnaissance teams who require relatively accurate data to be 
generated as quickly as possible.   
 
Municipal governments should make periodic recordings of building façades using digital 
video in a moving vehicle.  This offers advantages not only from the point of view of disaster 
management but also from the point of view of tracking down illegal construction, 
advertisements and land-use changes.  Consequently, digital video should be used as a tool 
in establishing fines and therefore in revenue collection − so long as this does not challenge 
the privacy laws.  Moreover, digital video cameras are nowadays widely available and can 
be easily rented for short periods.  Since this type of equipment would be infrequently used, 
and given the size of Costa Rica, the Institute for the Assistance and Stimulation of 
Municipalities (IFAM) is the ideal entity to run a loan system of digital video and GPS devices 
which would improve the ability of small local government departments to collect relevant 
data at given intervals. 
 
One of the most important challenges relates to the municipal cadastre as a basic platform 
on which to build risk assessment.  The case study demonstrated that whenever cadastral 
data is unavailable, it is necessary to make gross assumptions related to the area of 
construction.  This is obviously undesirable from the point of view of the reliability of the data 
that is then used in the cost-benefit analysis of mitigation strategies.  Basically three 
improvements are necessary if the cadastre is to be useful: 
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• The valuations contained in it should represent up-to-date replacement values and 
market values separately, rather than simply a nominal value that cannot be 
disaggregated.  This requires an aggressive overhaul of the cadastre, and the increase 
in revenue resulting from up-to-date valuations could be used to fund the salaries of 
extra staff.  At the moment, market values are only being established by real estate 
companies and they tend not to make this information public for obvious reasons.  
Replacement values can only be derived from the six-monthly estimates of construction 
costs issued by the Federated Board of Architects and Engineers (CFIA).  At present, 
the classes of buildings used by the CFIA do not match the classification of damage 
functions developed by Sauter and Shah (1978).  The issue of comprehensiveness and 
consistency in the building classifications used by the different groups that produce data 
usable for risk assessment has to be addressed.  
• The classification of land-uses contained in the cadastre database is very restricted and 
it should therefore be extended, especially if detailed land-use maps do not exist. 
• The number of storeys of buildings should be recorded.  At present only the total area of 
the building (and the parcel) is recorded.  Since different heights shake at different 
frequencies, without knowledge of height it is not possible to accurately calculate the 
damage for several earthquake scenarios.  The land-use per storey is also important 
from the point of view of establishing population density scenarios throughout the day. 
 
The case study has illustrated the variation in casualties depending on the time of day.  It 
therefore highlights the need for models and data for accurately estimating the population 
density during the day (as census data is based on night-time occupancy).  This underlines 
the importance of producing complementary censuses, for example the “business census”, 
which records characteristics of industrial and commercial establishments, such as the total 
number of employees.   
 
Spatially referenced inventories of school facilities and health facilities are also important 
sources that can be used for producing the day population density scenario.  In Costa Rica, 
a business census does not exist, although this data is available through other sources such 
as the tax office, either at national level (Tributación Directa) or at local government level 
itself.  The difficulty in using data from the tax office, the local government or the ministries of 
health or education is that their data cannot be easily geo-coded.   
 
In Cartago, as across the whole country, the Spanish colonial grid carries avenue and street 
numbers.  After the use of the grid pattern was abandoned, however, new streets were given 
no names and presently, under a rather unique system, addresses are given in the form of 
distance from a widely known feature.  Although this system seems to allow local people to 
find their way around, it makes it practically impossible to geo-code buildings or plots.  To 
make matters even worse, there is no such thing as a post-code system.  Unfortunately, this 
issue has been completely neglected by politicians as they consider an address and post-
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coding system to have little importance and minimal political leverage.  However, to move 
forward in the application of GIS, not only for disaster management but for a variety of other 
purposes as well, the government must launch a programme that funds and empowers 
Correos de Costa Rica (the post entity) to develop a nationwide street address and post-
coding system.  Pressure is therefore needed from technocrats to highlight the wide-ranging 
applications of such a system, beyond the postal service. 
 
On the other hand, the funding necessary to generate basic datasets such as the national 
population census and aerial survey photographs has to be ensured, as the availability of 
data generated at given intervals is important not only in risk assessment but also for 
monitoring mitigation measures under implementation.  In Costa Rica, the national 
population and housing census of 1984 was cancelled as funds were diverted into 
reconstruction and relief operations following the devastating Hurricane Caesar.  A 
mechanism must be developed to guarantee the funds for producing these basic datasets.  
A more aggressive approach is required for marketing government data and information 
products.  For example, as of September 2002 the National Geographic Institute of Costa 
Rica still lacked a website, and hence its products are not advertised through the internet.  
This low-cost measure could provide the necessary funding to ensure the continuation of the 
1:10,000 land-use series. 
 
9.1.3  Strategy Development and Cost-Benefit Analysis 
 
According to Zeckhauser and Shepard (1984), the fundamental risk management dilemma 
is: Where should we spend whose money to undertake what programmes to save which 
lives with what probability?  Although there may be ethical objections as well as technical 
difficulties in putting a price on human lives, it seems that unfortunately this has to be done. 
Failure to do so implies that decisions are adopted on the basis of property and production.  
This research has illustrated that despite the need to improve in some areas (see Section 
9.2, “Recommendations for Further Research”), it is possible to estimate the financial cost of 
building and infrastructure damage as well as that associated with casualties.  The case 
study has illustrated the degree to which building losses outweigh human losses.  One can 
conclude that, from a policy point of view, if the priority is to save human lives, the financial 
losses due to casualties should be given higher weight in a cost-benefit analysis.  It has also 
highlighted the fact that it is meaningless to analyse strategies by considering only these two 
criteria while overlooking the damage to contents and secondary losses (such as loss of 
production and costs associated with medical attention and temporary shelter).  A multi-
disciplinary team would need to be expanded by incorporating both research staff with a 
background in industrial engineering or business administration for estimating the loss of 
production.  This is a particularly complex topic as it requires resumption times to be 
determined not only for damage within facilities but also for damage to transport 
infrastructure, such as rail tracks, roads or bridges. 
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Prevention 
 
The production of a zonation map is the most useful mechanism for preventing future 
damage from taking place.  An adequate way of handling urban growth in Cartago is to 
combine the construction bans with a mechanism that guides growth by means of financial 
incentives according to the levels of expected ground shaking.  The application of different 
construction permit tariffs and annual property taxes is thought to be an effective way of 
guiding urban growth, as this would have implications for both the developers and future 
owners. 
 
The local government should also consider the option of applying financial incentives (in the 
form of lower construction permit tariffs) to promote the development of housing and 
commercial estates rather than individual buildings.  This is highly desirable; it not only cuts 
down on the human resources and equipment needed for the supervision of construction 
works, but a higher quality of supervision can also be delivered throughout the areas.  The 
latter can be attributed to the deeper understanding of the buildings’ construction process, 
resulting from the volumes involved.  Estates are also desirable as they offer stratification 
possibilities that can reduce the time spent collecting ground data. 
 
Reduction 
 
In order to decrease the losses and casualties that could occur in existing buildings, apart 
from evacuation drills, the types of strategies that could be developed for Cartago are 
basically either physical or functional changes. 
 
Evacuation drills are probably the most cost-effective measure in the field of reducing 
population risk.  In Cartago, however, the issue of evacuation is not such a high priority as it 
is in cities such as Mexico City, Istanbul or Tokyo.  The time it takes most individuals to 
reach safety is relatively short, as approximately 95% of the buildings are either one or two 
storeys high.  The case study has demonstrated the use of GIS for identifying areas where 
potential accommodation is available in relation to residential areas.    
 
From the analysis of temporary load design parameters (refer to Table 6.3), one can 
conclude that the change in use of a building can lead to higher vulnerability.  Planning 
offices should therefore only grant change-of-use permits in cases where the building will 
have a similar load to that which it was designed for, or where it will be re-strengthened to 
enable it to cope with the extra load.  The change in use of a building should be also 
considered as a low-cost reduction measure to decrease building vulnerability.  If the first 
floor of a two-storey adobe building is used as a warehouse, the owner could be forced to 
change the land-use to “residential” in an effort to bring down the temporary loads.  Similarly, 
the changes in land-use can also be used to modify the population densities in certain areas 
of town.  This is easy to achieve for government-owned buildings, otherwise it might involve 
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complex legal procedures and financial compensation.  The monitoring of building use 
change should therefore be one of the priority mechanisms to control and reduce 
vulnerability.  It is thought that the digital image capture method developed as part of this 
research is an important tool for keeping track of building use changes.   
 
Two physical changes that would be appropriate measures in Cartago are the demolition or 
retrofitting of buildings.  In the case of adobe and un-reinforced masonry buildings, there is 
unfortunately little that can be done to improve their response.  The most obvious starting 
point is to decrease the load of the roof, as regards both the actual roof material (e.g. clay 
tiles) and the roof trusses.  In the case of Cartago, clay tile roofs have already been replaced 
by corrugated metal.  Replacing the heavy Spanish colonial or early Republican wood 
trusses with lightweight materials such as metal should be undertaken. 
 
There are measures, however, that, despite not modifying a building’s susceptibility to 
damage, represent low-cost options that can reduce casualties.  For example, meshes can 
be attached to both sides of a wall.  They are then fixed together and also fixed to the roof 
trusses and finally plastered.  The time it takes the walls to collapse is extended by a few 
seconds; this extra time can represent the difference between safe evacuation and death.  
 
The other issue that must be considered in an urban disaster reduction plan is the 
prioritisation of the work.  Due to cash flow and labour supply, it is not possible to demolish 
or retrofit all the buildings at the same time.  The simplest way to prioritise is by type of 
building; adobe buildings would be demolished first, followed by un-reinforced masonry 
buildings, while reinforced concrete frames without proper seismic resistant design would 
have high priority for re-strengthening (refer to Figure 9.1 for an illustration of steel bracing 
used for strengthening an existing frame).   
 
 
Figure 9.1: Steel Bracing for Reinforcing Concrete Frames without Proper Seismic Resistant Design 
 
However, from the point of view of casualties, the parameter of population density should be 
Steel bracing sections added
Existing reinforced concrete frame
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considered alongside the building type, and therefore it is possible to prioritise the various 
measures by applying simple multi-criteria evaluation techniques. 
 
A public-private partnership is seen as a mechanism that could be used in Cartago for 
redeveloping areas that concentrate adobe and un-reinforced masonry buildings.  This 
partnership could focus on the redevelopment of the city centre, where there is a high 
concentration of these types of buildings.  Due to their proximity to the market, land in this 
area has a high commercial value.  The role of the government in this partnership would be 
to make the land available by means of expropriation.  Private sector developers would have 
the chance to bid for the land and redevelop it according to guidelines drawn up by the local 
government.  In this way, a considerable portion of these weak buildings would be 
demolished, thus lowering building and population risk. 
 
Diffusion 
 
If the production of risk scenarios and the development of strategies on the urban disaster 
management of Cartago are important, perhaps even more relevant are the mechanisms for 
the diffusion of this information amongst the general public.  Children and teenagers are 
easily reached in schools; reaching the rest of the population is considerably more difficult.  
In Cartago, the Catholic Church could play an important role in the implementation of 
awareness campaigns.  The attendance at mass on weekends is high, as the inhabitants of 
this city are devoted Christians.  As an institution, it could provide a forum for discussion on 
the changing attitude of the Church in relation to the perception of the cause of hazards.  As 
a building visited by large numbers of people, it could provide a space for the display and 
distribution of maps and leaflets.   
 
It is important to keep in mind that it appears that some politicians would rather hide risk 
assessments from fear that their dissemination might deter foreign investors.  It means 
therefore that technocrats and urban planners must devise mechanisms to make sure that 
the information is not only produced but also disseminated as widely as appropriate. 
 
9.1.4  The Multi-Hazard Probability-Based Approach to Disaster Management 
 
A multi-hazard probability-based approach to disaster management must be adopted in 
Cartago − in other words, an integrated strategy in which first the bigger picture is assessed 
before working out the details of the individual strategies.  There are basically two very 
important weaknesses in the way risk is addressed, the first relates to lack of awareness of 
the “secondary domino effects” while the second relates to how to address the use of 
probability to integrate all existing scenarios.  Unless probability is brought into the analysis, 
very misleading conclusions can be drawn and funds will most likely be spent inadequately.   
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Regarding the domino effects in Cartago, an earthquake can trigger a landslide upstream at 
San Blas and this can in turn trigger a mudslide.  On the other hand, due to the large number 
of wooden buildings and the existence of an oil pipeline situated to the north of the study 
area, the fire scenario should also be generated.  This post-earthquake fire scenario should 
be developed by staff from the fire department (which in Costa Rica is attached to the 
National Insurance Institute), as these are the experts on ignition sources and fire spread.  
Similarly, experts in ground failure and hydrology should generate the mudflow scenario. 
 
The three scenarios should be combined in order to estimate the maximum possible damage 
throughout the city in what could be described as the “what if everything goes wrong 
scenario”.  Similar to the basic analysis carried out in the case study, the resources of 
emergency and health facilities could be analysed against this scenario to identify whether 
they would be able to “cope” or whether it would be necessary to pool resources from 
outside the city boundaries.  
 
Hazard probability is possibly one of the most important factors contributing to the successful 
generation of mitigation strategies as the recurrence period converts absolute figures into 
relative ones, which can then be interpreted more easily.  Probability data could identify, for 
example, whether the yearly flood (which only features in the local newspaper) causes more 
annual losses than a mudflow (which takes place every 50 years but features on the 
international newspapers and attracts foreign rescue teams and donations).  Although 
planners tend to be more comfortable with annual or 10-yearly figures, a compromise might 
be needed as pragmatism dictates that politicians would favour annual and four-yearly 
analyses as these correlate with the duration of one fiscal year and one term in office.  
Therefore it is probably easier for them to relate to these time frames than to the decade. 
 
9.1.5 Information Infrastructure and Networks  
 
Since natural disasters respect neither administrative nor political boundaries, institutions 
must network, not only in terms of technical and human resources but also in terms of data 
and information products.  This implies that disaster management requires a change in 
attitude as government institutions tend to work in isolation.  Additionally within Costa Rican 
organisations, there is a culture of ownership of data by individuals.   
 
From the analysis of the legal framework of Costa Rica, it was concluded that it is 
reasonably adequate in terms of setting responsibilities and making individuals and 
institutions accountable for their acts − or lack of them.  Efforts at this point in time should 
therefore be concentrated on policy regarding the establishment of both a national spatial 
infrastructure and a disaster information network.  The establishment of these two entities 
would lead to an improvement in disaster management, thus decreasing risk.   
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Rather than establishing its own standards, the national disaster information network should 
adhere to standards set by the national spatial infrastructure.  A Costa Rican national spatial 
infrastructure should be established around the Central American Geographic Information 
Project (PROCIG), which has already made some progress in identifying suppliers of 
spatially-referenced data and information products by surveying 12 government institutions, 
three non-government organisations and six research centres.  The Ministry of Planning and 
Economic Policy (MIDEPLAN) would be a suitable leader of the national spatial data 
infrastructure.  This institution is the entity responsible for regional planning; it deals with 
issues such as identifying physical, natural and human assets, as well as developing policy-
making in fields such as production and poverty alleviation. The National Commission for the 
Prevention of and Response to Emergencies (CNE) would be the obvious institution to lead 
a disaster information network. 
 
Setting up a successful disaster data/information network is one of the greatest challenges 
faced by the geo-information community in Costa Rica.  This requires considerable effort 
and commitment by the various users and providers of information, as well as clarity on the 
rights and obligations of all the parties involved.  To achieve this objective, there are several 
important issues that should be addressed: 
 
• A coordinating organisation or committee should be appointed to serve as primary portal 
of access to national and international networks.  MIDEPLAN and CNE appear the most 
suitable entities for this task. This coordinating entity should also be responsible for 
semantics, as one of the issues that hampers the disaster management process in 
Costa Rica is the severe inconsistency in the use of terminology.  A review of the legal 
framework must be performed by this entity to identify confidentiality laws that limit 
access to datasets.  The restrictions on access to the various datasets must be 
established according to the resolution of data and the type of data user (i.e. 
government, non-government or private organisation).  Security mechanisms must 
therefore be designed to limit access to certain datasets by particular users. This issue is 
particularly important if it is intended to grant access to data and information products 
through the World Wide Web. Parallel to this activity, there should be an initiative to 
review confidentiality laws from the point of view of both adequacy and any 
misinterpretation that may be currently taking place. It has been observed that, for 
example, access to high-resolution census datasets is denied by the information centre 
at the National Statistics and Census Bureau (INEC) due to a misinterpretation of the 
law.  As far as possible, data sharing barriers must be abolished or at least lowered.  
 
• Users (and potential users) of data must be identified in both the public and private 
sectors.  Within the private sector, the involvement of the real estate, insurance and 
building manufacturing sectors is important.  These sectors possess vast knowledge 
regarding building and population vulnerability, and in some cases they have conducted 
the most comprehensive studies on building and population risk.  Financial resources 
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are often wasted, as in Costa Rica it is common that several organisations conduct 
studies of the same type.  In other words, a network would be useful for preventing 
duplication of efforts.  The case study in Cartago has highlighted the costs involved in 
developing building inventories.  In the case of the insurance and real estate sectors, 
they should also be seen as potential purchasers of data that could contribute to the 
financial sustainability of the risk assessment and its periodic update.  A pricing policy 
must therefore be developed to ensure cost-recovery of data production.   
 
• A user-needs assessment must be conducted in each organisation to identify the 
relevant datasets that support each of the tasks carried out by the institution.  Ideally, the 
user-needs assessment should target decision-makers as well as geo-information 
professionals and technicians.  Of particular importance is the identification of the 
minimum spatio-temporal standards required by each organisation.  For those 
organisations that require “coarser” data supplied less frequently, it should be 
established whether aggregation is an acceptable option. 
 
• The list of institutions surveyed by PROCIG highlights the fact that the private sector is 
not regarded as a potential data provider, but simply as a data user and purchaser.  Data 
providers (and potential ones) must be identified in both the public and private sectors 
and the spatio-temporal characteristics of the datasets that they presently produce must 
be identified.  In cases where several organisations currently duplicate efforts by 
producing the same data layers, the work should be split amongst the various providers.  
An analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of these providers is necessary to 
distribute the work in a way that ensures the best possible results in terms of quality and 
time.  Agreement must be achieved in terms of interoperability, metadata and 
classification standards, as well as deadlines for delivery of the datasets, which each 
organisation will be responsible for producing.  The government should be responsible 
for setting data standards and quality control. 
 
• Communication technologies such as the World Wide Web could be used for the 
diffusion of information about the network and available products, as well as for the 
dissemination itself.  A website should be designed to provide details about available 
datasets and their metadata, as well as pricing policy and regulations on use.  Such a 
website could also act as the primary platform for access to the datasets by means of 
downloading − although since large files require high bandwidth, access to some files 
might only be feasible through CD-Roms.  One must be aware that, although at present 
most government organisations and private companies have access to internet, 
according to Martínez (2001) it is estimated that only approximately 4% of the Costa 
Rican public officially subscribe to it.  One of the greatest challenges relates to the 
access of small community-based organisations (CBOs), such as the local emergency 
committees, to this “communication superhighway” as these groups constitute the 
warhorses of disaster management in Costa Rica. 
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9.1.6  The Role of Academia 
 
A considerable amount of research has been conducted on hazard phenomena and their 
zonation.  In comparison, smaller amounts of research have been carried out in the field of 
vulnerability and the application of risk assessments for urban disaster management and 
emergency response.  A particularly serious weakness relates to the development of 
damage curves for assessing the risk of the elements.  There must be sustained efforts in 
raising awareness both within the engineering community and within organisations that could 
provide the funding for undertaking such research.  Disaster managers should play a leading 
role in ensuring that these topics are included in the agendas of research and funding 
organisations.   
 
On the other hand, academics must engage in disaster management along with other 
disaster planners and “responders”.  During the Global Disaster Information Network 
Conference in Rome in 2002, for example, a consensus seemed to exist regarding a lack of 
communication, particularly between the academic community and emergency relief 
organisations.  A possible way forward is to establish a system by which disaster managers 
and emergency relief workers draft research questions of relevance and the academic 
community engages in the topics that are thought to be of sufficient scientific content to be 
“researchable”.  This type of cooperation would promote a balance between technology-
driven and problem-driven research.  
 
9.2 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
 
This thesis has illustrated several fields where further research is required.  The following 
are four fields that provide challenging and relevant research opportunities: 
 
1. Development of vulnerability functions and classifications of buildings to enable multi-
hazard risk assessments to be conducted rather than individual hazard risk 
assessments.  This type of research requires people with a background in structural 
engineering, particularly engineers that have been part of earthquake damage 
reconnaissance teams.  One aspect to consider is the need to develop guidelines to 
enable surveyors to distinguish between building types of similar external appearance. 
 
2. Modelling of population mobility throughout the day.  This topic requires researchers with 
a background in urban or human geography, particularly those with experience of census 
data and household surveys. 
 
3. Estimating loss of production is probably one of the most important topics in need of 
research. It is complex as it first requires civil and architectural engineers to conduct 
research into the estimation of time required to rehabilitate or reconstruct damaged 
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buildings and infrastructure such as roads, rail tracks and bridges.  In a second stage, 
researchers with a background in industrial engineering and business management are 
required to investigate the estimation of the loss suffered through interrupted production 
(due to casualties and building damage), the lack of transport means and the loss of 
market.   
 
4. Integration of portable devices and their use in an environment of multiple users and time 
constraints for field data collection.  More research is needed into linking mobile GIS 
devices such as palm-top computers (including a review of suitable palm-top GIS 
software) with GPS and digital video devices.  Particular attention should be paid to rapid 
and straightforward methods of linking the devices and integrating the data collected by 
the various surveyors.  This type of research is required to make it possible for 
emergency decision-makers to obtain the necessary information products as quickly as 
possible. 
 
Several of these topics not only require multi-disciplinary research teams but also require 
partnerships with other research organisations to be established. 
 
9.3  FINAL REMARKS 
 
When interpreting risk or damage maps, planners must be aware that these do not offer 
predictions.  Due to the uncertainty of the knowledge available on hazards, their recurrence 
patterns and their effects, all loss estimates are merely extrapolations into the future of the 
observed statistical distribution of occurrences of hazards and their effects in the past. 
 
This situation is highlighted by the UN Disaster Management Training Programme (United 
Nations Department of Humanitarian Affairs 1994). 
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Appendix I:  MODIFIED MERCALLI INTENSITY SCALE 
Source:   (Smith 1996) 
 
 
 
MMI 
 
Description 
Average 
PGA 
g = gravity 
(9.8 m s2) 
I Not felt except by a very few under especially favourable circumstances. - 
II Felt only be a few persons at rest, especially on upper floors of buildings. 
Delicately suspended objects may swing. 
- 
III Felt quite noticeably indoors, especially on upper floors of buildings, but many 
people do not recognise it as an earthquake. Standing motorcars may rock 
slightly. Vibration like passing of truck. Duration estimated. 
- 
IV During the day felt indoors by many, outdoors by few. At night some awakened.  
Dishes, windows, doors disturbed; walls make cracking sound. Sensation like 
heavy truck striking building. Standing motorcars rocked noticeably. 
0.015g – 0.02g 
V Felt by nearly everyone, many awakened. Some dishes, windows, etc., broken; a 
few instances of cracked plaster; unstable objects overturned. Disturbances of 
trees, poles, and other tall objects sometimes noticed. Pendulum clocks may stop. 
0.03g – 0.04g 
VI Felt by all, many frightened and run outdoors. Some heavy furniture moved; a few 
instances of fallen plaster or damaged chimneys. Damage slight. 
0.06g – 0.07g 
VII Everybody runs outdoors. Damage negligible in building of good design and 
construction; slight to moderate in well-built ordinary structures; considerable in 
poorly built or badly designed structures; some chimneys broken. Noticed by 
persons driving motorcars. 
0.10g – 0.15g 
VIII Damage slight in specially designed structures; considerable in ordinary 
substantial buildings, with partial collapse; great in poorly built structures. Panel 
walls thrown out of frame structures. Fall of chimneys, factory stacks, columns, 
monuments, walls. Heavy furniture overturned. Sand and mud ejected in small 
amounts. Changes in well water. Persons driving motorcars disturbed. 
0.25g – 0.30g 
IX Damage considerable in specially designed structures; well-designed frame 
structures thrown out of plumb; great in substantial buildings, with partial collapse. 
Buildings shifted off foundations. Ground cracked conspicuously. Underground 
pipes broken. 
0.50g – 0.55g 
X Some well-built wooden structures destroyed; most masonry and frame structures 
destroyed with foundations; ground badly cracked. Rails bent. Landslides 
considerable from river banks and steep slopes. Shifted sand and mud. Water 
splashed (slopped) over banks. 
above 0.60g 
XI Few, if any, (masonry) structures remain standing. Bridges destroyed. Broad 
fissures in ground. Underground pipelines completely out of service. Earth slumps 
and land slips in soft ground. Rails bend greatly. 
 
XII Damage total. Practically all works of construction are damaged greatly or 
destroyed.  Waves seen on ground surface. Lines of sight and level are distorted. 
Objects are thrown upward into the air. 
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Appendix II:  EUROPEAN MACROSEISMIC SCALE 1998 
Source:  (European Seismological Commission 1998) 
II.I  Vulnerability Table 
 
 
 
 
II.II Definitions of Quantity 
 
 
 
II.III  Definitions of Intensity Scales 
 
 Effects on Humans Effects on Objects and Nature Damage to Buildings 
I Not felt, even under the 
most favourable 
circumstances 
No effect No damage 
II The tremor is felt only at 
isolated instances (<1%) of 
individuals at rest and in a 
specially receptive position 
indoors. 
No effect No damage 
Type of Structure
Rubble stone, fieldstone
Adobe (mud brick)
Simple stone
Massive stone
Unreinforced with manufactured stone units
Unreinforced with RS floors
Reinforced
Frame without earthquake-resistant design (ERD)
Frame with moderate level of ERD
Frame with high level of ERD
Walls without ERD
Walls with moderate level of ERD
Walls with high level of ERD
Steel structures
Timber structures
Vulnerability Class
A      B      C      D E      F
Most likely vulnerability class
Probably range
Range of less probable, exceptional cases
0         10          20          30        40          50    60         70         80         90         100%
few
many
most
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III The earthquake is felt 
indoors by a few.  People at 
rest feel a swaying or light 
trembling. 
Hanging objects swing slightly. No damage. 
IV The earthquake is felt 
indoors by many and felt 
outdoors only by very few.  
A few people are awakened.  
The level of vibration is not 
frightening.  The vibration is 
moderate.  Observers feel a 
slight trembling or swaying 
of the building, room or bed, 
chair, etc. 
China, glasses, windows and doors 
rattle.  Hanging objects swing.  Light 
furniture shakes visibly in a few cases.  
Woodwork creaks in a few cases. 
No damage. 
V The earthquake is felt 
indoors by most, outdoors 
by few.  A few people are 
frightened and run outdoors.  
Many sleeping people 
awake.  Observers feel a 
strong shaking or rocking of 
the whole building, room or 
furniture. 
Hanging objects swing considerably.  
China and glasses clatter together.  
Small, top-heavy and/or precariously 
supported objects may be shifted or 
fall down.  Doors and windows swing 
open or shut.  In a few cases window 
panes break.  Liquids oscillate and 
may spill from well-filled containers.  
Animals indoors may become uneasy. 
Damage of grade 1 to a few buildings of 
vulnerability class (vc) A and B. 
VI Felt by most indoors and by 
many outdoors.  A few 
persons loose their balance.  
Many people are frightened 
and run outdoors.   
Small objects or ordinary stability may 
fall and furniture may be shifted.  In 
few instances dishes and glassware 
may break.  Farm animals (even 
outdoors) may be frightened. 
Damage of grade 1 is sustained by many 
buildings of vc A and B; a few of class A and B 
suffer damage of grade 2; a few of class C suffer 
damage of grade 1. 
VII Most people are frightened 
and try to run outdoors.  
Many find it difficult to stand, 
especially on upper floors. 
Furniture is shifted and top-heavy 
furniture may be overturned.  Objects 
fall from shelves in large numbers.  
Water splashes from containers, tanks 
and pools. 
Many buildings of vc A suffer damage of grade 
3; a few of grade 4.  Many buildings of vc B 
suffer damage of grade 2; a few of grade 3.  A 
few buildings of vc C sustain damage of grade 2.  
A few buildings of vc D sustain damage of grade 
1. 
VIII Many people find it difficult 
to stand, even outdoors. 
Furniture may be overturned.  Objects 
like TV sets, typewriters, etc. fall to the 
ground.  Tombstones may 
occasionally be displaced, twisted or 
overturned.  Waves may be seen on 
very soft ground. 
Many buildings of vc A suffer damage of grade 
4; a few of grade 5.  Many buildings of vc B 
suffer damage of grade 3; a few of grade 4.  
Many buildings of vc C suffer damage of grade 
2; a few of grade 3.  A few buildings of vc D 
sustain damage of grade 2. 
IX General panic.  People may 
be forcibly thrown to the 
ground. 
Many monuments and columns fall or 
are twisted.  Waves are seen on soft 
ground. 
Many buildings of vc A sustain damage of grade 
5.  Many buildings of vc B suffer damage of 
grade 4; a few of grade 5.  Many buildings of vc 
C suffer damage of grade 3; a few of grade 4.  
Many buildings of vc D suffer damage of grade 
2; a few of grade 3.  A few buildings of vc E 
sustain damage of grade 2. 
X   Most buildings of vc A sustain damage of grade 
5.  Many buildings of vc B sustain damage of 
grade 5.  Many buildings of vc C suffer damage 
of grade 4; a few of grade 5.  Many buildings of 
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vc D suffer damage of grade 3; a few of grade 4.  
Many buildings of vc E suffer damage of grade 
2; a few of grade 3.  A few buildings of vc F 
sustain damage of grade 2. 
XI   Most buildings of vc B sustain damage of grade 
5.  Most buildings of vc C suffer damage of 
grade 4; many of grade 5.  Many buildings of vc 
D suffer damage of grade 4; a few of grade 5.  
Many buildings of vc E suffer damage of grade 
3; a few of grade 4.  Many buildings of vc F 
suffer damage of grade 2; a few of grade 3. 
XII   All buildings of vc A, B and practically all of C are 
destroyed.  Most buildings of vc D, E and F are 
destroyed.  The earthquake effects have 
reached the maximum conceivable effects. 
 
II.IV  Classification of Damage  
 
 
 
Masonry Buildings
Grade 1:  Negligible to slight damage
(no structural damage, slight non-
structural damage)
Hair-line cracks in very few walls.
Fall of small pieces of plaster only.
Fall of loose stones from upper parts of 
buildings in very few cases.
Grade 2:  Moderate damage
(slight structural damage, moderate non-
structural damage)
Cracks in many walls.
Fall of fairly large pieces of plaster.
Partial collapse of chimneys.
Grade 3:  Substantial to heavy damage
(moderate structural damage, heavy non-
structural damage)
Large and extensive cracks in most walls.
Roof tiles detach.  Chimneys fracture at the 
roof line; failure of individual non-structural 
elements (partitions, gable walls.
Grade 4:  Very heavy damage
(heavy structural damage, very heavy 
non-structural damage)
Serious failure of walls’ partial structural 
failure of roofs and floors.
Grade 5:  Destruction
(very heavy structural damage)
Total or near total collapse
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Reinforced Concrete Buildings
Grade 1:  Negligible to slight damage
(no structural damage, slight non-
structural damage)
Fine cracks in plaster over frame members 
or in walls at the base.
Fine cracks in partitions and infills.
Grade 2:  Moderate damage
(slight structural damage, moderate non -
structural damage)
Cracks in columns and beams of frames and 
in structural walls.
Cracks in partition and infill walls; fall of 
brittle cladding and plaster.  Falling mortar 
from the joints of wall panels.
Grade 3:  Substantial to heavy damage
(moderate structural damage, heavy non -
structural damage)
Cracks in columns and beam column joints 
or frames at the base and at joints of 
coupled walls.  Spalling of concrete cover, 
bucking of reinforced rods.
Large cracks in partition and infill walls, 
failure of individual infill panels.
Grade 4:  Very heavy damage
(heavy structural damage, very heavy 
non-structural damage)
Large cracks in structural elements with 
compression failure of concrete and fracture 
of rebars; bond failure of beam reinforced 
bars; tilting of columns.
Collapse of a few columns or of a single 
upper floor.
Grade 5:  Destruction
(very heavy structural damage)
Collapse of ground floor or parts (I.e.   
wings) of buildings.
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Appendix III:  BUILDING CONFIGURATION 
Source:  Sauter and Shah (1978) 
 
 
 
 
 
a)                                b)                            c)
d)                                e)                            f)
a)                                b)                            c)
d)                                 e)                         f)
A) Perfect  Symmetry
B) Asymmetric
Geometry of Floor Plan
B) Irregular
A) Regular
Regularity of Shape in Vertical Plane
a)                                b)                            c)
a)                             b)                                   c)
d)     e)
 
A) Perfect  Symmetry 
B) Asymmetric 
a)                                b)                             c)
d)                                e)                             f)
a)                                b)                             c) 
d)                                  e)                           f)
Distribution of Rigidity
  199
Appendix IV:  DAY/NIGHT CASUALTIES 
 
 
DAY 
Unmodified Scenario A Scenario B Return 
Period Minor Major Deaths Minor Major Deaths Minor Major Deaths 
      1.00     1.96     0.26  0.07 0.00  0.00  0.00   1.96   0.26  0.07 
    11.00     3.98     4.51  1.13 3.98  0.53  0.13   3.98   0.53  0.13 
    29.00     14.85     6.62  1.66 3.98  4.28  1.33  14.85   4.83  1.66 
    64.00   235.27   33.93  8.48 3.98  4.79  4.84  63.41  33.04  8.48 
  137.00   455.70   61.23 15.31 3.98  5.30  8.35 111.97  61.25 15.31 
  227.00 1247.75 166.72 41.68 4.08 17.23  9.58 201.10 150.92 37.73 
  363.00 2039.80 272.21 68.06 4.18 29.16 10.80 290.24 240.58 60.14 
  619.00 2831.86 377.70 94.43 4.27 41.09 12.03 379.37 330.24 82.56 
1007.00 3623.91 483.19 120.80 4.37 53.01 13.25 468.50 419.91 104.98 
 4227.90   70.64   993.38   
 
NIGHT 
Unmodified Scenario A Scenario B Return 
Period Minor Major Deaths Minor Major Deaths Minor Major Deaths 
     1.00 1.67 0.22 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.67 0.22 0.00 
    11.00 3.70 3.53 0.84 3.70 0.50 0.00 3.70 0.50 0.00 
    29.00 12.13 5.96 1.49 3.70 3.63 1.23 12.13 4.45 1.49 
    64.00 206.63 30.00 7.50 3.70 4.29 5.18 76.16 29.24 7.50 
  137.00 401.13 54.03 13.51 3.70 4.94 9.14 140.18 54.03 13.51 
  227.00 1106.66 151.30 37.83 4.08 16.02 9.93 212.00 128.50 32.13 
  363.00 1812.18 248.56 62.14 4.47 27.10 10.72 283.83 202.97 50.75 
  619.00 2517.71 345.83 86.46 4.86 38.18 11.51 355.65 277.44 69.36 
1007.00 3223.23 443.10 110.78 5.25 49.26 12.31 427.47 351.90 87.98 
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Appendix V:  DAMAGE BY PROBABILITY SCENARIO 
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Appendix VI:  CALCULATION OF HUMAN CAPITAL  
 
 
Increase in Human Capital Over Time at Various Rates of Inflation 
 
 
 
 
Based on: 
 
• Average population age of 27 (Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Censos 2001),  
• Retirement at 65,  
• Life expectancy of 77 (Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Censos 2001),  
• Monthly income of 442 US$ (Ministerio de Planificación y Política Económica 2002),  
• Pension of 80% of last salary. 
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Summary  
 
Natural hazards pose a threat to population, its goods and the environment.  Urban areas 
are particularly vulnerable not only because of the concentration of population but due to the 
interplay that exists between people, buildings, and technological systems.  Disasters have 
the potential to destroy decades of investment and effort, and cause the deviation of 
resources intended for primary tasks such as education, health and infrastructure.  Disaster 
management is therefore an important component of urban planning and management as 
disasters pose a serious threat to sustainable development.     
 
There are basically three very important weaknesses in the way disaster management is 
currently being carried out.  The first relates to the reliance upon hazard zonations alone 
rather than using risk as input for the selection and prioritisation of mitigation strategies.  
This is unfortunately in part due to the lack of empirical-historical data on damage and due to 
the high costs of generating and updating building inventories.  The second relates to the 
reliance upon response rather than a concerted effort in both the pre-disaster and the post-
disaster phases.  The last relates to the lack of disaster information networks which co-
ordinate efforts amongst the many institutions involved.  
 
The case of the Costa Rican city of Cartago was chosen as an example of the challenges 
that lie ahead in terms of geo-information for urban disaster management.  The city provides 
an interesting case study; it represents a typical example of a medium-sized Costa Rican 
city that is located in a highly hazard-prone area.  Cartago is also representative of a 
financially constrained local government authority with very basic baseline information where 
plans are elaborated without proper disaster-related information inputs.   
 
The research addresses building and population risk by integrating a hazard intensity map, 
damage curves derived from historical damage records and a building inventory.  Building 
damage is classified into several classes for the purpose of assessing the extent of the 
rehabilitation and reconstruction works.  In terms of emergency planning, the damage types 
are also thought to be useful for estimating the number of people in need of temporary 
accommodation and the likely duration of their displacement.  Population risk is considered a 
function of building damage class.  Population risk is classified in three injury levels to 
assess the capacity of the local health services and identify any need for pooling resources 
from a wider region.  This therefore highlights the regional dimension of disaster 
management.  Probability estimates were used as tool to standardize the various seismic 
risk scenarios for the purpose of carrying out a cost-benefit analysis.  In the case of cities 
subject to different types of natural hazards, a multi-hazard probability-based approach to 
disaster management is the key for identifying which risk should be mitigated.  
 
The precision and accuracy of input maps plays a role in the application of the output maps.  
Combining large-scale maps of elements at risk with small-scale hazard zonations has 
  206
obvious weaknesses from the point of view of precision, and it therefore implies that 
aggregation to higher spatial units (i.e. census tract, district level) is necessary to keep the 
uncertainties under control.  Micro hazard zonations are therefore a pre-requisite for urban 
disaster management.  From an accuracy point of view, the literature review indicated that 
zonations ought to be calibrated according to the local soil and topography as these can 
amplify or reduce ground motion considerably.  The case study has highlighted the problems 
caused by a weak earthquake catalogue.  In Costa Rica, a single earthquake has 
dramatically re-shaped the seismic code’s zoning map which dictates minimum standards for 
1 and 2 storey residential buildings.  Unfortunately, this is possibly the weakest link as new 
earthquakes can be built into the catalogue but there is no way to expand the catalogue 
backwards.   
 
Population density scenarios should be developed to account for mobility throughout the day 
and during the weekends.  If these scenarios are made available to emergency planners, 
more lives can be saved as rescue personnel can be directly sent to areas where higher 
casualties are expected, rather than waiting for the public to ask for help through 
communications means which might be overloaded or out of order.  A survey was conducted 
to identify criteria that influenced mobility in Cartago.  A day population density model was 
designed on the basis of census data and a land-use map. 
 
For the estimation of financial losses, a model was designed to calculate the lost human 
earning capacity for three classes of injuries.   The building risk was calculated simply on the 
basis of a flat value per square meter of new construction.  However, a threshold was set 
above which, the buildings are regarded as being in need of demolition.  For these buildings, 
the risk is calculated at 100% of replacement cost. 
 
The data capture methodology hereby developed consists of three main phases:  initial 
classification of the building stock, mission planning and data capture.  The initial 
classification of the building stock is carried out based on emergency response 
considerations.  This classification allows the application of different survey methods to each 
group, thus maximising existing financial and human resources.  It is dependent, however, 
upon a detailed land use map.  This research addressed the data capture that applies to 
those buildings which are not considered to be key for emergency response.  The data 
capture method constitutes an off-the-shelf low-cost and rapid method involving the 
combination of digital video (DV), remote sensing (RS) and global positioning systems 
(GPS) for the data capture phase and the use of a geographic information system (GIS) for 
the processing and display phases.  Remote Sensing is used to identify homogeneous 
areas, thus reducing the extent of the interpretation effort without hampering the accuracy of 
the overall results.  By resetting the clock information of the DV to match that of the GPS, 
still images of known location can be produced and input into a GIS for further analysis and 
manipulation.  In the case of seismic building vulnerability, for example, relevant attributes 
that can be extracted from the image include building material/structural type, number of 
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stories, level of maintenance and age of construction.  This video offers a great advantage in 
the sense that it is multi-functional since the classification and other interpretation issues can 
be decided a posteriori.  
 
An analysis of Costa Rican legal framework identified few gaps in terms of planning 
regulations, building codes and liability.  Although efforts could be made to raise compliance 
with building codes, this is not considered to be as acute a problem as in other countries.   
The biggest challenge identified relates to data production, interoperability and barriers on 
data sharing.  These problems could be tackled within the framework of a national disaster 
information network, which would co-ordinate efforts to avoid duplication, issue standards, 
make proper diffusion of available data and information products and serve as portal for the 
exchange of views.  This network should be linked to a wider national spatial data 
infrastructure. 
 
Two basic disaster management measures were proposed on the basis of the case study 
findings.  The first relates to a zonation map for future growth while the second one relates to 
the cost-benefit analysis of two re-development scenarios.   The strategy therefore consists 
of sustained efforts on both the prevention and the reduction fronts.  Regarding the 
development zonation, a mechanism was proposed by making use of the hazard zonation in 
combination with the damage curves.   It is thought that by imposing different construction 
permit and property tax rates, development in some areas may be deterred as this system 
affects both the developer and the owner.  Two re-development scenarios were developed; 
the first one consisted of the demolition of all mud-brick and un-reinforced masonry as well 
as the bracing of all reinforced concrete frames lacking proper seismic design.  The second 
scenario consisted of only the bracing of the concrete frame buildings.  A cost-benefit 
analysis was conducted to identify the ratios and conclusion was that the more humble 
option of only bracing the reinforced concrete frames would probably be the favoured option 
by decision-makers as its cost benefit ratio was lower.  The change of use of buildings was 
also identified as a low-cost vulnerability reduction mechanism worth exploring, although its 
cost-benefit ratio was not developed due to time and data constraints.   
 
One very important finding of the risk assessment was the large margin by which building 
risk outweighed population risk.  If government policy were to give priority to life over 
property, a weighting system would have to be incorporated into the cost-benefit analysis.  
 
The greatest strength of GIS proved to be its ability to handle the “what if” type of scenarios.  
Converting the original forecast into a scenario that, for example, illustrated “what if all 
reinforced concrete frames without proper seismic design are braced?” was carried out in 
very little time.  This characteristic is probably most useful in emergency response and can 
therefore contribute to minimize human and property losses. 
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Samenvatting 
 
Natuurrampen vormen een bedreiging voor bevolking, eigendommen en milieu. Stedelijke 
gebieden zijn bijzonder kwetsbaar, niet alleen vanwege de bevolkingsconcentratie aldaar 
maar ook door de wisselwerking tussen bevolking, gebouwen en technologische systemen. 
Rampen kunnen tientallen jaren van investeringen en inspanningen teniet doen, en maken 
dat middelen bedoeld voor primaire taken zoals onderwijs, gezondheidszorg en 
infrastructuur elders moeten worden ingezet. Rampenpreventieplanning is daarom een 
belangrijke component van stedelijke planning en bestuur want rampen zijn een serieuze 
bedreiging voor duurzame ontwikkeling. 
 
Er zijn in wezen drie zwakke punten aan te wijzen die een belangrijke rol spelen in de 
manier waarop thans de rampenpreventieplanning wordt uitgevoerd. Het eerste betreft het 
vertrouwen op uitsluitend risicozonering in plaats van het gebruiken van risicogegevens als 
basis voor selectie en prioriteitenstelling van preventiestrategieën. Dit komt ongelukkigerwijs 
gedeeltelijk voort uit het gebrek aan empirisch-historische gegevens over geleden schade en 
gedeeltelijk uit de hoge kosten voor het opbouwen en bijhouden van gegevens over de 
bebouwing. Het tweede betreft het vertrouwen op maatregelen na een ramp in plaats van 
een systematische aanpak in zowel de fase voor als na de ramp. Het laatste zwakke punt 
betreft het ontbreken van rampeninformatienetwerken die de inspanningen van de vele 
betrokken instellingen zouden kunnen coördineren. 
 
De stad Cartago in Costa Rica werd gekozen als voorbeeld van de uitdagingen die op 
bestuurders afkomen in termen van geo-informatie voor stedelijke rampenpreventieplanning. 
De stad vormt een interessant onderzoeksobject; het is een typisch voorbeeld van een 
middelgrote Costa-Ricaanse stad in een gebied waar de kans op een natuurramp groot is. 
Cartago is ook representatief waar het een lokaal bestuur met beperkte financiële middelen 
en minimale informatiebronnen betreft dat plannen voor rampenpreventie moet uitwerken 
zonder over de nodige relevante gegevens te beschikken  
 
Het onderzoek richt zich op risico's voor gebouwen en bevolking door het integreren van een 
natuurrampenintensiteitskaart, schadegrafieken die afgeleid zijn uit historische 
schaderapporten, en een gebouweninventarisatie. Schade aan gebouwen is geclassificeerd 
om de omvang van herstel- of nieuwbouwwerkzaamheden te kunnen vaststellen. Deze 
schadeklassen worden ook nuttig geacht voor de planning in noodsituaties om in te schatten 
hoeveel mensen tijdelijk onderdak nodig zullen hebben en hoelang hun evacuatie zal duren. 
Het risico voor de bevolking wordt beschouwd als een functie van de schadeclassificatie. 
Het bevolkingsrisico is onderverdeeld in drie letselniveaus om de capaciteit van de lokale 
gezondheidsdiensten te beoordelen en voorbereid te zijn op de noodzaak om eventueel 
hulpverleningsdiensten uit een groter gebied in te schakelen. Hiermee wordt de aandacht 
gevestigd op de regionale dimensie van rampenpreventieplanning. Met behulp van 
waarschijnlijkheidsschattingen zijn de verschillende seismische risicoscenario's 
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gestandaardiseerd om kosten-baten-analyses uit te kunnen voeren. Wanneer een stad 
blootgesteld is aan het risico op uiteenlopende natuurrampen dient een multirisico 
waarschijnlijkheidsberekening om aan te geven welke risico's verminderd moeten worden. 
 
De juistheid en nauwkeurigheid van de invoerkaarten spelen een rol bij de toepassing van 
de uitvoerkaarten. Het combineren van grootschalige kaarten van risico-elementen met 
kleinschalige kaarten van zones met een verhoogd risico op natuurrampen schiet duidelijk 
tekort op het punt van precisie, en dat impliceert dat aggregatie naar grotere ruimtelijke 
eenheden (bijvoorbeeld volkstellingsgebieden, districten) noodzakelijk is om de 
onzekerheden te beperken. Voor stedelijke rampenpreventieplanning is daarom micro-
zonering van het risico op een natuurramp een vereiste. Uit literatuuronderzoek blijkt dat uit 
een oogpunt van nauwkeurigheid de zonering aangepast moet worden met locale informatie 
over bodemgesteldheid en topografie aangezien door deze factoren de bodembewegingen 
aanzienlijk vergroot of verkleind kunnen worden. De casestudie legt de nadruk op de 
problemen veroorzaakt door een zwakke aardbevingcatalogus. In Costa Rica heeft één 
enkele aardbeving de seismische zoneringskaart met minimum-eisen voor woongebouwen 
met 1 of 2 verdiepingen dramatisch veranderd. Helaas is dit wellicht de zwakste schakel: 
weliswaar kunnen nieuwe aardbevingen aan de catalogus toegevoegd worden, maar er 
bestaat geen manier om de catalogus naar het verleden toe uit te breiden. 
 
Er moeten scenario's voor het meten van de bevolkingsdichtheid ontwikkeld worden die de 
mobiliteit gedurende de dag en het weekend laten zien. Als zulke scenario's aan 
rampenpreventieplanners ter beschikking staan kunnen meer levens gered worden. 
Hulpverleners kunnen meteen naar die gebieden gestuurd worden waar de meeste 
slachtoffers verwacht worden in plaats van te blijven wachten op verzoeken om hulp via 
communicatiemiddelen die mogelijkerwijs overbelast of buiten werking zijn. In Cartago werd 
een onderzoek uitgevoerd om criteria te vinden die van invloed zijn op de mobiliteit. Er werd 
een model voor de dagelijkse bevolkingsdichtheid ontworpen op basis van 
volkstellingsgegevens en een grondgebruikskaart. 
 
Om de financiële schade te kunnen schatten werd een model ontworpen om het verlies aan 
verdiensten van de bevolking te berekenen voor drie klassen van verwondingen. Het risico 
voor gebouwen werd eenvoudig berekend op basis van een vast bedrag per vierkante meter 
voor de kosten van nieuwbouw. Daarbij is een drempel vastgesteld; bij overschrijding 
daarvan werd aangenomen dat het gebouw afgebroken moet worden. Voor die gebouwen 
werd het risico berekend op basis van de kosten voor volledige nieuwbouw. 
 
De methodologie voor de gegevensverzameling die hierbij ontwikkeld werd bestaat uit drie 
fasen: een eerste classificatie van de aanwezige gebouwen, planning van het veldwerk en 
het verzamelen van de gegevens. De aanvankelijke classificatie van de aanwezige 
gebouwen is gebaseerd op overwegingen die de maatregelen in een noodsituatie 
beïnvloeden. Deze classificatie maakt het mogelijk verschillende onderzoeksmethoden te 
  210
gebruiken voor elke groep om zo het gebruik van de aanwezige menselijk en financiële 
middelen te maximaliseren. Maar dit is wel afhankelijk van de beschikbaarheid van een 
gedetailleerde grondgebruikskaart. Dit onderzoek richtte zich op het verzamelen van 
gegevens voor die gebouwen die niet geacht worden een sleutelrol te spelen bij noodhulp 
(voor gebouwen die wel een sleutelrol spelen wordt door teams van bouwkundig ingenieurs 
uitgebreid onderzoek gedaan en wiskundige analyses uitgevoerd). De methode is 
toegankelijk, goedkoop en snel door een combinatie van digitale video (DV), remote sensing 
(RS) en het global positioning system (GPS) voor de verzameling van de gegevens, en het 
gebruik van geografische informatie systemen (GIS) voor het verwerken en presenteren van 
de gegevens. Remote sensing werd gebruikt om homogene gebieden te identificeren. Op 
die manier wordt de omvang van het interpretatiewerk beperkt zonder de nauwkeurigheid 
van het uiteindelijk resultaat te verminderen. Door de klok van de DV te synchroniseren met 
die van de GPS kunnen (stilstaande) beelden verkregen worden met bekende locatie. De 
informatie van die beelden kan ingevoerd worden in een GIS voor verdere analyse en 
bewerking. Als een gebouw aardbevingsgevoelig is bijvoorbeeld kunnen relevante attributen 
uit het beeld gehaald worden zoals bouwmateriaal, bouwtechniek, aantal verdiepingen, 
onderhoudstoestand en ouderdom. Deze video heeft grote voordelen in die zin dat hij multi-
functioneel is omdat over de classificatie en andere interpretatieve overwegingen a posteriori 
een besluit kan worden genomen. 
 
Een analyse van het Costa-Ricaanse wettelijke kader bracht weinig leemtes aan het licht 
met betrekking tot planningregels, bouwvoorschriften en verantwoordelijkheden. Hoewel het 
nog mogelijk is ernaar te streven naleving van de bouwvoorschriften te verbeteren, wordt dit 
niet als een zo dringend probleem beschouwd als in andere landen. Gevonden werd dat de 
grootste uitdagingen liggen in het verzamelen van gegevens, de uitwisselbaarheid van 
gegevens en de belemmeringen voor het gezamenlijk gebruik ervan. Deze problemen 
zouden kunnen worden aangepakt binnen het kader van een nationaal informatienetwerk 
voor natuurrampen dat pogingen zou coördineren om dubbel werk te voorkomen, 
standaarden zou bepalen, een goede verspreiding van de beschikbare gegevens en 
informatieproducten zou bewerkstelligen, en zou dienen voor de uitwisseling van 
standpunten. Dit netwerk zou gekoppeld moeten zijn aan een bredere nationale 
infrastructuur voor ruimtelijke gegevens. 
 
Op basis van de bevindingen van deze casestudie zijn voorstellen gedaan voor twee 
fundamentele maatregelen met betrekking tot rampenbestrijding. Het eerste voorstel betreft 
een zoneringskaart voor toekomstige groei en het tweede betreft de kosten-baten-analyse 
van twee scenario's voor de wederopbouw. De strategie houdt dus doorlopende 
inspanningen in zowel op het preventie- als op het kostenverminderings-front. Wat betreft de 
zonering voor toekomstige groei werd een werkwijze voorgesteld die gebruik maakt van 
risicozonering in combinatie met schadegrafieken. Er wordt verondersteld dat door het 
instellen van verschillende bouwvergunningen en tarieven van onroerendgoedbelasting de 
ontwikkeling in sommige gebieden kan worden afgeschrikt omdat dit systeem zowel 
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uitwerking heeft op de ontwikkelaar als op de eigenaar. Twee scenario's voor 
herontwikkeling werden ontworpen; de eerste betreft de afbraak van alle gebouwen 
bestaande uit leemblokken en ongewapend metselwerk, en de versterking van alle 
gebouwen van gewapend beton die niet aardbevingsbestendig zijn. Het tweede scenario 
behelsde uitsluitend de versterking van gebouwen van gewapend beton. Een kosten-baten-
analyse werd uitgevoerd om de ratio's te bepalen. De conclusie was dat de meer 
bescheiden optie van alleen versterking van de gebouwen van gewapend beton 
waarschijnlijk de voorkeur van de beleidsambtenaren zou hebben omdat de kosten-
batenverhouding gunstiger was. Verandering van het gebruik van gebouwen werd ook als 
een mogelijkheid gezien om tegen lage kosten de kwetsbaarheid te verminderen. Hoewel dit 
een onderzoek waard is, kon daarvoor niet de kosten-baten-analyse ontwikkeld worden door 
gebrek aan tijd en gegevens. 
 
Een zeer belangrijke uitkomst van de risico-beoordeling was dat het risico voor de 
bebouwing zeer veel groter is dan het risico voor de bevolking. Als het overheidsbeleid een 
hogere prioriteit zou geven aan leven dan aan bezit dan zouden nog wegingsfactoren aan 
de kosten-baten-analyse moeten worden toegevoegd. 
 
De grootste kracht van GIS bleek de mogelijkheid die het systeem biedt om scenario's van 
het type "wat als" te hanteren. De omzetting van de oorspronkelijke voorspelling in een 
scenario dat bijvoorbeeld verduidelijkt "wat als alle gebouwen van gewapend beton die niet 
ontworpen zijn met het oog op aardbevingen zouden worden versterkt?" kostte bijzonder 
weinig tijd. Deze eigenschap is waarschijnlijk uiterst nuttig tijdens hulpverlening na rampen 
en kan er daarom aan bijdragen het verlies van levens en eigendommen te verminderen. 
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Resumen  
 
Los fenómenos naturales constituyen una amenaza para la población, sus propiedades y 
para el medio ambiente.  Las zonas urbanas son particularmente vulnerables no sólo por la 
concentración de población sino por la interacción entre población, edificios y sistemas 
tecnológicos.  Los desastres son capaces de destruir décadas de inversión y esfuerzo así 
como de causar el desvío recursos originalmente destinados a obras primarias tales como 
la educación, la salud y otras obras de infraestructura.  Por lo tanto, la gestión de desastres 
es un componente importante de la planificación y gestión urbana ya que los desastres 
constituyen una amenaza seria al desarrollo sostenible. 
 
Existen básicamente tres deficiencias importantes en la forma en que se lleva a cabo el 
manejo de desastres.  La primera se refiere al uso de las zonificaciones de amenaza en 
lugar de la utilización del riesgo como insumo para la selección y categorización de 
estrategias de mitigación.  Desgraciadamente, esto ocurre en parte por la carencia de datos 
empírico-históricos sobre daños, así como por los costos elevados de la producción de los 
inventarios de edificaciones.  La segunda se refiere a la utilización de la respuesta como 
mecanismo de gestión en lugar de esfuerzos conjuntos tanto en la fase pre-desastre como 
en la post-desastre.  La última se refiere a la carencia de redes de información sobre 
desastres que coordinen los esfuerzos de las muchas instituciones involucradas. 
 
El caso de la ciudad costarricense de Cartago fue escogido como un ejemplo de los retos a 
futuro en términos de información geográfica para manejo de desastres urbanos.  La ciudad 
ofrece un caso de estudio interesante ya que representa un ejemplo típico de una ciudad 
costarricense de mediano tamaño localizada en un terreno de amenaza alta.  Cartago es 
también representativa de un gobierno local con limitaciones económicas, el cual cuenta 
con muy poca información básica y en donde los planes se elaboran sin insumos 
adecuados en el campo de la información sobre desastres. 
 
La investigación aborda el riesgo de edificios y de la población integrando un mapa de 
intensidad de amenaza, curvas de daños derivadas de registros históricos y un inventario de 
elementos en riesgo.  El daño a edificaciones se clasifica en varias categorías con el 
propósito de evaluar la magnitud de las obras necesarias de rehabilitación y reconstrucción.  
Con relación a la gestión de emergencia, se considera que esta clasificación de daños es 
útil para estimar el número de personas que estarían necesitadas de alojamiento provisional 
así como la duración del mismo.  El riesgo de la población se considera en función a la 
clase de daño del edificio.  El riesgo de la población se clasifica en tres tipos con el objetivo 
de evaluar la capacidad de los servicios médicos locales e identificar si hubiera necesidad 
de solicitar recursos externos, lo cual pone de manifiesto la dimensión regional del manejo 
de desastres.  Se utilizaron datos sobre probabilidad como herramienta para estandarizar 
los varios escenarios de riesgo sísmico con el propósito de llevar a cabo un estudio de 
costo-beneficio.  En el caso de ciudades sujetas a diferentes tipos de amenazas naturales, 
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el manejo de desastres debe hacerse bajo un enfoque de amenazas múltiples basado en 
probabilidad con el fin de identificar el riesgo más problemático. 
 
La precisión y exactitud de los mapas de entrada dicta la aplicación que puedan tener los 
mapas de salida.  La combinación de mapas de elementos en riesgo de escala grande con 
mapas de zonificación de amenaza de escala pequeña presenta desventajas obvias desde 
el punto de vista de precisión.  Esto lleva a la necesidad de agregar hacia unidades 
espaciales más grandes (p.e. segmento censal, distrito) para mantener los niveles de 
incertidumbre bajo control.  Por lo tanto, las micro-zonificaciones de amenaza son un pre-
requisito para la gestión de desastres en el campo urbano.  Con relación a la exactitud, la 
revisión bibliográfica ha indicado que las zonificaciones deben calibrarse con base en los 
suelos y topografía locales ya que estos amplifican o reducen considerablemente el 
movimiento sísmico.  El caso de estudio ha ilustrado los problemas ocasionados por un 
catálogo sísmico limitado.  En Costa Rica, un solo terremoto cambió dramáticamente el 
contenido del mapa de zonificación sísmica utilizado por el código, el cual define los 
estándares mínimos para viviendas de 1 y 2 pisos.  Desgraciadamente, esto es 
posiblemente el mayor problema en el campo de la evaluación de riesgos ya que los 
terremotos nuevos pueden incorporarse al catálogo pero no hay forma de expandir este 
catálogo hacia el pasado. 
 
Los escenarios de densidad de población deben ser desarrollados tomando en cuenta la 
movilidad a través del día y durante los fines de semana.  Si los oficiales de servicios de 
emergencia contaran con estos escenarios, se podrían salvar más vidas ya que los equipos 
de emergencia podrían enviarse directamente al campo, sin tener que esperar reportes por 
medios de comunicación que, de todas formas, estarían posiblemente fuera de servicio o 
saturados.  Se llevó a cabo una serie de entrevistas para identificar los parámetros que 
influyen la movilidad en Cartago y un modelo de densidad de población diurna fue 
desarrollado basándose en datos del censo y un mapa de usos del suelo urbano. 
 
Un modelo de pérdida de capacidad de ahorro fue diseñado para la estimación de las 
pérdidas económicas por concepto de muertos y heridos.  El riesgo de las edificaciones fue 
calculado simplemente con base en un valor único por metro cuadrado de construcción.  Sin 
embargo, un umbral fue establecido sobre el cual, las edificaciones tendrán que ser 
demolidas.  En estos casos, el riesgo se considera como 100% del valor de reposición. 
 
La metodología de captura de datos desarrollada como parte de esta investigación consiste 
en tres fases:  la clasificación inicial de las edificaciones, la preparación de la captura y la 
captura misma.  La clasificación inicial se llevó a cabo bajo el criterio de respuesta a las 
emergencias y por ende se puede llevar a cabo con base en un mapa detallado de uso de 
suelos.  Esta clasificación permite aplicar métodos diferentes de captura para maximizar los 
recursos humanos y económicos.  Esta investigación se centra en la captura de datos de 
aquellos edificios que no tienen importancia para labores de emergencia.  El método de 
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captura de datos es de bajo costo y consiste en el uso del video digital, la teledetección y 
los sistemas de posicionamiento global (GPS) para la etapa de captura y el sistema de 
información geográfica (SIG) para el procesamiento y visualización.  La teledetección fue 
usada para identificar áreas homogéneas, reduciendo la magnitud de la labor de 
interpretación sin comprometer la exactitud de los resultados globales.  Se crearon 
imágenes estáticas de localización conocida sincronizando el reloj del video digital con 
respecto al del GPS.  Una vez capturadas como imágenes individuales, la interpretación de 
estas imágenes provee atributos tales como: sistema constructivo y material, número de 
pisos, nivel de mantenimiento y edad aproximada.  Este video ofrece una gran ventaja en el 
sentido de su multi-funcionalidad ya que la clasificación y otros aspectos de interpretación 
pueden decidirse a posteriori. 
 
El análisis del marco legal de Costa Rica identificó pocos problemas en torno a las 
regulaciones, códigos y responsabilidad civil.  Aunque la conformidad con los códigos 
podría mejorarse, no se considera como un problema serio si se compara con la situación 
en otros países del área.  Sin embargo, los problemas que se identificaron como de 
inmediata atención son la producción de datos, su interoperabilidad y las barreras que 
limitan su acceso.  Estos problemas pueden combatirse dentro del marco de una red 
nacional de información sobre desastres, la cual coordinaría los esfuerzos para evitar 
duplicidad en la producción de datos, establecería estándares, haría la difusión de los 
productos existentes y actuaría como portal para el intercambio de ideas.  Esta red debería 
esta ligada a una red superior, una infrastructura nacional de datos espaciales. 
 
Dos medidas de manejo de desastre fueron propuestas con base en los resultados del caso 
de estudio.  La primera se refiere a un mapa de zonificación para expansión urbana 
mientras que la segunda se refiere al análisis costo-beneficio de dos escenarios de 
reducción de daños.  La estrategia por lo tanto consiste en esfuerzos sostenidos tanto en el 
campo de la prevención como de la reducción.  Con respecto a la zonificación para futura 
expansión, se propuso el uso de la zonificación de amenazas junto con las curvas de daños, 
en otras palabras, el riesgo específico. Se consideró que al imponer diferentes tasas tanto 
para los permisos de construcción como para los impuestos anuales a la propiedad 
inmueble, se estaría desalentando tanto al desarrollador como al dueño.  Dos escenarios de 
reducción fueron diseñados; el primero consiste en la demolición y reconstrucción de los 
edificios de adobe y mampostería no confinada así como el refuerzo de los edificios de 
concreto reforzado de tipo marco dúctil carentes de diseño sísmico adecuado (por medio de 
estructuras de metal en forma de equis).  El segundo escenario consiste únicamente en el 
refuerzo de las estructuras de marco dúctil descritas anteriormente por el método antes 
mencionado.  Un análisis de costo-beneficio fue llevado a cabo para estimar las relaciones.  
Se concluyó que el escenario más “humilde” que involucra a los marcos dúctiles únicamente 
sería probablemente la opción favorecida por aquellos a cargo de la toma de decisiones ya 
que la relación es más baja.  El cambio en el uso de los edificios también fue identificado 
como una opción de reducción de vulnerabilidad que debería ser considerada, sin embargo, 
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la relación costo-beneficio no fue calculada debido al tiempo disponible y a limitaciones con 
respecto a los datos. 
 
Un hallazgo importante del caso de estudio fue el grado mínimo que el riesgo por muertes y 
heridos representa en el riesgo total.  Esto significa que si la política gubernamental da 
prioridad a la vida humana, un sistema de pesos debería ser incorporado en el análisis de 
costo beneficio.   
 
De la presente investigación se desprende que la mayor ventaja del SIG radica en su 
habilidad para manejar los escenarios “que ocurre si”.  La conversión del pronóstico original 
en uno escenario que, por ejemplo, ilustra “que ocurre si todos los edificios de concreto 
reforzado de marco dúctil que carecen de diseño sismo-resistente fueran reforzados?” fue 
llevada a cabo muy rápidamente.  Esta característica es probablemente de mayor utilidad 
en la respuesta a emergencias y puede por lo tanto minimizar la pérdida de vidas y 
propiedad. 
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